HARRY BLYNN, APPELLANT,
v.
LOUIS HIRSCH, APPELLEE
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Blynn appeals a final decree in an accounting action arising from an alleged oral partnership agreement for real property purchase. The trial court awarded Blynn half the profits from the property sale but denied him costs. The appellate court affirmed the accounting award but reversed the denial of costs, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award costs to the prevailing party.
The trial court properly awarded the accounting and profits but erred in denying costs to the prevailing party. The denial of costs constituted an abuse of discretion, and costs should have been awarded to the appellant as the prevailing party in the action.
“the Chancellor has a discretion in the matter of assessing costs, but this is a sound judicial discretion and, in view of the issues presented and the final result of the action, it was an abuse of discretion * * * in the case at bar. Costs should have been assessed against the losing party.”
Establishes the standard that while chancellors have discretion in assessing costs, it must be a sound discretion exercised in light of the final result, and failure to award costs to a prevailing party constitutes abuse of discretion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBlynn and Hirsch allegedly entered into an oral partnership agreement for the purchase of certain real property. Hirsch subsequently sold the property…
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This is the second appearance of this litigation in this court.1 The appellant, plaintiff below, appeals a final decree in an action for an accounting based upon an alleged oral partnership agreement for the purchase of certain real property. The final decree adjudicated that the appellant had proved the partnership agreement and awarded the sum of $554.40 as one-half of the profits derived by the appellee from the sale of the real property. Costs were denied to both parties by the decree.
On appeal, the appellant makes two contentions, the first of which questions the award of $554.40, and the second, the court’s denial of costs to the appellant. We consider it unnecessary, in the light of the record and testimony, to discuss the first question because we find it to be without merit.
The chancellor’s failure to award costs we conclude was error. The appellant, who was plaintiff below, prevailed on the cause of action alleged in his complaint and was awarded a decree representing one-half of the profits received by the appellee from the sale of real property which was the subject matter of the partnership agreement. In the absence of anything in the record to the contrary, or any reason or justification why costs should not have been awarded the prevailing party, we conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for the chancellor to have failed to- award to the appellant taxable costs incurred in the prosecution of the action. As the Supreme Court of Florida observed in Spencer v. Young, Fla.1953, .63 So.2d 334, when commenting *667on the assessment of costs in a chancery action:
“ * * * the Chancellor has a discretion in the matter of assessing costs, but this is a sound judicial discretion and, in view of the issues presented and the final result of the action, it was an abuse of discretion * * * in the case at bar. Costs should have been assessed against the losing party.”
See also 8 Fla.Jur., Costs, §§ 8-11.
Accordingly, that portion of the decree which denied costs to the appellant is reversed, and the cause is remanded for the entry of a cost judgment in favor of the appellant for those costs legally taxable.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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City OF Miami v. E. Realty Co., Inc., 202 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)…the costs against the defendant city. As the plaintiff prevailed under the decree which was rendered, the court was not in error in charging costs against the losing party. Spencer v. Young, Fla. 1953, 63 So. 2d 334; Blynn v. Hirsch, Fla. App.1962, 136 So. 2d 666. On remand it would be appropriate for the chancellor to reconsider the assessment of the costs as between the parties, in that the ultimate decision is only partly in favor of the plaintiff and is mainly in favor of the defendant City of Miami. Ha…
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Murray v. Plastridge, Inc., 338 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)…and appellate record we are of the opinion that the appellant having been the prevailing party and the party recovering judgment was entitled to the taxing of costs in his favor. Jordan v. Reynolds, 154 So. 2d 200 (Fla.3d DCA 1963); Blynn v. Hirsch, 136 So. 2d 666 (Fla.3d DCA 1962); F.S. § 57.041. Accordingly, the order denying plaintiff’s motion to tax costs is vacated and set aside and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith. MAGER, C. J., and CROSS and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.…
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Champlain Towers N. Assocs. v. Cohen, 481 So. 2d 1259 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…osts because the successor judge found the award of attorney’s fees to be unreasonable. In an equity proceeding a cost award is made in the exercise of discretion by a trial court, Foley v. Peckham, 256 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971); Blynn v. Hirsch, 136 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962), but to deny costs on the ground indicated in the instant case, is a clear abuse of discretion. We will therefore return the matter to the trial court to determine the propriety of the motion to tax costs. [*1261] Affirmed as to t…
Authorities Cited
- Spencer v. Young, 63 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1953)
- Mosley v. Mosley, 124 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960)