THE FLORIDA BAR, COMPLAINANT,
v.
WILLIAM B. DAWSON, III, RESPONDENT
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The Florida Supreme Court disbarred attorney William B. Dawson, III for violating professional responsibility rules by making improper financial advances to clients and knowingly receiving stolen property. The court found clear and convincing evidence of ethical violations that demonstrated respondent's inability to comprehend his responsibilities as an attorney.
The court found clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated Ethical Consideration 5-8 of the Florida Code of Professional Responsibility through the improper financial advances, and that respondent knew or reasonably should have known the typewriters were stolen. Taken together, these violations warranted disbarment to protect the public.
[1] A lawyer violates ethical rules by making monetary advancements to clients for purposes unrelated to litigation, especially when such advancements are not recovered upon…
[2] A lawyer's knowledge or constructive knowledge that property is stolen can be established by circumstantial evidence, including significantly below-market prices, unusual…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a financial interest in the outcome of litigation results if monetary advances are made by a lawyer to his client”
Establishes the core violation under Ethical Consideration 5-8 of the Florida Code of Professional Responsibility
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRespondent repeatedly made monetary advancements to clients for purposes unrelated to litigation, with no effort to recover the funds if cases were lo…
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PER CURIAM.
Pursuant to Article XI, Rule 11.09(3) of the Integration Rule of The Florida Bar, respondent has petitioned for a review of the report and recommendation of a referee appointed in a Bar disciplinary proceeding. The referee has recommended respondent’s disbarment on the grounds that he knowingly received stolen property and knowingly accepted a financial interest in the outcome of a client’s litigation. The referee’s findings of fact on these two charges essentially show:
1. that respondent repeatedly made monetary advancements to his clients for purposes unrelated to the conduct of their litigation, and if a client’s case was lost no effort was made to recover the advancements. Respondent’s secretary testified to a “Friday payroll” for a significant number of clients.
2. that respondent received five stolen typewriters, four of which he subsequently purchased, from an admitted thief. Although the thief never told respondent that the typewriters were stolen, the referee found that the price paid was significantly below the market value for like equipment, that the transactions occurred at an unusual hour and location, and that taken together these facts were sufficient to establish that respondent knew or should have known that the merchandise was stolen.
Our independent review of the record on the first charge indicates that there was clear and convincing evidence before the referee to justify his finding that respondent violated Ethical Consideration 5-8 of the Florida Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a financial interest in the outcome of litigation results if monetary advances are made by a lawyer to his client. The record further substantiates the referee’s recommendation that respondent should be disbarred based on his complete inability to comprehend the responsibility of an attorney admitted to practice in this state.1
Our independent review of the record on the second charge indicates that there was sufficient evidence to support the referee’s findings that respondent knew or reasonably should have known that typewriters brought to his home in the middle of the night were stolen property. Because this finding is based in part on circumstantial evidence, however, we would not be inclined to disbar respondent if this were the only offense with which he had been charged. Taken with the other proven charge, however, we believe the public will best be protected if respondent is denied continued permission to engage in the practice of law in Florida.
The report of the referee is adopted and the recommendation of disbarment is approved.
Accordingly, the respondent William B. Dawson, III is disbarred from the practice of law in Florida.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, C. J., and ROBERTS, BOYD, OVERTON and ENGLAND, JJ., concur. . Respondent was previously disciplined for similay misconduct involving money advances to clients. State v. Dawson, 111 So. 2d 427 (Fla.1959).
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Kopplow & Flynn, P.A. v. Trudell, 445 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984)…nies for the cost of litigation, it is never appropriate for a lawyer to advance financial assistance to a client in the manner outlined in the majority opinion. See The Florida Bar v. Rogowski, 399 So. 2d 1390 (Fla.1981); The Florida Bar v. Dawson, 318 So. 2d 385 (Fla.), cert. denied mem., 423 U.S. 995, 96 S.Ct. 422, 46 L.Ed.2d 369 (1975); The Florida Bar v. Rhubottom, 132 So. 2d 395 (Fla.1961); The Florida Bar v. Dawson, 111 So. 2d 427 (Fla.1959); Fla. Bar Code Prof. Resp. EC 5-7, 5-8, DR 5-103(B); see also…
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THE Fla. BAR RE Amendments TO Rules Regulating THE Fla. BAR. Amendment TO THE Rules Regulating THE Fla. Bar-Rule 4-1.8(e), 635 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1994)…s of interest. This Court has disciplined members of the Bar for advancing funds to clients or assisting others to do so. The Fla. Bar v. Hastings, 523 So. 2d 571 (Fla.1988); The Fla. Bar v. Wooten, 452 So. 2d 547 (Fla.1984); The Fla. Bar v. Dawson, 318 So. 2d 385 (Fla.), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 995, 96 S.Ct. 422, 46 L.Ed.2d 369 (1975). [*970] Lawyers should not be encouraged or allowed to do indirectly what they cannot do directly. The majority of states likewise prohibit this conduct. We therefore reject LRM…
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In re Dawson, 609 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1980)…t for the Southern District of Florida suspending William B. Dawson, III, from practice in the Southern District. The controversy arose as a result of Dawson’s disbarment from the practice of law by the Florida Supreme Court. Florida Bar v. Dawson, 318 So. 2d 385, 386 (Fla.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995, 96 S.Ct. 422, 46 L.Ed.2d 369 (1975). The principal basis for the disbarment was a referee’s finding that Dawson had made regular monetary advancements to a substantial number of his clients for purposes unrel…
Authorities Cited
- State of Fla. ex rel. The Fla. BAR v. Dawson, 111 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 1959)