MOISES S. HERNANDEZ, APPELLANT,
v.
SHEILA I. HERNANDEZ, APPELLEE
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In this Florida family law case, the court addresses whether a circuit court has jurisdiction to modify the amount of periodic alimony contained in a settlement agreement that was incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution. The court holds that Florida Statute § 61.14 authorizes consideration of the wife's petition for redetermination of alimony.
The court holds that Florida Statute § 61.14 authorizes the consideration of the wife's petition for redetermination of alimony. The court affirms without expressing an opinion on the merits of the petition itself.
[1] A circuit court has jurisdiction to modify the amount of alimony in an agreement that was entered into during the pendency of a cause and subsequently adopted and incorpo…
[2] Florida Statute § 61.14 authorizes a court to consider a petition for redetermination of alimony.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We hold that Fla.Stat. § 61.14 authorizes the consideration of the wife's petition.”
The court's holding that statutory authority exists for the circuit court to consider a petition for redetermination of alimony
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties entered into a Property and Alimony Settlement Agreement during the pendency of the dissolution action. The agreement was adopted and inco…
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PER CURIAM.
The question presented by this appeal is whether the circuit court has jurisdiction to modify as to amount of alimony an agreement which was entered into by the parties during the pendency of the cause and was subsequently adopted and incorporated into the final judgment.1
After the dissolution was entered, and prior to the expiration of the time for the payment of periodic alimony,2 the wife brought a Petition for Redetermination of Alimony. In addition to the alimony provision, the agreement provided for the payment of child support, some expenses and an agreement by the wife to vacate the “husband’s home.”
We hold that Fla.Stat. § 61.14 authorizes the consideration of the wife’s petition. By this holding, we do not express any opinion as to the merits thereof. See Lee v. Lee, Fla.App.1975, 309 So. 2d 26; and Cantor v. Cantor, Fla.App. 1975, 306 So. 2d 596.
Affirmed.
. The final judgment of dissolution provides as follows:
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“2. The Parties heretofore having entered into a Property and Alimony Settlement Agreement and the Court having examined same, hereby adopts same and incorporates it into this Order of Final Judgment. The said Property and Alimony Settlement Agreement is attached to this Final Judgment as Exhibit T.’ ”
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. The agreement provided as to alimony as follows:
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“2. The Husband shall pay to the Wife as alimony, the sum of Five Hundred and No/100 ($500.00) Dollars per month in advance on the first (1st) day of each month, beginning on October 1, 1971, and continuing for the next twenty-four (24) consecutive months. Following such period, the husband shall pay to the wife the sum of Four Hundred and No/100 ($400.00) Dollars per month, in advance, on the first Cist) day of each month, beginning on October 1, 1973, and continuing for the next consecutive twenty-four (24) months. In addition thereto, the Husband shall pay to the Wife the sum of Three Thousand Nine Hundred and No/100 (3,900.-00) Dollars, within three (3) days of the signing of this Agreement.”
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“All payments as outlined in this paragraph shall cease upon either the death or remarriage, of the Wife. In the event of the Husband’s death, his Estate shall be liable for the alimony payments called for in this paragraph.”
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Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Pujals v. Pujals, 414 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…612 (Fla.1981); Schottenstein v. Schottenstein, 384 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), review denied, 392 So. 2d 1378 (Fla.1980); Sima v. Sima, 337 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Cann v. Cann, 334 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Hernandez v, Hernandez, 325 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Lee v. Lee, 309 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Cantor v. Cantor, 306 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Because the issue is a jurisdictional one, it does not matter that the petition was filed on the very last day of the rehabilitati…
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Reid v. Reid, 396 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…to modify an award of rehabilitative alimony filed, as here, before the period for payment of rehabilitative alimony expires. Cantor v. Cantor, 306 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Lee v. Lee, 309 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Hernandez v. Hernandez, 325 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). While not directly in issue for our determination, we deem it expedient to treat a related argument espoused by appel-lee in order to forestall the possibility of a subsequent appeal based on that position. It is appellee’s cont…
Authorities Cited
- Ranelle M. LEE v. LEE, 309 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Cantor v. Cantor, 306 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)