WALTER ABRAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Walter Abrams appeals his robbery conviction, arguing the trial judge committed reversible error by shaking hands with and conversing with the state's key witness in the jury's presence after her testimony, creating the appearance the judge endorsed her credibility. The court agrees and reverses, holding that judges must avoid any conduct that conveys their opinion of witness credibility to the jury.
The trial judge's conduct was reversible error. The court held that judges have an affirmative duty to avoid any comments or conduct that expressly or inferentially convey their opinion of the weight, character, or credibility of evidence. The judge's handshake and conversation with the state's key witness allowed the jury to reasonably infer that the judge believed her to be a credible and honest witness, which was prejudicial to the defendant.
[1] A judge's conduct must avoid conveying any intimation of their opinion as to the weight, character, or credibility of evidence presented to the jury.
[2] A judge's personal familiarity with a witness, if revealed to the jury, can create an inference of witness credibility.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“great care should always be observed by the judge to avoid the use of any remark in the hearing of the jury that is capable, directly or indirectly, expressly, inferentially, or by innuendo, of conveying any intimation as to what view he takes of the case, or that intimates his opinion as to the weight, character or credibility of any evidence adduced”
Establishes the foundational principle that judges must avoid all conduct that signals their view of witness credibility to the jury
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter the state's key witness and victim finished testifying in a robbery case, she approached the judge's bench and shook hands with him while engagi…
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WALDEN, Chief Judge.
Defendant appeals his conviction of robbery. On appeal he urges that the trial judge committed reversible error due to his inadvertent prejudicial conduct. We agree and reverse.
The conduct in question occurred after the first day of testimony in the presence of the jury. After the state’s key witness (and victim of the crime) finished testifying, she went up to the Bench and shook hands with the judge and visited with him and they engaged in conversation. As the judge later stated, he and his family had known the witness for years. The defendant moved for a mistrial which was denied.
It is incumbent upon all judges to avoid any comments or conduct which convey expressly or inferentially his opinion of the weight, character or credibility of any evidence adduced; as the court in Lester v. State, 37 Fla. 382, 20 So. 232 (1896) admonishes :
“ . . . great care should always be observed by the judge to avoid the use of any remark in the hearing of the jury that is capable, directly or indirectly, expressly, inferentially, or by innuendo, of conveying any intimation as to what view he takes of the case, or that intimates his opinion as to the weight, character or credibility of any evidence adduced. All matters of fact, and all testimony adduced, should be left to the deliberate, independent, voluntary, and unbiased judgment of the jury, wholly uninfluenced by any instruction, remarks or intimation, either in express terms or by inuendo from the judge, from which his view of such matters may be discerned. Any other course deprives the accused of his right to trial by jury, and is erroneous.” Id. 20 So. at 234.
see Hunter v. State, 314 So. 2d 174 (4th DCA Fla. 1975).
From the judge’s shaking hands and conversing with the state’s witness, the jury could most reasonably infer that he believed her to be a very credible, honest witness. This inadvertent conduct was prejudicial to the defendant, especially in view of the fact that this was the state’s key witness. See Robinson v. State, 161 So. 2d 578 (3rd DCA Fla.1964).
We, therefore, reverse defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
OWEN, J., concurs.
DOWNEY, J., dissents, with opinion.
DOWNEY, Judge
(dissenting).
Unquestionably a trial judge must be circumspect in what he says and does in the presence of the jury. And while undue recognition of certain witnesses in the presence of the jury should be avoided, I am not convinced that reversible error was committed in the trial of this case. On the contrary, the totality of the evidence convinces me that the judicial conduct complained of was at most harmless error.
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State v. Abrams, 350 So. 2d 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)…nt, Walter Abrams’ motion for discharge. We reverse. Abrams was found guilty after a jury trial and sentenced to ten years imprisonment for robbery. On appeal, Abrams’ conviction was reversed by this court and remanded for new trial, as reported at 326 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). While a private attorney had initially represented Abrams, the public defender was appointed to prosecute the appeal. On remand, private counsel was served notice of Abrams’ new trial date, at which time he moved to withdraw fro…
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Marr v. State, 470 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…n my judgment, is simply to acknowledge them as being declaratory of the general, judicial rule that judges should ordinarily refrain from expressing comments relating to the weight, character or credibility of the evidence adduced, Abrams v. State, 326 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Raulerson v. State, 102 So. 3d 281 (Fla.1958); Gans v. State, 134 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961), but not as divesting a trial judge from exercising his or her inherent discretion to so instruct when the standard instructions do…
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Reyes v. State, 547 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989)…4 (Fla.1896); Peek v. State, 488 So. 2d 52 (Fla.1986); Whitenight v. Int’l Patrol & Detective Agency, Inc., 483 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1333 (Fla.1986); Keane v. State, 357 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Abrams v. State, 326 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). In the case before us, the trial judge departed from his impartial role and commented on the testi [*348] mony of witnesses. The court’s comments were especially damaging because the outcome of the case depended on the credibili…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Lester v. State, 37 Fla. 382 (Fla. 1896)
- Carlton Robinson v. State, 161 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Hunter v. State, 314 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)