STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
WILLIAM REGINALD NORRIS, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The State appeals the trial court's dismissal of fraud charges against Norris for attempting to obtain a prescription drug. The court reversed, holding that knowledge of fraudulent intent is a factual question for the jury, not a matter suitable for dismissal on the pleadings.
The court held that Norris's knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the prescription is a material factual question that cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss. Even if all facts alleged in the motion were admitted, the State could still prove the charge of attempting to obtain a prescription drug by fraud.
[1] A demurrer admits the truth of all facts well-pleaded in the complaint or motion to which it is directed.
[2] The knowledge of a defendant, like intent, is typically a question of fact for the trier of fact.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Intent is not usually subject to direct proof, but may be inferred from the acts of the parties and surrounding circumstances. Being a state of mind, intent is usually a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact.”
Establishes that intent/knowledge is a factual question for the jury, not for dismissal on the pleadings
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA pharmacist received a suspicious telephone call purporting to be from a doctor prescribing medication for a patient named Ben Stroud. When the pharm…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Demurrer cases and more on FLexlaw
HERSEY, Judge.
The State takes an appeal from an order granting appellee’s motion to dismiss.
Appellee was charged with attempting to obtain a prescription drug by fraud. The circumstances leading to this charge began with a telephone call to a pharmacist purportedly from a doctor prescribing medication for a patient, one Ben Stroud. The pharmacist called the doctor and as certained that no such telephone call had been made by him nor did he have a patient named Ben Stroud. Consequently, the pharmacist alerted the police who set up surveillance of the pharmacy. Upon appel-lee’s entry into the pharmacy and his request for the prescription for Ben Stroud, the police approached him, asked him for identification and then placed him under arrest. In response to an inquiry, appellee indicated that Ben Stroud was a friend and that he was picking up the prescription at his request. A police officer located a slip of paper in one of the pockets of appellee’s jacket, containing the name and address of Ben Stroud, the name and B.N.D. number, telephone number and partial ¿ddress of the physician who allegedly made the original call, the name and telephone number of the pharmacy, and the name tussionex (the prescription drug involved here).
Appellee filed a pleading entitled “Sworn Motion to Dismiss,” although the motion was not made under oath. Attached to and filed with the motion was an affidavit of appellee that quoted from a police report of the incident and contained a statement that the handwriting on the slip of paper found in appellee’s pocket was not his. The State filed a demurrer. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the basis that the demurrer accepted the facts alleged in the motion and that the facts “ . . .as stated in the motion are insufficient to prove that the Defendant has “knowledge” that the prescription was fraudulent.”
We find error and reverse.
Neither the motion nor the affidavit contain any suggestion that appellee was without knowledge of the fact that Ben Stroud was fraudulently attempting to obtain a prescription drug. In as much as the State’s demurrer does not admit that appel-lee was without such knowledge, this fact of knowledge remains a material fact in dispute between the parties and therefore subject to trial on the merits. Intent is not usually subject to direct proof, but may be inferred from the acts of the parties and surrounding circumstances. Being a state of mind, intent is usually a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. State v. West, 262 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). In this respect knowledge is like intent. Heineman v. State, 327 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976).
In summary, the State could well admit every fact alleged in the motion to dismiss and the accompanying affidavit and still make a case for the charge of attempting to obtain a prescription drug by fraud. Under these circumstances, the order granting defendant’s sworn motion to dismiss contains reversible error and is accordingly reversed. The case is remanded for such further proceedings as may be appropriate.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
DOWNEY and MOORE, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
In the Interest of S.T.N. v. State, 474 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)…rd, 395 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State v. Evans, 394 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); State v. McCray, 387 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); State v. Rogers, 386 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 392 So. 2d 1378 (Fla.1980); State v. Norris, 384 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); State v. J.T.S., 373 So. 2d [*886] 418 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); State v. West, 262 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972). We reversed a dismissal in State v. Alexander, supra, and said: Since the crux of the appellee’s argument rests upon…
-
State v. Evans, 394 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…idence or the credibility of the witnesses in determining whether there exists a genuine issue of material facts; nor substitute itself for the trier of the fact and determine controverted issues of fact. (Emphasis added). See also State v. Norris, 384 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). Sub judice, we hold that appellee’s intent was an issue for the triers of fact; consequently, the sworn motion to dismiss should have been denied. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for trial. REVERSED and REMANDED. DOWNEY an…
-
Grant v. State, 13 So. 3d 163 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…intent, knowledge (or its absence) must often be inferred from surrounding circumstances. See Heineman v. State, 327 So. 2d 898, 898 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (stating knowledge is “a state of mind ... often not subject to direct proof’); State v. Norris, 384 So. 2d 298, 299 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (stating that intent “may be inferred from ... surrounding circumstances” and that in “this respect knowledge is like intent”). Ms. Grant argues that, because evidence that she knew the check to be altered and that she inte…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. West, 262 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)
- Heineman v. State, 327 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)