EMMY LOU TIRONE, APPELLANT,
v.
ANTONIO TIRONE, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1976-02-10
No. 75-1142
Before PEARSON, HENDRY and NATHAN, JJ.
327 So. 2d 801 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1976) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

In a matrimonial appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court order that denied a wife's motion for relief from a final judgment based on her inability to pay her former attorney. The court held that access to courts cannot be conditioned on payment to a prior attorney, and that clients have the right to discharge attorneys and retain new counsel.


Holding

A party may not be deprived of the right to have an attorney on a motion for relief from final judgment because of failure to pay a previous attorney. A client has the absolute right to discharge an attorney at any time with or without cause, and the substitution of counsel is governed by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, not by the client's payment status to a former attorney.


Headnotes

[1] A client may discharge their attorney at any time, with or without cause.

[2] Access to the courts cannot be conditioned upon a litigant's payment to their attorney in prior litigation.

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Key Quotes

“access to the courts may not be conditioned upon actual payment to one's attorney in a prior litigation”

Establishes the core holding that a party cannot be denied court access based on unpaid prior attorney fees

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Facts & Procedural History

Emmy Lou Tirone sought relief from a final judgment in a matrimonial case. At a hearing on the husband's motion to dismiss the wife's motion for relie…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

[*802] PER CURIAM.

The order appealed here is entitled “Order On All Pending Motions.” The initial portion of this order provides as follows:

“THIS CAUSE came on to be heard, after due notice, on the ‘Husband’s Motion to Dismiss Wife’s Motion for Relief from Final Judgment and/or in the Alternative, for More Definite Statement’, the husband’s ‘Motion to Remove Exhibits’ and the husband’s ‘Contempt Motion and Notice of Hearing’ re: the execution of deeds as provided in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Final Judgment and the tax matters contained in paragraph 7 of the Final Judgment; and at said hearing the parties each personally appeared, the wife, however, remaining in the Court’s ante-chamber claiming that she was nauseous; the husband’s attorney of record, Irving B. Levenson of the law firm of Sibley, Giblin, Levenson & Ward, and the wife’s attorney of record, Daniel Neal Heller; and H. Lee Bauman, associate of Ellis Rubin, the wife’s attorney who the Court finds does not have standing to appear, having failed to submit and have entered an order on his motion for substitution of counsel filed at the time of the hearing conducted in this cause on April 28, 1975, which was orally granted, conditioned upon Mr. Heller being paid as heretofore agreed, as evidenced by the record in this case, that is, by a mortgage on the home which is to become solely the property of the wife after conveyance to her of the husband’s half interest therein, as provided in paragraph 3 of the Final Judgment; . . .” (Emphasis added)

* * * * *

One of the things decided by the order is a denial of the wife’s motion for relief from final judgment filed pursuant to RCP 1.-540.

The thrust of the appeal is that the court may not deprive the wife of the right to have an attorney on a rule 1.540 motion because she has not paid the attorney who handled her initial cause. We hold that access to the courts may nob be conditioned upon actual payment to one’s attorney in a prior litigation. The extent to which a change of lawyers in pending litigation can be conditioned upon a security of the rights of the prior lawyer is governed by RCP 1.030(e). In representing a client, an attorney acts pursuant to a contract for personal services and, therefore, may be discharged by the client at any time with or without cause. See 610 Lincoln Road, Inc. v. Kelner, Fla.App. 1974, 289 So. 2d 12. Therefore, the trial judge was in error in holding that the wife’s attorney had no standing to appear and, having so determined, was in error in proceeding to a final determination of that motion. Therefore, the order appealed is reversed insofar as it rules upon the motion for relief from final judgment, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings thereon.

Reversed and remanded.

HENDRY, J., dissents.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Osman v. Hialeah Hous. Auth., 785 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1986)
    …ida case law the personal and confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship means that a client has the right to discharge his attorney either with or without cause. Goodkind v. Wolkowsky, 132 Fla. 63, 180 So. 538 (1938); Tirone v. Tirone, 327 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 3d DCA [*1551] 1976). The right to discharge one’s counsel is absolute and is not modified by a written agreement. Adams v. Fisher, 390 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Implied in every contract of legal employment is the right of the client t…

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