LEO NICHOLAS, AS CHAIRMAN, ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
FIRST INTERSTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, A CORPORATION ORGANIZED AND EXISTING UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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In this zoning appeal, the Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court's decision granting appellee First Interstate Development Corporation's application for a special exception to build a residential planned unit development (RPUD) in an R-1 zoning district. The appellants challenged the decision based on a subsequent zoning ordinance amendment, but the court held that the amendment was not properly introduced into evidence and therefore could not be considered on appeal.
The trial court's decision granting the preliminary application was affirmed because the purported zoning amendment was never properly entered into evidence at trial, and therefore the appellants waived the argument by failing to raise it in the lower court. The court refused to take judicial notice of the amended ordinance, as municipal ordinances must be proven through proper evidence.
[1] A trial court's review of a zoning board's decision is de novo, allowing for the consideration of evidence beyond the board's record.
[2] A party cannot raise new arguments or objections on appeal that were not presented to the lower court.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the general rule in suits of this nature is that the law in effect at the time of final decision governs, notwithstanding the fact there has been a change in the law since the time of application.”
Principle from City of Boynton Beach v. Carroll regarding which law applies when zoning laws change during application processing
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFirst Interstate filed a preliminary application on May 30, 1972 for an RPUD in an R-1 district under the city's zoning ordinance. The building offici…
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NEWELL, EMERY J., Associate Judge.
On May 30, 1972, appellee filed a preliminary application for a special exception for a residential planning unit development (RPUD) to be located in an R-l zoning district. Zoning Ordinance No. 12-71 of the City of Cape Canaveral provided for such RPUD. A section of the zoning ordinance provided a schedule for special exceptions permissible by the Board of Adjustment for planned development. The building official determined that such planned development was permissible in an R-l district. The respondent Board of Adjustment affirmed this particular determination of the building official, and no appeal was taken on that decision. Thereafter, a public hearing on the merits of the RPUD was scheduled before the Board of Adjustment. Evidence was presented by appellee and opponents to the plan and the Board rejected appellee’s request for special exception. Appellee then filed a petition for certiorari in the circuit court pursuant to F.S. 176.16, writ was issued and a trial commenced. The trial court entered an order reversing the decision of the Board of Adjustment and remanded the matter back to the Board for a new hearing. Appellee next filed a motion for rehearing which was granted and the trial court entered a new order dated November 14, 1973. This order receded from the previous order to the extent the matter was not returned to the Board of Adjustment for a new hearing, but instead went ahead and granted appellee’s preliminary application for special exception for an RPUD. It is this order on rehearing and final judgment which is appealed.
Appellants contend that, while this application was being processed, there was an amendment to the zoning ordinance which would not permit RPUD’s within an R-l district and thus the trial court was bound by the principles announced in City of Boynton Beach v. Carroll, Fla.App., 272 So. 2d 171 (1973). In that case it was said, in part
“.the general rule in suits of this nature is that the law in effect at the time of final decision governs, notwithstanding the fact there has been a change in the law since the time of application.”
It is not necessary to consider the validity of appellant’s argument on this point for another, more basic, reason. The purported amendment was never placed or offered into evidence in the case sub ju-dice. The pleadings and proof were directed to the ordinance as it was formed on the date preliminary application was made. It is the declared policy of the appellate court to confine the parties to the points raised and determined in the court below and not to permit the presentation of points, grounds or objections for the first time in the appellate court. 2 Fla.Jur., Appeals, Sec 290; also Wyrembek v. Frey, Fla.App., 231 So. 2d 222; Cosid v. Bay Steel Products Co., Fla.App., 288 So. 2d 277; Palmer v. Thomas, Fla.App., 284 So. 2d 709.
Nor can the record void be cured by the court taking judicial notice of any amended ordinance. The established rule is to the contrary. Haverty v. State of Florida, Fla.App., 258 So. 2d 18; Conrad v. Jackson, Fla., 107 So. 2d 369. The case of Town of Medley v. Coplan, Fla.App., 191 So. 2d 449, is particularly noteworthy as that case involved a municipal zoning ordinance which had been attached to the complaint. The ordinance was not properly admitted into evidence and the appellate court reaffirmed the principle that municipal ordinances must be proven and the courts may not take judicial notice of them.
The trial before the lower court was in the nature of an original proceeding de novo. Josephson v. Audrey, Fla., 96 So. 2d 784; Union Trust Co. v. Lucas, Fla.App., 125 So. 2d 582; Board of Adjustment of City of Fort Lauderdale v. Kremer, Fla.App., 139 So. 2d 448. Thus the court was not restricted to merely reviewing the record of proceedings before the Board of Adjustment, but additionally heard testimony of numerous witnesses, including qualified experts. We think the record supports the findings of the trial court and that he did not abuse his discretion in granting the preliminary application.
The judgment is affirmed.
WALDEN, C. J., and DOWNEY, J., concur.
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Lester v. State, 754 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)…State ex rel. Kay v. City of Miami, 158 Fla. 26, 27 So. 2d 413, 413 (1946) (declining to take judicial notice of a municipal ordinance “not made a part of the record and ... not before us for construction”); Nicholas v. First Interstate Dev. Corp., 315 So. 2d 238, 240 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Haverty v. State, 258 So. 2d 18, 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972); Applied Research Lab. of Fla. v. Homer, 249 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); City of Opa-Locka v. Trustees of the Plumbing Indus. Promotion Fund, 193 So. 2d 29, 32…
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Quick & Reilly, Inc. v. Morton J. Perlin and Charlotte W. Perlin, 411 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…he trial court erred in refusing to set aside the default, is without merit. Except for (b)(4) and (5), which were not raised in the motion to vacate and therefore need not be considered on appeal, see Nicholas v. First Interstate Development Corp., 315 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Palmer v. Thomas, 284 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973), all grounds for relief under Rule 1.540 were lost by passage of time since the motion was made more than one year after entry of final judgment. August v. August, 350 So. 2d…
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Murray v. Michael F. Chillemi t/a Chillemi & Assocs., 396 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…ision was unenforceable because it was excessive and constitutes a penalty. Unfortunately, appellants did not raise this point before the trial court and we, therefore, cannot consider the issue. Nicholas v. First Interstate Development Corporation, 315 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). Since appellants failed to preserve the point, we have no alternative other than to affirm. We conclude that all other issues raised are also without merit and the final judgment is therefore affirmed. AFFIRMED. MOORE, BERAN…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (13 total)
- Norton Josephson v. Autrey, 96 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1957)
- Warriner v. Maxine Hotel Corp., 96 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1957)
- The City OF Boynton Beach v. The Most Reverend Coleman F. Carroll, 272 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)
- Dick Palmer v. Thomas, 284 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- Bd. OF Adjustment OF City OF Fort Lauderdale v. Kremer, 139 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- Conrad v. Jackson, 107 So. 2d 369 (Fla. 1958)
- Union Tr. Co. v. Lucas, 125 So. 2d 582 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960)
- Haverty v. State, 258 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)
- Town OF Medley v. Caplan, 191 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Morse v. Morse, 191 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)