STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
GERALDINE JONES, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1983-01-14
No. AK-110
ERVIN and SHIVERS, JJ., concur.
425 So. 2d 178 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1983) Negative Treatment
Cited by 22 cases

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Synopsis

The State appealed a trial court's dismissal of an aggravated battery charge based on collateral estoppel, arguing that a prior probation revocation hearing had already addressed the same conduct. The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that collateral estoppel does not apply because jeopardy does not attach in probation revocation proceedings, which are sentencing functions rather than criminal trials.


Holding

Collateral estoppel does not apply because jeopardy does not attach in probation revocation proceedings. Since Jones was not placed in jeopardy in the probation revocation hearing, she cannot rely on collateral estoppel to bar the subsequent criminal prosecution.


Headnotes

[1] Collateral estoppel applies against the State only after a defendant has been placed in jeopardy in the first proceeding.

[2] Jeopardy attaches only when a defendant has been subjected to the risks of a determination of guilt.

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Key Quotes

“Collateral estoppel applies against the State only after a defendant is put in jeopardy in the first proceeding.”

Establishes the foundational requirement for collateral estoppel to apply in this context.

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellee Jones was charged with aggravated battery in an information. Previously, an affidavit had charged her with violating her probation by committ…

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Opinion of the Court
LARRY G. SMITH, Judge.

LARRY G. SMITH, Judge.

The State appeals a trial court order granting appellee’s motion to dismiss an information charging appellee with committing an aggravated battery. Appellee’s motion to dismiss alleged that an affidavit charging violation of probation had previously been filed charging, in language identical to that in the instant information, that she had violated her probation by committing the aggravated battery. The motion further recited that at the probation revocation hearing the court heard the testimony of the witnesses, and found that appellee had not violated her probation. The motion alleged that the subsequent criminal prosecution was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

The trial court agreed and dismissed the information.1 We reverse. Collateral estoppel applies against the State only after a defendant is put in jeopardy in the first proceeding. State v. McCord, 402 So. 2d 1147 (Fla.1981); State v. Kling, 335 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976). Jeopardy attaches only when the defendant has been subject to the risks of a determination of guilt. Kling, at 616. Since appel-lee was not placed in jeopardy in the probation revocation hearing,2 she is not entitled to rely on the doctrine of collateral estoppel in the subsequent criminal prosecution.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

ERVIN and SHIVERS, JJ., concur. . The trial judge in this proceeding also heard and ruled on the probation revocation charge.

. A probation revocation hearing is a sentencing function, not a trial. Brill v. State, 159 Fla. 682, 32 So. 2d 607 (1947); Young v. State, 305 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1974), cert. den. 317 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1975); McNeely v. State, 186 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1966).

Jeopardy occurs when a person is put upon trial under an indictment or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction before a court of competent jurisdiction, and a jury has been sworn and charged or the court begins to hear the evidence. See, State v. R.E.F., 251 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971), affm’d 265 So. 2d 701 (Fla.1972).

Since appellee’s probation revocation hearing concerned only her sentence for a prior offense, she may not be said to have been put in jeopardy for the instant offense. Further, the trial judge’s refusal to revoke probation cannot be equated with an adjudication of the criminal charge, since the trial judge is vested with broad discretion to revoke, modify, or continue probation even if the charge is admitted or proved.

Section 948.06, Florida Statutes.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (11 total)

  • Green v. State, 463 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 1985)
    …ner was not subjected to conviction or punishment for his new criminal conduct and, therefore, the double jeopardy clause through the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable. See State v. McCord, 402 So. 2d 1147 (Fla.1981); State v. Jones, 425 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). We note that, in an analogous situation, a prosecution may be instituted even though there is a finding of no probable cause at a preliminary hearing. State v. Hernandez, 217 So. 2d 109 (Fla.1968). Accordingly, for the reasons…
  • Fidel Gonzalez v. State, 447 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)
    …al speedy trial rights were violated. The speedy trial rule does not apply to a proceeding to revoke probation. Young v. State, 305 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). A probation revocation hearing is a sentencing function, not a trial. State v. Jones, 425 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). There is therefore no merit to the claim of speedy trial violations involving the revocation of probation. Affirmed.…
  • Freiheit v. State, 458 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984)
    …property, had violated the condition requiring him to live without violation of any law. The two proceedings are governed by different rules since a probation revocation proceeding is a sentencing function, not a criminal trial. E.g. State v. Jones, 425 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Appellant was convicted of attempted burglary on the burglary charge, and the judgment of conviction of attempted burglary was the evidence used to revoke his probation. The burglary and attempted burglary involved an incident a…

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