PAMELA S. FREELAND, FORMERLY KNOWN AS PAMELA S. PURCIFULL, APPELLANT,
v.
LEE MORTON PURCIFULL, APPELLEE
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The court reversed a trial court order terminating alimony payments where the former husband claimed changed financial circumstances. The court held that the husband's increased expenses (house, furniture, and debts incurred after the divorce) did not justify terminating alimony obligations based on a negotiated property settlement agreement.
The court reversed the termination order, holding that the husband failed to meet the heavier burden required to modify alimony based on a negotiated agreement. The husband's increased expenses caused by voluntary purchases and debts incurred after the divorce do not constitute a substantial change in circumstances justifying termination, particularly when his income actually increased.
[1] A party seeking modification of alimony based on an agreement bears a heavier burden than otherwise required.
[2] A substantial change in circumstances must be shown to justify modification of alimony or support payments.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[wjhere the amount of alimony is based upon agreement a heavier burden rests upon a party seeking a modification than would otherwise be required.”
Establishes the legal standard that modification of negotiated alimony requires a heavier burden than modification of court-ordered alimony.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties divorced in 1973, with a final judgment incorporating a property settlement agreement requiring the former husband to pay the former wife …
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OTT, Judge.
Appellant/former wife appeals an order modifying the final judgment of dissolution of marriage which relieved the appel-lee/former husband from making any alimony payments beyond a certain date.
The marriage of the parties was dissolved in 1973. The final judgment of dissolution incorporated a property settlement agreement which provided for the payment to appellant of $250 a month for five years or until her remarriage. In October of 1975, the lower court reduced the amount of support to $195 a month pursuant to a stipulation of the parties. On May 26, 1976 the husband filed a petition to terminate or reduce alimony payments on the ground that the financial circumstances of the parties had changed substantially since the entry of the final judgment of dissolution. The husband alleged that the wife was no longer in need of alimony payments and that he was not financially able to make the payments.
The trial court granted the petition. Appellant claims that this was error. We agree and reverse.
There is no question that the husband is on the verge of bankruptcy. However, the evidence concerning the husband’s substantial monthly expenses furnishes no legal rationale for a termination of his support obligations to his wife. In Scott v. Scott, 285 So. 2d 423, 424-25 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973) the court held that “[wjhere the amount of alimony is based upon agreement a heavier burden rests upon a party seeking a modification than would otherwise be required.” See Quinn v. Quinn, 307 So. 2d 848, 848-49 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Tsavaris v. Tsavaris, 307 So. 2d 845, 847 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 322 So. 2d 914 (Fla.1975).
The husband lives alone in a four bedroom, three bath house which he purchased and furnished after the final judgment of dissolution of marriage. Moreover, 'the majority of his substantial indebtedness — over and above his house and furniture payments — was also incurred after the dissolution of marriage.
To justify a modification of alimony or support payments the change of circumstances including financial circumstances of one or both of the parties must be substantial. Chastain v. Chastain, 73 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1954); See Section 61.14(1), Florida Statutes (1975); Quinn v. Quinn, supra; DeFrancisco v. DeFrancisco, 273 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973).
At the time of dissolution the wife’s earnings were approximately $8,900. The fact that she now makes $11,900 is not sufficient to bar the continued receipt of alimony payments. The mere fact of an increase in the wife’s income does not amount to a substantial change in circumstances. Accord, Reese v. Reese, 330 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). More important is the fact that the husband’s income has risen during the same period from $15,700 to $21,300. Although the court is sympathetic with the financial plight of the husband, a modification or termination of an agreement to pay alimony is not justified where the husband’s inability to pay is caused by matters within his control. Cf., Gamse v. Gamse, 291 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).
Reversed.
BOARDMAN, C. J., and HOBSON, J., concur.
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DePOORTER v. Win Edward DePOORTER, 509 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)…was set by the trial court based upon an agreement of the parties, bears a heavier burden than is otherwise the case. Tinsley v. Tinsley, 502 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Floyd v. Floyd, 393 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Freeland v. Purcifull, 347 So. 2d 726, 727 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). See also Adams v. Adams, 502 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. [*1145] 1st DCA 1987); Sheffield v. Sheffield, 310 So. 2d at 413. An agreement which fails to make provision for unmarried cohabitation may be interpreted as precluding reductio…
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Johnson v. Johnson, 386 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980). Whether or not a sufficient change in circumstances occurred in this case requires the consideration of the totality of the parties’ circumstances. Taplin v. Taplin, 341 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Freeland v. Purcifull, 347 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). Where the alimony obligation is based on an agreement, a heavier burden is on the applicant to establish the change as sufficient.3 The lower court in this case disregarded the affluent circumstances of the former husband, and th…
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Cowie v. Cowie, 564 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)…bligations sometimes made it difficult for him to pay his alimony obligation. As a matter of law, however, these obligations, [*535] which he had voluntarily created, are not sufficient grounds to modify the amount of alimony. Freeland v. Purcifull, 347 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Johnson v. Johnson, 386 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); McIntyre v. McIntyre, 380 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Concerning the former wife’s financial condition, two matters were presented. First, the former husband establish…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Chastain v. Chastain, 73 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1954)
- Scott v. Scott, 285 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973)
- Tsavaris v. Tsavaris, 307 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Gwenn Cantor Gamse v. Edmond Gamse, 291 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974)
- Valle v. State, 273 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973)
- Reese v. Reese, 330 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- Wilson v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 322 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1975)
- Archie GAY et ux. v. Brevard Cnty., 322 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1975)
- Quinn v. Maxie E. Quinn, 307 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)