JACK RYE
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Jack Rye was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape of a 15-year-old girl. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence did not prove the essential element of intent to consummate rape regardless of resistance, as Rye desisted voluntarily when the victim refused consent.
The conviction for assault with intent to commit rape cannot stand because the evidence failed to establish that Rye intended to consummate rape regardless of the victim's resistance and lack of consent. His voluntary desistance upon learning the girl was unwilling demonstrates only an intent to obtain consent to the illicit act, not an intent to rape.
“The gravamen of the offense of assault with intent to commit rape is the intent with which the assault was made and such intent must be shown by the state to have so possessed the accused that his determination was to consummate the rape regardless of resistance and want of consent.”
Establishes the essential legal requirement that separates assault with intent to commit rape from other indecent assaults
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA grand jury indicted Jack Rye on two counts: assault with intent to commit rape and attempt to commit rape. A 15-year-old unmarried girl of chaste ch…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Assault With Intent To Commit Rape cases and more on FLexlaw
The grand jury of Hamilton County returned an indictment, in two counts, against the appellant, Jack Rye. The first Count of the indictment charged an assault with intent to commit rape. The second count charged an attempt to commit rape. The trial jury found the defendant guilty of *560the offense charged in the first count, and not guilty of the offense contained in the second count. Appellant appealed from the judgment, assigning as error the refusal of the court below to grant a new trial grounded on the proposition that the evidence did not sustain the verdict.
The jury having acquitted the defendant on the charge of attempt to commit rápe, the only question here is whether the state has proved the essential elements of the offense of assault with intent to commit rape, beyond a reasonable doubt.
That an indecent assault was made on the prosecutrix, is amply established by the evidence. The prosecutrix was a young girl of the age of fifteen years, and, for aught the record shows to the contrary, was an unmarried female of previous chaste character. The action of the appellant in taking advantage of the temporary absence of the young girl’s parents from her home to intrude himself upon her, can excite no sympathy or compassion for his plight. But be that as it may, it is not every indecent assault, even under such circumstances, that will constitute an assault with intent to commit rape. Rushton v. State, 58 Fla. 94, 50 So. 486; Sparkman v. State, 84 Fla. 151, 92 So. 812. The gravamen of the offense of assault with intent to commit rape is the intent with which the assault was made and such intent must be shown by the state to have so possessed the accused that his determination was to consummate the rape regardless of resistance and want of consent. Hunter v. State, 29 Fla. 486, 10 So. 730; Clark v. State, 56 Fla. 46, 47 So. 481; Rushton v. State, supra; Bell v. State, 61 Fla. 6, 54 So. 799; Dannelly v. State, 80 Fla. 773, 87 So. 44; Sparkman v. State, supra. Moreover, a conviction for such offense will not be sustained where it appears that the assailant voluntarily desisted before the consummation, without any outside interference and with no unusual resistance on the female’s part. See Sparkman v. State, supra.
The testimony in the present case fails to establish that the appellant intended to consummate the rape regardless of resistance and want of consent. It tends, rather, to show that the appellant’s intent at the time was to obtain consent *561to the illicit act; and that when it became apparent that the prosecutrix was an unwilling victim and would not yield to his desires, he voluntarily desisted, without any outside interference or unusual resistance upon her part. The proof of guilt, therefore, was not sufficient; and the motion for new trial should have been granted.
The judgment should be reversed for further proceedings not inconsistent with law, and without prejudice to prosecution for the crime of assault with intent to have unlawful carnal intercourse with an unmarried female of previous chaste character under the age of eighteen years. See Sec. 794.05 Florida Statutes 1941; Bowden v. State, 152 Fla. 715, 12 So. (2nd) 887.
It is so ordered.
BUFORD, C. J., BROWN and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Manning v. State, 93 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 1957)…gravamen of the crime of assault with intent to commit rape is that the intent of the accused was to consummate the act regardless of resistance and want of consent. Dannelley v. State, 1920, 80 Fla. 773, 87 So. 44; Rye v. State, 1943, 153 Fla. 559, 15 So. 2d 255. According to the testimony of the prosecutrix, Manning did attempt to have intercourse with her when they first parked. The attempt was against her will and, according to her, failed due to her continued efforts of resistance. Subsequently, Mannin…
-
Miller v. Dugger, 565 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)…t the gravamen of the offense is the intent with which the assault was made. The state must show that the intent “so possessed the accused that his determination was to consummate the rape regardless of resistance and want of consent.” Rye v. State, 153 Fla. 559, 15 So. 2d 255 (Fla.1943). See also Manning v. State, 93 So. 2d 716 (Fla.1957). Moreover, the criminal intent element of the offense “must be proved by some act or deed evidencing it.” Clark v. State, 56 Fla. 46, 47 So. 481 (1908). Accord Reed v. St…
-
Roundtree v. State, 43 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1949)…ctim. Nothing will be accomplished by detailing further the circumstances of the despicable affair except to point out his desistance before he consummated the act and his reason for doing so. He now relies upon the rule announced in Rye v. State, 153 Fla. 559, 15 So.2d 255, that a conviction of the offense will not be upheld if it appears that the defendant "voluntarily desisted before the consummation, without any outside interference and with no unusual resistance" on the part of his prey. Here the ass…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Orum Rushton v. State, 58 Fla. 94 (Fla. 1909)
- Rubin Bowden v. State, 152 Fla. 715 (Fla. 1943)
- Cæsar Hunter v. State, 29 Fla. 486 (Fla. 1892)
- Clark v. State, 56 Fla. 46 (Fla. 1908)
- Bell v. State, 61 Fla. 6 (Fla. 1911)
- Dannelly v. State, 80 Fla. 773 (Fla. 1920)
- Sparkman v. State, 84 Fla. 151 (Fla. 1922)