EDWARD HEINEMAN AND JAMES LEHMAN, APPELLANTS,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellants Heineman and Lehman appealed their convictions for buying, receiving, or concealing stolen property and possessing marijuana, arguing the trial court erred by finding them guilty without sufficient evidence of their knowledge of the crimes' essential elements. The court affirmed, holding that knowledge as a state of mind can be inferred from circumstances and that the trial judge's factual findings are entitled to deference on appeal.
The court held that no reversible error was demonstrated. Knowledge, being a state of mind like intent, can be inferred from the circumstances of the case by the trier of fact, and the trial judge's factual findings in a nonjury trial are entitled to the weight of a jury verdict.
[1] Knowledge, as a state of mind, is often not subject to direct proof and can only be inferred from the circumstances of the case by the trier of fact.
[2] In a nonjury trial, a judge's factual findings are entitled to the weight of a jury verdict.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Knowledge is an elusive quality. Like intent, since it is a state of mind, it is often not subject to direct proof and can only be inferred from the circumstances of the case by the trier of fact.”
Establishes that knowledge of stolen property and contraband presence can be inferred from circumstantial evidence rather than requiring direct proof
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellants were tried before a judge without a jury on March 23, 1973. The trial court found them guilty of buying, receiving, or concealing stolen pr…
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PER CURIAM.
Appellants, defendants below, appeal their adjudications of guilty and concomitant sentences for buying, receiving, or concealing stolen property and possessing more than five grams of marijuana.
A nonjury trial was held on March 23, 1973, at which time appellants were found guilty of the offense stated above. On May 4, 1973, the trial court adjudicated appellants guilty as charged and sentenced each of them to three years in the state penitentiary. On March 31, 1975, a petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed in this court by which appellant sought a belated direct appeal of their convictions and sentences. On April 1, 1975, this court granted the relief requested in the petition and ordered that it be treated as a notice of appeal.
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in finding them guilty of buying, receiving, or concealing stolen property because no evidence was adduced at trial to establish that they knew the subject property was stolen, thereby violating their constitutional right to due process of law. Appellants also contend that the trial court erred in finding them guilty of the possession of marijuana because appellee failed to establish an essential element of the crime, i. e., their knowledge of the presence of the contraband.
Knowledge is an elusive quality. Like intent, since it is a state of mind, it is often not subject to direct proof and can only be inferred from the circumstances of the case by the trier of fact. Skold v. State, Fla.App.1972, 263 So. 2d 627; Jones v. State, Fla.App.1966, 192 So. 2d 285; and Scott v. State, Fla.App.1962, 137 So. 2d 625. Where, as in the instant appeal, a case is tried nonjury before a judge his factual findings are entitled to the weight of a jury verdict. We must assume that he drew from the facts established those reasonable conclusions most unfavorable to appellants. Jefferson v. State, Fla.App.1974, 298 So. 2d 465; Skold v. State, Fla.App. 1972, 263 So. 2d 627; and Parrish v. State, Fla.App.1957, 97 So. 2d 356. On appeal, this court can not substitute its judgment of such matters for that of the trier of fact. Jefferson v. State, supra; and Loprince v. State, Fla.App.1969, 218 So. 2d 212.
We have considered the record, all points in the -briefs and arguments of counsel in the light of the controlling principles of law, and have concluded that no reversible error has been demonstrated. Therefore, for the reasons stated and upon the authorities cited, the adjudications of guilt appealed are affirmed.
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (14 total)
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Hinkle v. State, 355 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)…rming this function we must assume that the jury believed the credible testimony and evidence most damaging to appel [*469] lant and drew from the facts established those reasonable conclusions most unfavorable to him. See, e. g., Heineman v. State, 327 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Starling v. State, 263 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Dreger v. State, 228 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); and Douglas v. State, 214 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968). See generally 2 Fla. Jur., Appeals §§ 308, 322, 340-15 (1963). I a…
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Fryc v. State, 377 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…t trial. See the principles of law discussed in State v. Hassberger, 350 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1977). There is evidence upon which the jury could find the defendant guilty despite his denial of knowledge of the controlled substance. See Heineman v. State, 327 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). Affirmed.…
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State v. Norris, 384 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)…parties and surrounding circumstances. Being a state of mind, intent is usually a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. State v. West, 262 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). In this respect knowledge is like intent. Heineman v. State, 327 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976). In summary, the State could well admit every fact alleged in the motion to dismiss and the accompanying affidavit and still make a case for the charge of attempting to obtain a prescription drug by fraud. Under these circumstan…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Esaw Jones v. State, 192 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Prentiss T. Parrish v. State, 97 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 1st DCA 1957)
- Jefferson v. State, 298 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Scott v. State, 137 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- Loprince v. State, 218 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- Skold v. State, 263 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)