NORMAN O. REESE, APPELLANT (HUSBAND),
v.
CAROL H. REESE, APPELLEE (WIFE)
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A divorcing husband sought to modify a permanent alimony obligation of $600 per month established in 1967. The Florida appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the modification, holding that the husband failed to demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances warranting relief from an alimony obligation the parties contemplated would be supplemented by the wife's employment.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the modification petition. The husband failed to demonstrate a substantial change in his circumstances—his financial condition had actually improved. Although the wife's circumstances had improved through employment, this was contemplated by the parties when they executed the stipulation and agreement.
[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a petition for modification of alimony when the payor's financial condition has improved and the payee's improved f…
[2] A substantial change in circumstances must be shown to warrant modification of a final judgment of divorce.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The husband did not show a substantial change in his circumstances. In fact, the evidence showed the husband's financial condition had improved.”
Establishes the controlling legal standard for modification of alimony—the husband must demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1967, the parties entered a stipulation and agreement providing for permanent alimony of $600 per month from the husband (taxable income $40,000 an…
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MILLS, Judge.
The husband appeals from an order denying his petition for modification of a final judgment entered in a divorce case.
The issue is whether the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the permanent alimony awarded to the wife by the judgment.
The judgment, which was entered in 1967, adopted the terms of a stipulation and agreement which’ provided that the husband would pay alimony of $600.00 a month to the wife for life. At that time, the husband had a taxable income of $40,000.00 a year. The wife was unemployed. The husband was required to pay $250.00 a month for the support of a minor son. In addition, the wife was made irrevocable beneficiary of the proceeds from a pension plan provided by the husband’s professional association.
Seven years later, at the modification hearing, the evidence disclosed that the husband’s taxable income had increased to $46,000.00, although he was suffering from hypertension which required that he reduce the number of hours he worked. The wife was employed and earned a net of $160.09 a week for ten months of the year. Additional education was required for her to maintain this earning capacity. She was in good health and had a master’s degree in speech therapy. The son, for whom the husband was required to pay $3,000 a year support, had reached majority and become self-supporting. The wife agreed that she be eliminated as the irrevocable beneficiary of the husband’s pension plan. The wife testified, without contradiction, that she and the husband entered into the stipulation and agreement with the understanding that it would be necessary for the wife to become employed in order to supplement the permanent alimony.
Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for modification and in refusing to set aside the alimony payable to the wife. The husband did not show a substantial change in his circumstances. In fact, the evidence showed the husband’s financial condition had improved. Although the wife’s financial condition had also improved, this was contemplated by the parties at the time the stipulation and agreement was signed by them.
AFFIRMED.
BOYER, C. J., and MELVIN, WOODROW M., Associate Judge, concur.
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Freeland v. Purcifull, 347 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)…ately $8,900. The fact that she now makes $11,900 is not sufficient to bar the continued receipt of alimony payments. The mere fact of an increase in the wife’s income does not amount to a substantial change in circumstances. Accord, Reese v. Reese, 330 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). More important is the fact that the husband’s income has risen during the same period from $15,700 to $21,300. Although the court is sympathetic with the financial plight of the husband, a modification or termination of an agree…
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McINTYRE v. McINTYRE, 380 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…d in Mrs. McIntyre’s forfeiture of an amount roughly equivalent to her alimony. This result, if permitted to stand, would not be a rule which would encourage the recipient of rehabilitative alimony to seek rehabilitation quickly. In Reese v. Reese, 330 So. 2d 89 (Fla.1st DCA 1976) the court denied a Petition for Modification on similar facts, a difference being that the alimony award was for life rather than for a set term as in the case sub judice. The court held; “The husband did not show a substantial ch…
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Galligher v. Galligher, 527 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)…1 So. 2d 781 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974); Scott v. Scott, 285 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973); Fort v. Fort, 90 So. 2d 313 (Fla.1956). . Linn v. Linn, 464 So. 2d 614 (Fla 4th DCA 1985); Freeland v. Purcifull, 347 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Reese v. Reese, 330 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). . Chastain v. Chastain, 73 So. 2d 66 (Fla.1954). . Schiff v. Schiff, 54 So. 2d 36 (Fla.1951); DeBowes v. DeBowes, 12 So. 2d 118 (Fla.1943).…
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