CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, A FLORIDA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
THE NEW FLORIDIAN HOTEL, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, D/B/A BISCAYA HOTEL, ET AL., APPELLEES
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No and no. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Rehnquist held that the school district was not entitled to sovereign immunity, which generally extended to the states themselves and to state officials in their official capacities. He reasoned that the board was more akin to a municipal corporation, given its independent power to issue bonds and levy taxes. While acknowledging that Doyle’s claims were not defeated by the fact that he lacked tenure and that his call to the station was protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court rejected the district court’s conclusion that the board’s consideration of the call in itself violated Doyle’s rights. He questioned the “substantial part” rule used by the district court, expressing concern that it might prevent employers from properly and thoroughly assessing employees’ performance when employers are aware of protected conduct. Instead, Justice Rehnquist held that the district court should have also determined whether the board showed by a preponderance of evidence that it would have reached the same decision if it had not considered Doyle’s phone call to the radio station. Finally, although the school district argued that it was not a “person” for purposes of a § 1983 claim, Justice Rehnquist declined to answer whether Doyle’s § 1331 federal question claim was limited by the terms of § 1983. He noted that Doyle demonstrated a proper federal question and claimed more than $10,000 in damages, given the potential value of his reinstatement.
[1] In a declaratory judgment action seeking to reclassify an establishment's business license, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving all material allegations of the comp…
[2] A party seeking a declaratory judgment that they are not in breach of any municipal ordinance implicitly places their compliance with all relevant ordinances at issue.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFred Doyle was a certified teacher and employee of the Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education from 1966 until 1971. In 1969, he was elect…
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NATHAN, Judge.
This is an appeal by the City of Miami Beach, defendant in the trial court, from a final judgment in a declaratory judgment action by The New Floridian Hotel, Inc., d/b/a Biscaya Hotel, A. Lionel Bosem, d/b/a President Madison Hotel and A. Lionel Bosem d/b/a Coronet Hotel, plaintiffs, finding that the plaintiffs’ establishments are boarding houses and not hotels within the purview of the City of Miami Beach Occupational License Chapter of the City Code, and requiring the defendant to license the plaintiffs’ establishments as boarding houses, and from a cost judgment entered against the defendant.
The plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment in order to determine whether the three establishments, Biscaya Hotel, President Madison Hotel and Coronet Hotel, are hotels or boarding houses for the purpose of payment of city occupational license fees. The plaintiffs claim to operate boarding houses since their guests, mainly elderly persons, lease the accommodations for long-term stays, rather than transient visits, and since many of the customary hotel services are not provided. The complaint asks the court to determine, inter alia, “. . . that the plaintiff is not in breach of any municipal ordinance. . . .” The City of Miami Beach filed an answer denying the material allegations of the plaintiffs’ complaint, contending that the plaintiff’s establishments are hotels and must be licensed as such.
At trial, the plaintiffs introduced into evidence copies of Chapter 17 and Chapter 20 of the Code of the City of Miami Beach. Chapter 17 defines and regulates boarding houses, hotels and rooming houses. Chapter 20 provides regulations which apply to the fee schedule for occupational licenses. Section 20-15 of Chapter 20 provides that, “No license shall be issued except in conformity with the zoning ordinance.” During the presentation of the defendant’s case, the city attorney sought to admit into evidence, a City of Miami Beach zoning ordinance which places a unit density maximum on boarding houses and provides for the areas in which they may be located. Counsel for the plaintiffs objected to the admission of or any reference to, the zoning ordinance as being a complete surprise and not material to the pleadings. The objection was sustained and the City was not permitted to raise the zoning issue in defense of the action.
Following the trial, the court entered a final judgment in which it determined that although the plaintiffs used the word “ho tel” in their advertising, the evidence rebutted the presumption that the three establishments are hotels, and proved that they are boarding houses. The court ordered that they be so classified and directed the City of Miami Beach to issue boarding house licenses to them. The judgment prohibited the plaintiffs from further use of the word “hotel” in the names or on the stationery or brochures or in any other manner. A cost judgment was also entered against the defendant. This appeal ensued.
The City of Miami Beach contends that the trial court erred in refusing to permit introduction of the zoning ordinance relating to boarding houses. We agree. Básed not only on the plaintiffs’ prayer for a declaration that they are “not in breach of any municipal ordinance,” but also on the plaintiffs’ reliance on and admission into evidence of Chapter 20 of the City Code which provides that licenses must be issued in conformity with the zoning ordinance, we find that it was incumbent on the plaintiffs to prove that they were entitled to operate a boarding house within the applicable zoning classifications for each of the establishments involved. In an action for a declaratory decree, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing the existence of a present, actual controversy, as well as proving the material allegations of the complaint. Groover v. Adiv Holding Company, Fla.App.1967, 202 So. 2d 103, 104. The owner of land is chargeable with knowledge of general laws prescribing the manner in which it may be enjoyed or the title thereto affected. Allstate Mortgage Corporation of Florida v. City of Miami Beach, Fla.App.1975, 308 So. 2d 629, 632. Since the plaintiffs’ own exhibits incorporated by reference the provisions of the ordinance, they had the burden of proving they were not in violation of it. Evidence which assists in making known the truth upon the issue in question should be admitted as evidence. Prior v. Oglesby, 1905, 50 Fla. 248, 39 So. 593.
Therefore, it was error to refuse to admit the zoning ordinance. The final judgment and the cost judgment are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
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Donahue v. Albertson's Inc., 472 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)…Campbell, 104 Fla. 274, 139 So. 886 (1932). The converse of this rule is embodied in the maxim that evidence which assists in making known the truth upon an issue in question should be admitted. See City of Miami Beach v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 324 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); see also Steiger v. Massachusetts Casualty Insurance Co., 273 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) (plaintiff is entitled to present evidence on the facts that are relevant to his theory of the case). Thus, “[t]he test of inadmissibility…
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Springfield Life Ins. Co. v. Edwards, 375 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…this reference may also tangentially have tended to reveal Edwards’ general financial condition would not have justified its exclusion from evidence. See Johnson v. State, 130 So. 2d 599 (Fla.1961); City of Miami Beach v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 324 So. 2d 715, 717 (Fla.3d DCA 1976); 13 Fla.Jur., Evidence, Section 112 (1957). Even more clearly, there was no error in the trial court’s failure to grant the plaintiff’s motion for a [*1124] mistrial on this ground. Since these rulings were therefore correct w…
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Dorsey Thompson and Joyce Thompson v. United States Sugar Corp., 548 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)…Campbell, 104 Fla. 274, 139 So. 886 (1932). The converse of this rule is embodied in the maxim that evidence which assists in making known the truth upon an issue in question should be admitted. See City of Miami Beach v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 324 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); See also Steiger v. Massachusetts Casualty Insurance Co., 273 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) (plaintiff is entitled to present evidence on the facts that are relevant to his theory of the case). Thus, “[t]he test of inadmissibility…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Allstate Mortg. Corp. of Fla. v. City OF Miami Beach, 308 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)
- Hodges v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 202 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967)
- Prior v. Oglesby, 50 Fla. 248 (Fla. 1905)