PETER E. SWINSCOE AND CHLOE M. SWINSCOE, HIS WIFE, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Peter and Chloe Swinscoe appealed an interlocutory order transferring their lawsuit against the Florida Department of Revenue from Broward County to Leon County. The District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that because the Department of Revenue took official tax collection action in Broward County, the Swinscoes had the right to sue there rather than in the county where the Department maintains its headquarters.
The court reversed the trial court's order transferring venue. A state agency may be sued in a county other than where its official headquarters is located when the official action complained of has been or is being performed in that county or when the threat of such action is real and imminent. Here, the Department's tax warrant execution was directed to the area supervisor in Broward County, making Broward County the proper venue.
[1] A state agency may be sued in a county other than its official headquarters if the official action complained of has been or is being performed in the county where the su…
[2] The recording of a tax warrant in a county constitutes official action performed in that county for venue purposes.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Absent a waiver, a state agency may be sued in a county other than the situs of its official headquarters only when the official action complained of has, in fact, been or is being performed in the county wherein the suit is filed or when the threat of such action in said county is both real and imminent.”
Establishes the legal standard for determining proper venue against state agencies in Florida.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Swinscoes filed suit in Broward County seeking to enjoin the Department of Revenue from collecting documentary stamp taxes. On August 28, 1974, th…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
CROSS, Judge.
Appellants, Peter E. Swinscoe and Chloe M. Swinscoe, his wife, take an interlocutory appeal from an order entered by the trial court transferring venue to Leon County. We reverse.
Appellants, Peter E. Swinscoe and Chloe M. Swinscoe, his wife, sued appellee, Department of Revenue, in Broward County seeking to enjoin appellee from collecting certain documentary stamp taxes. The Department of Revenue filed a motion seeking a change of venue to Leon County where it “resides” and maintains its official headquarters. The trial court entered an order transferring the cause to Leon County. It is from this order that appellants take this interlocutory appeal.
The sole question presented for our determination on this appeal is whether the trial court erred transferring this action to Leon County.
Absent a waiver, a state agency may be sued in a county other than the situs of its official headquarters only when the official action complained of has, in fact, been or is being performed in the county wherein the suit is filed or when the threat of such action in said county is both real and imminent. Department of Revenue v. Arvida Corporation, 315 So. 2d 235, Opinion filed July 2, 1975, Second District Court of Appeal Case; Department of Revenue v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association, 256 So. 2d 524 (Fla.App.1971).
Turning to the instant case, appellants were informed on August 28, 1974, by written notice from the Department of Revenue that a tax warrant and execution had been issued. Additionally, the notice further stated that “the tax warrant and execution are being delivered to [the] area supervisor . . . and he is instructed to withhold delivery of these documents to the Clerk of the Circuit Court and Sheriff until September 6, 1974. This extension of time is provided in the event you wish to make a voluntary payment to the area supervisor before he delivers the documents for execution.” The tax not having been paid by appellants, the tax warrant was recorded on December 13, 1974 in the official records of Broward County.
It is our opinion that the official action taken by the Department of Revenue in this case was of such a nature as to require that appellants be allowed to bring suit in Broward County against the Department of Revenue. The trial court, therefore, erred in transferring this action to Leon County.
Accordingly, the order of the trial court herein appealed is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed.
WALDEN, C. J., and DOWNEY, J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. Falls Chase Special Taxing Dist., 424 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)…d 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). . 344 So. 2d at 590. . E.g., Graham v. Vann, 394 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Dept. of Revenue v. Arvida Corp., 315 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), cert. dism., 336 So. 2d 1181 (Fla.1976); Swinscoe v. Dept. of Revenue, 320 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert. dism., 337 So. 2d 976 (Fla.1976). . W.D. Snodgrass, “Tact and the Poet’s Force,” in In Radical Pursuit, Critical Essays and Lectures 7 (1977).…
-
Dep't OF Revenue v. Crisp, 337 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)…that issuing a tax warrant and execution to collect past-due taxes was a real and imminent “attempt” to seize property, and venue was proper in the county where the taxpayer did business. See also Swinscoe v. Department of Revenue, Fla.App.4th 1975, 320 So. 2d 11. The formal notice of assessment and demand for delinquent taxes in First Federal specifying the date payment was due and merely advising the taxpayer to pay the assessment to avoid service of a tax warrant was characterized as a contingent and anti…
-
Fla. Dep't OF Revenue v. Hardy, 697 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…as not an imminent “attempt” to seize and sell property of taxpayer; thus, proper venue of taxpayer’s action for declaratory judgment against Department of Revenue was Leon County, the official headquarters of the Department). Cf. Swinscoe v. State, 320 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert. dism’d, 337 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 1976) (where Department of Revenue gave taxpayers written notice that a tax warrant and execution had been issued against them and delivered to area supervisor, and warrant was subsequently rec…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Dep't OF Revenue v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n OF Fort Myers, 256 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971)
- Dep't OF Revenue v. Arvida Corp., 315 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)