R. R. WALDEN, TAX ASSESSOR OF HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
FLETCHER AVENUE DEVELOPMENT CORP., APPELLEE
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A tax assessor appeals a summary judgment classifying the appellee's lands as agricultural property. The court reversed because the appellee's evidence failed to establish that the lands were used for 'bona fide agricultural purposes' as statutorily defined, requiring good faith commercial agricultural use.
The court reversed because the appellee's affidavit evidence failed to establish good faith commercial agricultural use as required by statute. The court did not reach the question of whether the appellee could rebut the statutory presumption based on special circumstances.
[1] A landowner seeking agricultural classification for land must demonstrate "bona fide agricultural purposes," defined as good faith commercial agricultural use.
[2] Affidavits from shareholders are insufficient to prove bona fide agricultural use if they fail to show good faith commercial use of the land.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“'Bona fide agricultural purposes' means good faith commercial agricultural use of the land.”
Defines the statutory requirement that appellee's evidence must satisfy for agricultural classification
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFletcher Avenue Development Corp. applied for agricultural classification of its lands. The company submitted affidavits from shareholders claiming th…
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SCHEB, Judge.
Appellant appeals a summary judgment which declared appellee’s lands to be in bona fide agricultural use and directed the appellant to reclassify said lands as agricultural.
Appellant denied appellee’s application for agricultrual classification on the authority of § 193.461(4) (c), Fla.Stat., which states:
“Sale of land for a purchase price which is three or more times the agricultural assessment placed on the land shall create a presumption that such land is not used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes. Upon a showing of special circumstances by the landowner demonstrating that the land is to be continued in bona fide agriculture, this presumption may be rebutted.”
We find it unnecessary to determine the sufficiency of appellee’s evidence of special circumstances offered to rebut the statutory presumption under § 193.461 (4) (c), since evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment failed to establish that appellee’s lands were used for “bona fide agricultural purposes” as defined by § 193.-461(3)(b). Appellee relied upon affidavits from its shareholders to prove that its lands were used for “bona fide agricultural purposes,” however, the facts contained in the relevant paragraphs of such affidavits1 failed to show any good faith commerical use of appellee’s lands and hence were insufficient to meet the requirements of § 193.461(3) (b).2 Hausman v. Rudkin, Fla. App.4th 1972, 268 So. 2d 407.
The appellee, as moving party for a summary judgment, failed to sustain the burden of showing sufficient facts to warrant a judgment in its favor under the applicable substantive law. Matarese v. Leesburg Elks Club, Fla.App.2d 1965, 171 So. 2d 606; Houdaille-Duval-Wright Co. v. Congdon, Fla.App.2d 1970, 237 So. 2d 305.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
HOBSON, Acting C. J., and GRIMES, J., concur. . “(8) That the agricultural purposes consist of the land’s being in natural pasture upon which the Plaintiff is grazing cattle. There are some trees upon the real estate and one decaying building which is unoccupied and uninhabitable. There are no other buildings or structures whatsoever upon the real estate. (9) That there is no other use other than bona fide agricultural use being made of the property in question in compliance with the applicable zoning laws.”
. “Subject to the restrictions set out in this section, only lands which are used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes shall be classified agricultural. ‘Bona fide agricultural purposes’ means good faith commercial agricultural use of the land. In determining whether the use of the land for agricultural purposes is bona fide, the following factors may be taken into consideration:
(1) The length of time the land has been so utilized;
(2) Whether the use has been continuous;
(3) The purchase price paid;
(4) Size, as it relates to specific agricultural use;
(5) Whether an indicated effort has been made to care sufficiently and adequately for the land in accordance with accepted commercial agricultural practices, including, without limitation, fertilizing, liming, tilling, mowing, reforesting, and other accepted agricultural practices;
(6) Whether such land is under lease and, if so, the effective length, terms, and conditions of the lease; and (7) Such other factors as may from time to time become applicable.”
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Markham v. Rose, 495 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)…o indicate some use for cattle grazing, that would not be sufficient to establish that there was a “good faith commercial agricultural use of the land.” § 193.-461(3)(b), Fla.Stat. (1983) (emphasis added); Walden v. Fletcher Ave. Development. Corp., 313 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Still assuming the standard of review to be as postulated by the parties, it is clear that the trial court did not find the evidence supportive of a finding that the property was presently subjected to active agricultural use as…
Authorities Cited
- Matarese v. Leesburg Elks Club, 171 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965)
- Ford Hausman v. Rudkin, 268 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- Houdaille-Duval-Wright Co. v. A. C. Congdon in Bankr. of Bill Radcliff & Co., Inc., 237 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)