RONALD JOSEPH JACKSON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Ronald Jackson was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny after a jury trial. He appealed challenging the denial of his motions for mistrial based on allegedly prejudicial references to his fingerprints on file and a prosecutor's comment, as well as the trial court's giving of an Allen Charge. The appellate court affirmed, finding no reversible error.
The appellate court held that no reversible error occurred. References to previously filed fingerprints were evidentiary improvident but harmless given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and the lack of objection or the defendant's decision against a cautionary instruction. The prosecutor's statement was legitimate comment on evidence, not a violation of the defendant's right not to testify. The Allen Charge was properly given.
[1] References to a defendant's previously taken or on-file fingerprints, while potentially improvident, do not automatically constitute reversible error, especially when con…
[2] The prejudicial effect of references to a defendant's fingerprints on file is generally less substantial than references to "mug shots."
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Those references to fingerprints previously taken, or on file, were evidentially improvident. However, as to one of them there was an absence of any objection and request for a cautionary instruction... and as to the other the defendant's attorney decided against the giving of an instruction to disregard, when such was proposed by the court.”
Establishes that while the fingerprint references were improper, harmless error principles apply given the lack of objection and defendant's own decision declining an instruction.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA lawyer's office was broken into over a Labor Day weekend. Coins valued over $100 and other items were stolen from a safe, and business machines were…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant was informed against, charged in one count with breaking and entering a building with intent to commit grand larceny, and in a second count charged with the crime of grand larceny. On a jury trial he was convicted on the first count, and has appealed therefrom. On the grand larceny count the jury was unable to agree and an order of mistrial was entered thereon.
While closed over Labor Day weekend, a lawyer’s office was broken into. Some coins of value in excess of $100.00 and other items were taken from a safe, and some business machines were taken. Fingerprints found in the office were determined to be those of the defendant. A confession was made by the defendant. His motion to suppress was heard and denied. The fingerprint evidence and confession were introduced at trial.
Appellant argues the court committed reversible error in denying his motions for mistrial following references in the prosecutor’s opening argument, and in testimony by a state’s witness as to comparison of defendant’s fingerprints found at the scene with his fingerprints previously made and on file. [The prints were also compared with standards taken for that purpose]. We hold that argument is without merit here.
Those references to fingerprints previously taken, or on file, were eviden-tially improvident.
However, as to one of them there was an absence of any objection and request for a cautionary instruction (Morris v. State, 100 Fla. 850, 130 So. 582), and as to the other the defendant’s attorney decided against the giving of an instruction to disregard, when such was proposed by the court.
Moreover, as argued by the state, any prejudicial effect thereof would not be of the substantiality which is attributed to references to “mug shots”, and even as to the latter it has been held that reference thereto will not constitute automatic reversibility, and that such references should be considered by an appellate court upon the entire record and surrounding circumstances, to determine whether they are of such character that neither rebuke nor retraction would entirely destroy their sinister influence. Loftin v. State, Fla. 1973, 273 So. 2d 70; Akin v. State, 86 Fla. 564, 98 So. 609, 612. Also, in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, the errors in that regard would not warrant reversal in this case, in view of the harmless error rule.
The trial court correctly denied the defendant’s motion for mistrial based on a claim that a statement made by the prosecutor in final argument amounted to a comment on the failure of the defendant to testify in his own behalf. Read in context, the challenged statement of the prosecutor was not of the character claimed by the defendant, but was legitimate comment on the evidence. No useful purpose would be served by setting out in this opinion the portion of the prosecutor’s argument showing the comment in question and the portions thereof which reveal the context of the argument in relation to which the statement was made. The ruling of the trial court in that connection is supportable under Gray v. State, 42 Fla. 174, 28 So. 53; Clinton v. State, 56 Fla. 57, 47 So. 389; State v. Jones, Fla.1967, 204 So. 2d 515; Woodside v. State, Fla.App.1968, 206 So. 2d 426.
We find no error in the giving of the “Allen Charge”, when the jury announced its indecision. State v. Bryan, Fla. 1974, 290 So. 2d 482; United States v. Furlong, 7 Cir. 1952, 194 F. 2d 1; Andrews v. United States, 5 Cir. 1962, 309 F. 2d 127. Lee v. State, Fla.App.1970, 239 So. 2d 136, is distinguishable on its facts.
No reversible error having been shown, the judgment is affirmed.
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Parrish v. State, 366 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…he card indicated that this was the case, or that the standards had been taken for any reason other than mere non-criminal identification, it is clear that no error, much less harmful error, has been demonstrated on this point. See Jackson v. State, 328 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Henderson v. State, 304 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Jenkins v. State, 208 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) cert. denied, 212 So. 2d 878 (Fla.1968); § 924.33, Fla.Stat. (1977). We likewise reject the defendant’s contention that t…
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Nelson v. State, 416 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)…tate, 316 So. 2d 41 (Fla.1975); Simmons v. State, 139 Fla. 645, 190 So. 756 (1939). However, a prosecutor’s remarks must always be examined with an eye to the context in which they appear. State v. Jones, 204 So. 2d 515 (Fla.1967); Jackson v. State, 328 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Duval v. State, 190 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). As the fifth circuit noted in United States v. Forrest, 620 F. 2d 446, 455-56 (5th Cir. 1980): [Statements that might appear improper when considered in a vacuum may be found pe…
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Lane v. State, 487 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. State v. DiGuilio, 10 FLW 430 (Fla. Aug. 29, 1985). See Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla.1982); Priestley v. State, 450 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Jackson v. State, 328 So. 2d 576, 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).…
Authorities Cited (11 total)
- State v. Jones, 204 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1967)
- Akin v. State, 86 Fla. 564 (Fla. 1923)
- Morris v. State, 100 Fla. 850 (Fla. 1930)
- Andrews v. United States, 309 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1962)
- State v. Bryan, 290 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1974)
- Gray v. State, 42 Fla. 174 (Fla. 1900)
- United States v. Furlong, 194 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1952)
- Buck Clinton and Edward Clinton v. State, 56 Fla. 57 (Fla. 1908)
- Loftin v. State, 273 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1973)
- Woodside v. State, 206 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)