WILLIAM ALFONSO MARTIN, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1975-11-18
No. 75-530
Before BARKDULL, C. J., and PEARSON and HAVERFIELD, JJ.
323 So. 2d 666 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1975) Caution
Cited by 14 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Martin was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident with personal injury. He appealed on the ground that evidence of a concussion he sustained proved he lacked the willfulness required by the statute, but the appellate court affirmed, holding that lack of mental capacity is an affirmative defense and the evidence was sufficient to support conviction.


Holding

The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support conviction because lack of mental capacity is an affirmative defense, not an element the State must disprove. The trial court properly determined that the conflicting evidence on whether the defendant's head injury prevented him from forming criminal intent was a factual question for the trial court to resolve.


Headnotes

[1] Lack of mental capacity due to injury sustained before leaving the scene of an accident is an affirmative defense in a prosecution for leaving the scene of an accident in…

[2] The State proves the offense of leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury by establishing that the defendant drove into another vehicle causing damage an…

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Key Quotes

“the defense of lack of mental capacity is an affirmative defense”

Establishes that the burden is on the defendant to prove lack of mental capacity, not on the State to prove its presence

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Facts & Procedural History

Martin, driving an automobile, collided with another vehicle, causing extensive damage and injuring a person inside. After the collision, Martin drove…

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Opinion of the Court
PEARSON, Judge.

PEARSON, Judge.

The appellant was charged with “leaving [the] scene of [an] accident involving personal injury” in violation of Fla.Stat. § 316.027. After a trial before the court without jury, he was found guilty as charged and sentenced to serve a period of one year in the county stockade. This appeal is from that judgment and sentence.

Two points are presented but they are argued together in that in each case the appellant urges an insufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. The gist of appellant’s argument is that inasmuch as there is evidence in the record which would support a conclusion that the defendant sustained a concussion before he left the scene of the accident that the State’s case was, therefore, not proved beyond a reasonable doubt because it is possible that the defendant did not know what he was doing and, accordingly, lacked the element of willfulness required in the felony defined by Fla.Stat. § 316.027(2). See State ex rel. Miller v. Patterson, Fla.App. 1973, 284 So. 2d 9.

We hold that the evidence is sufficient because the defense of lack of mental capacity is an affirmative defense. In this case, the best that can be said for the defense is that it raised an issue of fact to be decided upon the conflicting evidence by the trial court.

The State’s case was proved when it was established that the defendant, as the driver of the automobile, drove into the side of another car where the damage was extensive and a person therein was injured and that, thereafter, without making any investigation, he drove away. Intent, being a state of mind, is usually not susceptible to proof but must be gathered from the facts and circumstances of a particular case. Skold v. State, Fla.App.1972, 263 So. 2d 627. Until the contrary is proved, an individual is presumed to intend the ordinary results of his acts. See American Fire and Casualty Company v. Sunny South Aircraft Service, Fla.1963, 151 So. 2d 276; and see Pell v. State, 1929, 97 Fla. 650, 122 So.

110. The defendant attempted to meet the State’s case by presenting a claim of head injury which might result in an incapacity to form a criminal intent. This defense was similar in nature to a defense of insanity at the time of the act in that it claimed a lack of mental capacity. It is well established that insanity is an affirmative defense. See Brady v. State, Fla.App.1966, 190 So. 2d 607, and Byrd v. State, Fla.App.1965, 178 So. 2d 886.

Under the facts of this case, the issue was properly one for the trier of fact to determine. The issue of mental capacity could have been taken from the trier of fact only if there were insufficient evidence for the question to go to the trier of fact or if the defense were proved as a matter of law. See 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1130 (1961) and the cases cited thereat; cf. Frazee v. State, Fla.App.1975, 320 So. 2d 462 (released Oct. 21, 1975).

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Williams v. State, 505 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)
    …re is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s rejection of appellant’s affirmative defense of intoxication. Accordingly, we affirm appellant’s conviction for leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injuries. See Martin v. State, 323 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). Appellant also challenges a condition of her probation which required her to pay restitution to her employer or her insurance company, if the insurance company reduced its claim to a judgment and notified the court. She contends…
  • Heisterman v. State, 327 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
    …rges that the cumulative effect of all the evidence raises a doubt as to che defendant’s mental competency botn at the time of the offenses and the time of trial. Neither of these points presents reversible error. See Martin v. State, Fla. App.1975, 323 So. 2d 666. It should be noted that these points were not presented in the trial court. See State v. Barber, Fla. 1974, 301 So. 2d 7. Appellant’s fourth point challenges the propriety of the charge to the jury. In view of defendant’s failure to object to the…
  • Dubois v. State, 410 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
    …PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Chason v. State, 148 Fla. 540, 4 So. 2d 691 (1941); Martin v. State, 323 So. 2d 666 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); Brown v. State, 391 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Williams v. State, 400 So. 2d 542 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Bolen v. State, 375 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).…

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