ROBERT YOUNG, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Robert Young appealed the revocation of his probation for unlawful marijuana possession, challenging the procedural timeliness of the violation affidavit and the admissibility of hearsay evidence. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed the revocation, holding that speedy trial rules do not apply to probation revocation proceedings and that the direct evidence of violations was sufficient regardless of hearsay in the exhibits.
Speedy trial rules do not apply by their terms to probation revocation proceedings, and neither the spirit of the rule nor due process requirements were violated by the delay. The hearsay exhibits were not sufficient to overturn the trial judge's findings where direct evidence clearly established the probation violations.
[1] A speedy trial rule does not by its terms apply to a proceeding to revoke probation.
[2] A delay between an alleged probation violation and the filing of a violation affidavit does not violate due process if the spirit of speedy trial rules and due process re…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We hold that neither the spirit of the rule nor the requirement for due process upon charges of a violation of parole were shown to have been violated in this case.”
Court's holding that speedy trial rule protections do not apply to probation revocation proceedings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceYoung pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of marijuana and was placed on probation without adjudication of guilt. An affidavit alleging probation vi…
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PER CURIAM.
This is. an appeal from a revocation of probation. The appellant pleaded guilty to the charge of unlawful possession of marijuana. After having been placed upon probation without adjudication of guilt, an affidavit alleging several violations of the conditions of his probation was filed. After hearing, he was found by the sentencing judge to have violated two of the conditions, (d) and (f), of the order placing him on probation. They are: “(d) Avoid injurious or vicious habits; avoid association with persons of harmful character or bad reputation” and “(f) Neither carry nor own any weapons without first securing the consent of Probation Supervisor.”
Appellant first urges that he was entitled to discharge under the speedy trial rule 3.191(a)(1), CrPR, because the Affidavit of Violation of Probation was filed December 14, 1973, and the term of probation expired January 20, 1974. The Motion to Discharge was filed January 23, 1974.
Appellant argued before the trial court that the delay of 126 days between the date of the alleged probation violation and the formal filing of the probation violation affidavit denied the defendant due process and violated the spirit of rule 3.-191(a)(1), CrPR.
The trial court correctly denied the motion.
We note that appellant does not urge that the rule was violated since the rule does not by its terms apply to a proceeding to revoke probation.
We hold that neither the spirit of the rule nor the requirement for due process upon charges of a violation of parole were shown to have been violated in this case. See Bernhardt v. State, Fla.1974, 288 So. 2d 490.
Appellant’s second point claims that the affidavit of violation of probation and attached exhibits were so replete with hearsay as to be prejudicial to the defendant and deny him a fair hearing. The affidavit and exhibits went far beyond the necessary allegations of such a document. At a trial, the introduction of such evidence would have been prejudicial. But we deal here with a sentencing function not a trial. See Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682, 32 So. 2d 607 (1947); Blackburn v. State, Fla.App. 1972, 261 So. 2d 861. Direct evidence is full and complete to show that the appellant was arrested during the term of his probation. He was found in an automobile with another person shown to be a convicted felon. In the car were loaded shotguns and a face mask.
The evidence clearly-supported the court’s finding that the appellant had violated both conditions (d) and (f) set forth above. Under these conditions, the hearsay exhibits were not sufficient to avoid the finding of the trial judge.
Appellant’s point addressed to the sufficiency of the evidence at the hearing does not present error for the reasons discussed above.
Affirmed.
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Ursula H. Smith v. Telophase Nat'l Cremation Soc'y, Inc., 471 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)…court held that the trial court, absent a finding that the evidence was insufficient to support liability, erred in ordering a new trial on the issue of liability and damages when the only error was in regard to the damages. See also Young v. State, 305 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). A different rule, of course, prevails where there is such an insufficiency of the evidence as to cause it to be proper to grant a new trial, and the insufficient evidence is so closely intertwined with the dual issue of liabilit…
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State v. Jones, 425 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…concur. . The trial judge in this proceeding also heard and ruled on the probation revocation charge. . A probation revocation hearing is a sentencing function, not a trial. Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682, 32 So. 2d 607 (1947); Young v. State, 305 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1974), cert. den. 317 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1975); McNeely v. State, 186 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1966). Jeopardy occurs when a person is put upon trial under an indictment or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a convic…
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Fidel Gonzalez v. State, 447 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…la.3d DCA 1981); State v. Kelley, 322 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). There is no claim that the defendant’s constitutional speedy trial rights were violated. The speedy trial rule does not apply to a proceeding to revoke probation. Young v. State, 305 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). A probation revocation hearing is a sentencing function, not a trial. State v. Jones, 425 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). There is therefore no merit to the claim of speedy trial violations involving the revocation of probation.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gideon Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1974)
- Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682 (Fla. 1947)
- Gonzalez v. State, 159 Fla. 681 (Fla. 1947)
- Blackburn v. State, 261 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)