CHASE & CO.
v.
BENEFIELD
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This personal injury action involved an appeal from a final judgment where the appellant argued procedural errors regarding the complaint's identification of the driver and failure to prove ownership.
The court found no error in the pleadings, as the appellant admitted ownership by failing to specifically deny it and proceeded to trial on the theory that Willie Reynolds was the driver.
The plaintiff alleged a motor vehicle owned by the appellant was negligently operated by its driver, causing injury. The appellant denied negligence a…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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MATHEWS, Justice.
This is an appeal from a final judgment in a personal injury action.
The appellee alleges that at the time and place of the accident a motor vehicle was being operated on the public highway which was owned by the appellant, and the same was so carelessly and negligently driven and operated by “the driver thereof” that as a proximate result, it ran upon and against and collided with an automobile owned, driven and operated by the appellee. The appellant filed an answer denying the nfegli-gence and also denied liability for the alleged acts of “Willie Reynolds,” and alleged the appellant did not authorize or consent to the use of the automobile by Willie Reynolds. Appellant further alleged that at said time Willie Reynolds was not engaged in the business of the defendant (appellant) and was not acting in the scope of his employment. In another defense appellant denied the acts of Willie Reynolds and alleged that there was no relationship between the defendant (appellant) and Willie Reynolds of master and servant.
The appellant alleges as error the fact that the complaint did not state that Willie Reynolds was driving the automobile and did not in fact identify the driver. The complaint simply alleged that the automobile was owned by the defendant (appellant) and was being driven by the driver thereof.
The appellant did not attack the sufficiency of the complaint on that ground by motion to dismiss, motion to'strike or for a disclosure of the name of the driver. Instead of attacking the sufficiency of the complaint, appellant filed defenses and in three separate defenses assumed that Willie Reynolds was the driver of the car and specifically denied .that Willie Reynolds had authority or consent from the appellant, and alleged that he did not have such authority or consent; that Willie Reynolds was not engaged upon the business of the defendant (appellant), etc.; denied any relationship between appellant and Willie Reynolds of master and servant.
The case was tried upon the theory that Willie Reynolds was the driver of the truck and all the testimony related tO' Willie Reynolds as the driver, his relationship with the defendant and his authority to drive.
There was no error as shown by the pleadings in this case because the complaint did not allege that Willie Reynolds was the driver of the automobile.
It is next urged that the appellee failed to prove that the automobile (truck) was owned by the defendant (appellant). This was a material allegation of the complaint and was not specifically denied by the appellant and, therefore, ownership was .admitted and was not an issue in the case. The primary question involved and properly raised by the assignments of error is: Was the automobile (truck) in question intrusted to the care and custody of an employee under the facts and circumstances shown by the record in this case, such that the owner of the truck is liable for the negligent operation of the vehicle by such employee on a public highway?
This is not a case like that of Sykes v. Babijuice Corp., Fla., 63 So. 2d 65. In that case Holt was employed as a night watchman and not as a driver of a truck, or automobile. He was employed to protect a citrus plant and the property in or surrounding the same. He was required to stay on the property and prevent the removal or molestation of the property. He did not have a driver’s license and had been refused employment as a truck driver; while engaged as such night watchman, without any express or implied permission, he tqok one of defendant’s trucks from the parking area and drove it off on a personal mission and while so doing collided with another vehicle.
In the instant case, as shown by the record, Willie Reynolds was employed by the owner of the truck as-a truck driver and had the custody of one of the trucks, which he used for the purpose of transporting a working crew; when not transporting the crew, he would bring the truck back and keep it at his house; he also kept the truck at his house on week-ends; he had the custody of the keys of the truck; he was permitted by the owner to keep the truck parked at his house because it would save three miles walking distance out to the farm.
It may be that he was instructed by the owner not to use the truck except to haul the crew but he was given custody of the truck and he was particularly employed as a truck driver, by the owner. This case is controlled by the cases of Jacksonville Paper Co. v. Carlile, 153 Fla. 661, 15 So. 2d 443, and Boggs v. Butler, 129 Fla. 324, 176 So. 174. In the case of Jacksonville Paper Co. v. Carlile, supra, the Court said:
“On the other hand, the owner of an automobile is charged with knowledge that it is a dangerous instrumentality when in operation on a highway whether moving or standing and if he entrust it to another, he is liable for its negligent handling.”
In the case of Boggs v. Butler, supra, the Court said [129 Fla. 324, 176 So. 176]:
“Under the law of this state, if the owner once gives his express or implied consent to another to operate his automobile, he is liable for the negligent operation of it no matter where the driver goes, stops, or starts.”
We have considered the other assignments of error with reference to charges to the jury and the sufficiency of the evidence.. They are without merit.
Affirmed.
ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, HOB-SON, SEBRING and DREW, JJ., concur..
.TERRELL, J., agrees to the judgment.
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Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fowler, 480 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 1985)…provide the second layer of coverage since Travelers’ insured, Enterprise Leasing, is only vicariously liable under Florida’s dangerous instrumentality doctrine. The dangerous instrumentality doctrine is explained in Chase and Company of Benefield, 64 So. 2d 922, 924 (Fla.1953): [T]he owner of an automobile is charged with knowledge that it is a dangerous instrumentality.... Under the laws of this state, if the owner once gives his express or implied consent to another to operate his automobile, he is liab…
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Leonard v. Susco CAR Rental Sys. OF Fla., Inc., 103 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)…s been given and the agent has exceeded his authority in the use made of an automobile, it appears that the liability of the owner will not be altered because of a departure beyond the scope of the authority.8 In Chase & Co. v. Benefield, Fla.1953, 64 So. 2d 922, 924, the driver was the employee of the owner and had custody of the automobile on week-ends. The owner was held liable even though the Court found: “It may be that he (the driver) was instructed by the owner not to use the truck except to haul the…
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Ball v. Inland Mut. Ins. Co., 121 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)…dict for the insurance company was wrong, and that it should be required to meet the prima facie case against it. . Herr v. Butler, 101 Fla. 1125, 132 So. 815, 816; Greene v. Miller, 102 Fla. 767, 136 So. 532. . Chase & Co. v. Benefield, Fla.1953, 64 So. 2d 922. . Chase & Co. v. Benefield, supra note 2. . City Grocery Co. v. Cothron, 117 Fla. 322, 157 So. 891, 892. . Lynch v. Walker, 159 Fla. 188, 31 So. 2d 268. . Weber v. Porco, Fla.1958, 100 So. 2d 146, 149. . Boggs v. Butler, 129 Fla. 324, 176 So.…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Boggs v. Butler, 129 Fla. 324 (Fla. 1937)
- State v. Keller, 129 Fla. 276 (Fla. 1937)
- Lester v. State, 153 Fla. 661 (Fla. 1943)
- Shaw v. Perlmutter, 63 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1953)
- Sykes v. Babijuice Corp., 63 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1953)