JOEL PETER HEILMANN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Heilmann sought credit for time served in county jail under a new statute that amended Florida law to require such credit, but filed his motion over a year after sentencing without taking a direct appeal. The court held that procedural changes apply prospectively to pending cases on direct appeal, but not to collateral proceedings after the case is no longer pending.
A defendant may not obtain the benefit of a new statute requiring credit for time served through a collateral 3.850 proceeding when no direct appeal was filed. While procedural and remedial changes may apply to cases pending on direct appeal, they do not apply to collateral proceedings in cases that are no longer pending.
[1] A statutory change in law is normally presumed to apply prospectively, but procedural or remedial changes may be immediately applied to pending cases.
[2] Courts have applied statutory amendments to cases on direct appeal even if the amendment became effective after the trial court imposed sentence.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A rule 3.850 proceeding, however, is a collateral proceeding, independent of the original prosecution. Courts have long recognized that such collateral remedies are no substitute for a direct appeal.”
Establishes the distinction between collateral proceedings and direct appeals, supporting the court's decision not to apply the new statute retroactively.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHeilmann was sentenced and did not appeal within the time allowed. More than a year after sentencing, he filed a Rule 3.850 motion seeking credit for …
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HOBSON, Judge.
Chapter 73-71, Laws of Florida, amended § 921.161(1) to require that a defendant be given credit for time served in county jail prior to imposition of sentence. It became effective after Heilman was sentenced but before his time for appeal expired. He did not appeal, but more than a year later made this 3.850 motion1 asserting the statutes application. Ruling that, at the time appellant was sentenced, credit for time served rested in the sentencing court’s discretion, the trial court denied the motion and Heilman appealed. We affirm.
While statutory changes in law are normally presumed to apply prospectively,
procedural or remedial changes may be immediately applied to pending cases,3 including in some instances cases pending on direct appeal.4 Thus, the courts have applied Fla.Stat. § 921.161(1), as amended, to cases on direct appeal even though the change became effective after imposition of sentence by the trial court. Hamilton v. State, Fla.App.2d 1975, 306 So. 2d 600; Hollingshead v. State, Fla.App.1st 1974, 292 So. 2d 617; Joins v. State, Fla.App.1st 1974, 287 So. 2d 742; Gallagher v. State, Fla.App.4th 1974, 300 So. 2d 299.
A rule 3.850 proceeding, however, is a collateral proceeding, independent of the original prosecution. Courts have long recognized that such collateral remedies are no substitute for a direct appeal. E.g., Brown v. State, Fla.App.1st 1969, 227 So. 2d 527. Where, as here, the sentence is legal when imposed and no direct appeal is taken, the case is no longer “pending” for purposes of applying a statutory change in procedures or remedies. To hold otherwise would seriously undermine the judicial systems interest in preserving the finality and integrity of its judgments.
Affirmed.
McNULTY, C. J., and GRIMES, J., concur. . Heilman’s pro se petition for habeas corpus was properly treated by the trial court as a motion to vacate under RCrP 3.850.
. Keystone Water Company v. Bevis, Fla.1973, 278 So. 2d 606. Board of Trustees v. Medeira Beach Nominee, Fla.App.2d 1973, 272 So. 2d 209. Criminal statutes are also governed by Fla.Const. Art. X, § 9. See, Turner v. State, 1924, 87 Fla. 155, 99 So. 334. See, also Ellis v. State, Fla.App.2d 1974, 298 So. 2d 527 and cases cited therein.
. See, e. g., Ratner v. Hensley, Fla.App.3d 1974, 303 So. 2d 41. See, also, Lee v. State, 1937, 128 Fla. 319, 174 So. 589. Mathis v. State, 1893, 31 Fla. 291, 12 So. 681. Ex parte Pells, 1891, 28 Fla. 67, 9 So. 833.
. General Capital Corp. v. Tel. Service Co., Fla.App.2d 1966, 183 So. 2d 1. For disposition of the appeal after remand see Tel. Service Co. v. General Capital Corp., Fla.App.2d 1968, 212 So. 2d 369 affirmed Fla.1969, 227 So. 2d 667.
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Cited By (11 total)
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Fla. Med. Ctr., Inc. v. von Stetina, 436 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)…tes must not be given retroactive application unless an intent to do so is clearly expressed, Dade County v. Ferro, 384 So. 2d 1283 (Fla.1980) or unless the statute is merely procedural, remedial or affects the measure of damages. Heilmann v. State, 310 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). In the case at bar, we are firmly of the opinion that this statute affects a substantive matter (indeed the Fund, on p. 15 of its initial brief, agrees) and that no change in the measure of damages is involved here, only the meth…
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Johnson v. State, 371 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)…lant. Section 39.111(6) is procedural. See McShay v. State, 321 So. 2d 464 (Fla.4th DCA 1975). While statutory changes in the law are normally presumed to apply prospectively, procedural changes are to be applied to pending cases. Heilmann v. State, 310 So. 2d 376 (Fla.2d DCA 1975); McShay v. State, supra. See also Hall v. State, 358 So. 2d 891 (Fla.2d DCA 1978); Hamilton v. State, 306 So. 2d 600 (Fla.2d DCA 1975). The trial court’s failure to comply with the requirements of Section 39.111(6) [*558] cannot b…
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McSHAY v. State, 321 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)…e crime. The Ellis court said: “The courts of Florida have long held that the statute in effect at the time of the commission of the crime, rather than at the time of sentencing, is the controlling statute.” Id. at 527. [*465] In Heilmann v. State, 310 So. 2d 376 (Fla.App.2nd 1975) the court explained the distinction in the different methods of applying statutory revisions: “While statutory changes in law are normally presumed to apply prospectively, procedural or remedial changes may be immediately applied…
Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (17 total)
- TEL Serv. Co., Inc. v. Gen. Cap. Corp., 227 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 1969)
- Mathis v. State, 31 Fla. 291 (Fla. 1893)
- Turner v. State, 87 Fla. 155 (Fla. 1924)
- Ex parte Corpus, 28 Fla. 67 (Fla. 1891)
- Gen. Cap. Corp. v. TEL Serv. Co., Inc., 212 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)
- Lee v. State, 128 Fla. 319 (Fla. 1937)
- Keystone Water Co., Inc. v. Bevis, 278 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1973)
- White v. State, 272 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- Ellis v. State, 298 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974)
- Joins v. State, 287 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)