MARSHALL T. RANES, APPELLANT,
v.
BEATRICE O. RANES, APPELLEE
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Husband appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage where the trial court awarded exclusive possession of two parcels of real property (marital home and business property) to each spouse. The appellate court holds that while the exclusive possession awards were improper, the more significant issue is that the trial court erred in denying the husband's request for partition of the property, which became tenants in common upon dissolution.
The exclusive possession awards were improper because they did not constitute lump sum alimony, were not awarded to support minor children, and no special equity was found. Upon dissolution, the property automatically became tenants in common, and the husband's request for partition should have been granted pursuant to Florida law.
[1] A final judgment of dissolution of marriage, absent lump sum alimony or provision for minor children, does not authorize granting exclusive possession of entireties prope…
[2] Upon entry of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, parties who previously held property as tenants by the entirety become tenants in common.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The granting of exclusive possession of entireties property to one of the parties in a final judgment of dissolution is, we think anathema unless it either takes the form of a lump sum alimony award or is so awarded to a wife and mother of minor children of whom she has custody so as to enforce the husband-father's obligation to support and maintain the children.”
Establishes the legal standard for when exclusive possession of tenancy by the entirety property may be granted in dissolution proceedings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHusband and wife owned two parcels of real property as tenants by the entirety: the marital home and business property. Upon dissolution of marriage, …
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HOBSON, Judge.
Appellant appeals a final judgment of dissolution of marriage asserting five points on appeal, only one of which we find to have merit.
The husband in his petition for dissolution of marriage alleged that the parties owned two parcels of real property as tenants by the entirety. One parcel was the marital home of the parties and the other parcel was the business property where the husband conducted his business. In the final judgment the trial court gave the exclusive possession of the marital home to the wife as long as she used it for her personal residence. It also gave the exclusive possession of the business property to the husband as long as he used it for his business.
The exclusive possession did not take the form of lump sum alimony nor was it derived from a finding of special equity. There are no minor children of the parties whereby the exclusive possession could be deemed as the father’s obligation to support a minor child or children.
The parties became tenants in common upon the entry of the final judgment of dissolution of marriage. Fla.Stat. § 689.15. As a general rule tenants in common are entitled to partition as a matter of right. Condrey v. Condrey, Fla.1957, 92 So. 2d 423. There are exceptions to the rule, which are not present in the instant case.
The husband in his petition for dissolution of marriage pled a right to partition in accordance with Florida Statutes, Chapter 64, and prayed for a partition of the real property or a partition sale if the property was determined to be incapable of partition. In the case of Saviteer v. McAdoo, Fla.App.2d 1974, 310 So. 2d 28 at p. 29 opinion filed April 2, 197S, this court held:
“The granting of exclusive possession of entireties property to one of the parties in a final judgment of dissolution is, we think anathema unless"'it either takes the form of a lump sum alimony award or is so awarded to a wife and mother of minor children of whom she has custody so as to enforce the husband-father’s obligation to support and maintain the children. Neither was the case here. Likewise, if it were intended by the final judgment herein that the husband be given a life estate, which both parties seem to think but with which we disagree, it is equally ineffective. We are aware of no-rule of law which would authorize the granting of a life estate under the circumstances here absent a finding of special equity. No such finding was made.
“In any case, whatever interest was awarded husband, we think it propitious to say here, and we so hold, that the final judgment did not change the statutory legal effect of the judgment of dissolution on the aforesaid entireties property.1 That is to say, upon the judgment of dissolution the parties owned the same as tenants in common.”
The parties having become tenants in common upon the dissolution of marriage and the husband having properly pled and prayed for partition, the lower court erred in not granting the husband’s request for partition. This cause is remanded with directions to the trial court to follow the requirements of Chapter 64, Florida Statutes.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part with directions.
McNULTY, C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur. . § 689.15, F.S.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980)…sed upon the husband’s special equity in the property. We initially accepted jurisdiction based upon conflict in the areas of exclusive possession and special equity. Conflict with Watson v. Watson, 324 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), Ranes v. Ranes, 311 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), and Saviteer v. McAdoo, 310 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), concerning the award of exclusive possession has been resolved in part by our express disapproval of Saviteer and Ranes in McDonald v. McDonald, 368 So. 2d 1283 (Fla.1979)…
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Wilmer H. McDONALD v. McDONALD, 368 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 1979)…BOYD, Justice. We granted certiorari to review the decision of the district court of appeal, 346 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), because of conflict with Ranes v. Ranes, 311 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) and Saviteer v. McAdoo, 310 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla.Const. In Saviteer, a party to a divorce proceeding was awarded exclusive possession of the marital home, previously held as an estate by the entire…
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Lange v. Lange, 357 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…part of lump sum alimony, Saviteer v. McAdoo, 310 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Coalla v. Coalla, 330 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976), or where special equities exist in favor of the wife which support her exclusive use and possession, Ranes v. Ranes, 311 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). The temporary nature of the wife’s possession of the husband’s undivided interest in the home belies any attempt to characterize the award of exclusive possession as permanent or lump sum alimony. Rehabilitative alimony is clearl…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Condrey v. Condrey, 92 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 1957)
- Saviteer v. McADOO, 310 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)