WILLIAM MICHAEL LYDEN, PETITIONER,
v.
LOUIE L. WAINWRIGHT, DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF CORRECTIONS, RESPONDENT
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Lyden sought a writ of mandamus against the Director of Corrections to correct his sentence computation. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring recomputation of Lyden's sentence time in accordance with prior binding precedent (Brumit and Voulo), while withholding habeas corpus relief pending the Director's recomputation.
The court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring the Director to recompute Lyden's sentence time according to Brumit and Voulo. The court retained jurisdiction over the petition despite noting that such matters should ordinarily be brought to the Circuit Court for Leon County, because the admitted facts supported grounds for immediate release.
[1] Petitions for writs of mandamus against state officers should ordinarily be filed in the circuit court of the county where the respondent's office is located.
[2] A court may retain jurisdiction over a petition for writ of mandamus and treat it alternatively as a petition for habeas corpus if grounds for either writ appear to exist…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The response of Mr. Wainwright as Director of the Division of Corrections asserts that Brumit and Voulo are clearly erroneous, a proposition which is clearly irrelevant because these decisions are clearly binding.”
Establishes that the Director's challenge to the applicability of binding precedent was without merit
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLyden petitioned for a writ of mandamus against Director Wainwright challenging his sentence computation. The Director admitted the factual allegation…
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MANN, Chief Judge.
This is one of a series of petitions following in the wake of Brumit v. Wain wright, Fla.1973, 290 So. 2d 39, and Voulo v. Wainwright, Fla.1974, 290 So. 2d 58. In other cases we have transferred such petitions to the Circuit Court for Leon County, where the office of respondent Wainwright is located. We do not take the authority of the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus against state officers1 as exclusive. It appears to us that orderly procedure would require that these matters be brought initially to the attention of a Circuit Judge in the appropriate county.
However, under the allegations of this petition which the respondent admits to be correct, Lyden may be entitled to immediate release. Consequently, we retain jurisdiction over this petition for writ of mandamus, treating it alternatively as a petition for habeas corpus, which is plainly within our jurisdiction.2
The response of Mr. Wainwright as Director of the Division of Corrections asserts that Brumit and Voulo are clearly erroneous, a proposition which is clearly irrelevant because these decisions are clearly binding. The response also asserts that jurisdiction lies elsewhere. In the view we take of the matter, since there appears ground for issuance of a writ of ha-beas corpus as well as a peremptory writ of mandamus, we issue the latter as incident to the complete exercise of our jurisdiction.
For the guidance of those who may seek similar relief in the future, it is our judgment that such petitions ought to be filed in the Circuit Court for Leon County.
The peremptory writ of mandamus is hereby issued requiring respondent to recompute the time which the petitioner is required to serve, in accordance with Brumit v. Wainwright and Voulo v. Wainwright, supra. In the interest of orderly procedure, we withhold issuance of the writ of habeas corpus until respondent has had a reasonable opportunity to recompute the time remaining on petitioner’s sentence. A report of such recomputation shall be submitted to this court within seven days of this date.
McNULTY and GRIMES, JJ., concur. . Fla.Const. Art. V, § 2.
. Fla.Const. Art. V, § 4(b) (3).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Taylor v. Louie L. Wainwright, 418 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…e parole release date where, as in the instant ease, the prisoner claims his entitlement to immediate release. Jenrette v. Wainwright, 410 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Smith v. Crockett, 383 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); cf. Lyden v. Wainwright, 307 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). In Jenrette, which was a habeas corpus proceeding, the issue essentially was the same as in the instant case, and only Wainwright was named as respondent. The latter moved to dismiss on the ground that Jenrette had failed to exh…
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Curry v. Louie L. Wainwright, 419 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…ion for mandamus seeking to require the Florida Parole and Probation Commission to give credit for time served in computing petitioner’s presumptive parole release date. Taylor v. Wainwright, 418 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Lyden v. Wainwright, 307 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). Since the petition does not contain definite allegations that if the presumptive parole release date were properly computed, petitioner would be entitled to immediate release, this court cannot treat the petition as one for habea…
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Gibson v. Fla. Dep't OF Corr., 828 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)…separate sentence that has already expired. . Where "there appears ground for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,” a petition for another extraordinary writ is properly treated "alternatively as a petition for habeas corpus.” Lyden v. Wainwright, 307 So. 2d 258, 259 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). See Diggs v. Dep’t of Con., 503 So. 2d 412, 413 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) ("[W]e conclude that petitioner's sentence has expired, and we therefore grant the writ.”). See also Singletary v. Bronson, 764 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1st DCA 200…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Brumit v. Louie L. Wainwright, 290 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1973)
- Voulo v. Louie L. Wainwright, 290 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 1974)
- McCLERNAN v. McCLERNAN, 301 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)