JOHN HENRY MCARTHUR, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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John Henry McArthur appealed his conviction for assault, claiming the trial court violated his right to a speedy trial by exceeding the 180-day rule. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that McArthur's right to a speedy trial was waived when his first attorney requested a continuance, regardless of whether McArthur consented.
The trial court properly denied the motions because McArthur's right to a speedy trial was waived when his first attorney requested the continuance. An attorney's acts bind the client even if done without consulting him or against his wishes, and the principle is well established that requesting a continuance constitutes a waiver of the speedy trial right.
[1] A defendant's right to a speedy trial is waived when the defendant or their attorney requests a continuance.
[2] The actions of an attorney on behalf of a client are binding on the client, even if taken without the client's consultation or against the client's wishes.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The right to a speedy trial is waived when the defendant or his attorney requests a continuance.”
Establishes the core legal principle that the speedy trial right is waived by continuance requests from either the defendant or his counsel.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMcArthur was taken into custody on February 20, 1973, and brought to trial on November 14, 1973—more than 180 days later. The trial was originally sch…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, defendant in the trial court, seeks review of his conviction and sentence to sixty days in the Dade County Stockade for assault.
Appellant’s sole point on appeal is that the trial court erred in failing to discharge him because of a violation of Rule 3.191 CrPr, 33 F.S.A., in that more than one hundred eighty (180) days had elapsed between February 20, 1973, when he was taken into custody, and November 14, 1973, when he was brought to trial. Appellant bases this contention on the fact that his trial was continued at the request of his first attorney, on the ground that said attorney would be on vacation on the trial date. Appellant urges that he neither knew about nor consented to this continuance.
Shortly thereafter, defendant’s second attorney, who also withdrew, filed a motion to dismiss for violation of Rule 3.191, CrPr, 33 F.S.A., stating as grounds, that defendant was ready and willing to proceed and that he was without knowledge of and did not approve, the continuance. This motion was denied and defendant’s third attorney filed a motion to discharge under the same rule, alleging the same grounds, which motion was also denied.
Denial of defendant’s motions to dismiss and to discharge for want of speedy trial was proper. A timely trial, as originally scheduled was continued on motion of the defendant’s (first) attorney, following which trial was had within a reasonable time. The principle is well established that thé right to a speedy trial is waived when the defendant or his attorney requests a continuance. See State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen, Fla.1971, 253 So. 2d 861; Atkins v. State, Fla.App.1972, 265 So. 2d 72; Llano v. State, Fla.App.1972, 271 So. 2d 34; Collie v. State, Fla.App.1972, 267 So. 2d 382.
We cannot accept the appellant’s argument that because the continuance was obtained without his knowledge, consent or approval, it would not operate as an effective waiver. The acts of an attorney “ . . . will be binding on the client even though done without consulting him and even against his wishes.” State v. Earnest, Fla.App. 1972, 265 So. 2d 397, 400. See also Griffith v. Investment Co., Fla. 1926, 92 Fla. 781, 110 So. 271.
For the reasons hereinabove set forth, it is our view that the trial court was correct in not discharging the appellant for failure to bring him to trial within the 180 days.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- State of Fla. ex rel. Isaac Don Butler & Gerald Nickles v. Honorable Ralph O. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1971)
- State v. Earnest, 265 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- Griffith v. Inv. Co., 92 Fla. 781 (Fla. 1926)
- Llano v. State, 271 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Atkins v. State, 265 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Ellene B. Resmondo v. Int'l Builders OF Fla., Inc., 265 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- Collie v. State, 267 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)