SPENCER
v.
YOUNG
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Spencer sought to establish a partnership with Young but the Chancellor dismissed the complaint based on a Special Master's findings. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the partnership claim but reversed the assessment of court costs against the defendant, holding that costs should be borne by the losing party.
The Chancellor was correct in accepting the Special Master's findings as they were not clearly erroneous, and a choice between two permissible views of evidence is not reversible error. However, the assessment of court costs against the defendant was an abuse of discretion—costs should have been assessed against the losing party. The court affirmed the $400 fee despite inadequacy concerns, as courts are bound by existing statute.
“Having seen and heard the witnesses, the Master was in a position to determine the facts, superior to one who examines only a cold printed record. Accordingly, the Master's decision should be treated as 'presumptively correct'.”
Establishes the deference standard for Special Master findings based on superior position to judge witness credibility.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff Spencer filed a bill of complaint seeking to establish a partnership with defendant Young in a business enterprise. The case was referred to…
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WHITE, Associate Justice.
This is an appeal from a final decree dismissing plaintiff’s bill of complaint, which sought to establish a partnership between plaintiff and defendant in a certain business enterprise. The decree was entered upon recommendations of a Special Master in Chancery to whom the case had been referred with directions to make findings.
The question for determination now is whether or not the Chancellor was correct in overruling plaintiff’s exceptions to the Master’s findings and in accepting the Master’s conclusions regarding the truth of the facts in issue.
Here, much of the testimony was in conflict. The Master’s findings were based upon his judgment as to the credibility of the witnesses. Having seen and heard the witnesses, the Master was in a position to determine the facts, superior to one who examines only a cold printed record. Accordingly, the Master’s decision should be treated as “presumptively correct”. In such a case, the Chancellor may not set aside the findings of the Master unless they are “clearly erroneous” or against the clear weight of the evidence. See Fletcher Equity Pleading and Practice, page 620. In a recent case the Supreme Court of the United States has said that a choice between two permissible views of the weight of evidence is not “clearly erroneous”. U. S. v. Yellow Cab Co., 1949, 338 U.S. 338, 70 S.Ct. 177, 94 L.Ed. 150.
Applying that principle to the case at bar, leads to the inescapable conclusion that the Chancellor was without error in following the recommendation of the 'Special Master. Appellee complains that the Chancellor was in error in assessing court costs against him. In a Chancery suit the Chancellor has a discretion in the matter of assessing costs, but this is a sound judicial discretion and, in view of the issues presented and the final result of the action, it was an abuse of discretion to assess the costs against defendant in the case at bar. Costs should have been assessed against the losing party.
The lower court allowed a fee of $400 to the Special Master. We again call attention to Statute 62.07, F.S.A., prescribing fees for a Special Master in a case of this character. Compensation fixed for Masters by the Statute proves inadequate in many cases, but the problem is a legislative one, and until changed, courts are bound to the present statute.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
TERRELL, Acting Chief Justice, and SEBRING and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (12 total)
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McANESPIE v. McANESPIE, 200 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)…n, Fla.1950, 47 So. 2d 748; Dade County v. Trombly, Fla.App.1958, 102 So. 2d 394. A Master’s findings should not be disregarded “unless clearly wrong”. Parker v. Interstate Trust & Banking Co., CCA Fla.1932, 56 F. 2d 792; Spencer v. Young, Fla.1953, 63 So. 2d 334; Moncrief v. Hall, Fla.1953, 63 So. 2d 640; Slatcoff v. Dezen, Fla.1954, 74 So. 2d 59; Ozgowicz v. Leighton, Fla.App.1963, 151 So. 2d 21; Applefield v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., Fla.App.1965, 176 So. 2d 366; Gulf Coast Docks, Inc. v. Simon, Fla.…
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Foley v. Peckham, 256 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)…departed from unless there are circumstances presented therein which render it unjust that the costs should be charged against the losing party. Moyers v. Coiner, 22 Fla. 422; Moore v. Hunter, 153 Fla. 158, 13 So. 2d 909; Spencer v. Young, Fla.1953, 63 So. 2d 334. In this case we do not observe from the record circumstances which would make it unjust to charge against the defendant the [*68] costs in question. The circumstances of the case appear to be otherwise. The accountants were employed under the auth…
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Blynn v. Hirsch, 136 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)…ling party, we conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the chancellor to have failed to- award to the appellant taxable costs incurred in the prosecution of the action. As the Supreme Court of Florida observed in Spencer v. Young, Fla.1953, .63 So. 2d 334, when commenting [*667] on the assessment of costs in a chancery action: “ * * * the Chancellor has a discretion in the matter of assessing costs, but this is a sound judicial discretion and, in view of the issues presented and the final result of…
Previewing 3 of 12 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- United States v. Yellow CAB Co., 338 U.S. 338 (U.S. 1949)