WARREN ALLISON IVEY, JR., PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. | 1976-02-11
No. 47249
Overton, J., Adkins, C.J., Roberts, J., Boyd, J., England, J.
327 So. 2d 219 Florida Supreme Court (1976) Positive Treatment
Cited by 14 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Florida Supreme Court held that jail time served as a special condition of probation must be credited toward a subsequent jail sentence imposed upon probation revocation, overruling the District Court's reliance on Section 948.06(2).


Holding

Jail time served as a special condition of probation must be credited toward a jail sentence imposed following probation revocation.


Headnotes

[1] Time served in county jail as a special condition of probation must be credited toward a jail sentence imposed upon revocation of that probation.

Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Petitioner served six months in county jail as a special condition of a two-year probationary sentence. His probation was later revoked for violation …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
OVERTON, Justice.

OVERTON, Justice.

This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal reported at 308 So. 2d 565 (Fla.App.2nd, 1975). In it the District Court considered whether six months’ time petitioner had spent in county jail as a special condition of a two-year probationary sentence should be credited to a jail sentence later imposed by the trial court following revocation of that probation. The probation was revoked for a violation of its terms, and a three-year jail sentence imposed. The District Court held Section 948.06(2), Florida Statutes (1973), to be controlling, and refused to credit the six months’ county jail time toward petitioner’s newly imposed jail sentence.

The District Court decision is in conflict with our recent decision in State v. Jones, 327 So. 2d 18 (Fla.1976).1

The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. We dispense with oral argument. So much of the decision of the District Court that denies crediting the county jail time is quashed, and the cause is remanded with directions to credit petitioner with the time he served in the county jail as a special condition to the initial probation sentence. State v. Jones, supra; see North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). In all other respects the decision is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

ADKINS, C. J., and ROBERTS, BOYD and ENGLAND, JJ., concur. . We have jurisdiction. Art. Y, § 3(b) (3), Fla.Const. (1972).


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • DeLAUGHTER v. State, 337 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
    …ed in the instant sentence of two years in the state penitentiary. It undisputedly appears that he was not given credit for the aforementioned eighteen months served as conditions of probation. He should have been given it. Ivey v. State (Fla.1976), 327 So. 2d 219. In view thereof, the cause is remanded with directions that the sentence herein be recorded to reflect credit for time served as conditions of the previous two periods of probation. While it is, of course, not necessary that appellant be present f…
  • Freeman v. State, 329 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)
    …rd on appeal we are of the opinion that the legal issues raised in this appeal have been laid to rest by the Supreme Court in its recent decisions of State v. Jones, Fla., 327 So. 2d 18, opinion filed January 14, [*414] 1976 and Ivey v. State, Fla., 327 So. 2d 219, opinion filed February 11, 1976. These decisions essentially hold that trial courts have both the general and specific authority to impose a split sentence probation alternative, i. e. imprisonment as condition for probation; and that upon a findi…
  • Robinson v. State, 827 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)
    …given credit for all the time he spent in jail prior to sentencing on the original charges and for time spent in jail after sentencing on the original charges. Appellant is entitled to such credit. See § 921.161(1), Fla. Stat. (2000); Ivey v. State, 327 So. 2d 219 (Fla.1976); Whitehead v. State, 677 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Sharp v. State, 303 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974). We note that the transcript of the plea colloquy filed by appellant in this Court indicates the possibility that there may have b…

Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw