WILLIAM C. BOCK, PETITIONER,
v.
JOANNA LOUISE BOCK, RESPONDENT

Fla. 2d DCA | 1975-04-23
No. 75-337
GRIMES and SCHEB, JJ., concur.
311 So. 2d 684 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1975) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

In a certified question case arising from a family law dispute, the Florida District Court of Appeal clarified that when an appellate court reverses a modification order without providing directions, the trial court must reinstate the original judgment retroactively to the date of the modification, not prospectively from the mandate date. The court held that absent specific appellate directions, the reversed order must be treated as if it never existed.


Holding

When an appellate court reverses an order without providing directions, the trial court must reinstate the original judgment of dissolution retroactively to the date of modification, thereby returning the parties to their status prior to the modification proceedings. The trial court retains discretion regarding the time and manner in which any alimony arrearage shall be paid.


Headnotes

[1] When an appellate court reverses a trial court's order of modification without providing specific directions, the trial court must reinstate the original judgment retroac…

[2] An order reversed on appeal without directions is treated as if it had never been made.

Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“where an order is reversed on appeal without directions, it must be returned to the trial court as if the reversed order had never been made”

This quote establishes the foundational legal principle governing the trial court's obligation when an appellate reversal lacks specific directions.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

The parties' marriage was dissolved on December 29, 1972, with a judgment awarding the wife custody of minor children and establishing alimony and chi…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge.

BOARDMAN, Acting Chief Judge.

This is the second appearance of this case before the court. The cause is now before us upon a certified question pursuant to Rule 4.6, F.A.R. Briefly stated, the facts are that the marriage of the parties was dissolved on December 29, 1972, by entry of a judgment which awarded the wife custody of the minor children, alimony and child support. Subsequently, the trial court entered an order modifying the judgment by reducing the husband’s monthly alimony payment. The wife appealed this order of modification without a stay pending appeal. This court reversed the trial court’s order of modification in Bock v. Bock, Fla.App.2d, 1974, 302 So. 2d 774. After issuance of our mandate in the cited case the wife moved alternatively for contempt or relief. The trial court entered an order provisionally reinstating the original judgment of dissolution prospectively from the date of our mandate and has certified to us the following question:

Where an order of modification of judgment of dissolution reducing the husband’s alimony payments is appealed by the wife without stay and reversed on appeal without directions, should the trial court reinstate the original judgment of dissolution retroactively to the date of the modification, prospectively from the date of the mandate of reversal by the Appellate Court, or is the determination within the discretion of the trial court ?

In the trial court’s order of certification the trial judge stated that he is reserving final ruling until this court decides the applicability of our recent decision in Howell v. Howell, Fla.App.1974, 301 So. 2d 781, on the issue involved in the instant case. In Howell, we held it would be equitable that the original alimony be reinstated prospectively. Therefore, we specifically provided in that opinion such direction to the trial court, based upon the special facts presented in that case.

In answering the certified question, we hold that when this court does not provide the trial court with any directions, the trial court should reinstate the original judgment of dissolution retroactively to the date of modification thereby placing the parties in the same status as they were prior to modification proceedings. It is established law in Florida that where an order is reversed on appeal without directions, it must be returned to the trial court as if the reversed order had never been made. See Smith v. Smith, Fla. 1960, 118 So. 2d 204. In our ruling, we leave to the trial court’s discretion, the time and manner in which the alimony arrearage shall be paid by the husband to his former wife.

Accordingly, we remand this cause for entry of an appropriate order consistent with this opinion.

GRIMES and SCHEB, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Harry Pepper & Assocs., Inc. v. The City OF Cape Coral, 352 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
    …ur initial opinion we reversed the judgment of the trial court without directions. Appellee correctly points out that this would be construed as returning this cause to the trial court just as if the reversed order had never been made. Bock v. Bock, 311 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). As noted in our opinion, the judgment appealed from was a directed verdict entered in favor of the city at the close of appellants’ evidence. At that point the trial court denied injunctive relief and entered final judgment again…
  • Regante v. Regante, 652 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
    …t opinion to vacate the default judgment of dissolution and for the parties to return to the posture of the case previous to the final default judgment of dissolution entered July 1, 1991. Smith v. Smith, 118 So. 2d 204 (Fla.1960), and Bock v. Bock, 311 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). That is to say that all issues except one remained for disposition. These pending issues included but were not limited to whether the marriage between the parties was irretrievably broken, enforcement of temporary support arreara…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw