J. H. TURNER, TRADING AND DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE TRADE NAME OF TURNER PRODUCE COMPANY,
v.
F. B. KREIDER AND G. W. SHUBERT, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CO-PARTNERS TRADING AND DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE TRADE NAME OF TROPICAL REFRIGERATING COMPANY

Fla. | 1944-06-23
BUFORD, C. J., TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.
154 Fla. 832 Florida Supreme Court (1944) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 19 So. 2d 408
Cited by 12 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Turner sued Kreider and Shubert for breach of warranty in the construction of a cold storage plant, claiming defects in refrigeration coils, fan installation, and automatic operation caused spoilage and shrinkage losses. The trial court reduced a $4,000 jury verdict to $900 via remittitur, but the Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding the reduction was unsupported by the evidence and the original verdict was justified.


Holding

The trial court abused its discretion in entering the remittitur order because the evidence sufficiently supported the jury's damage award. The verdict was not excessive; the trial court's order provided no rational basis for the specific reduction and did not identify which damage items it was rejecting, and the evidence established spoilage losses of $2,226.33, coil replacement costs of $700, and supported the jury's assessment of other damages.


Key Quotes

“Damages are seldom capable of proof to a mathematical certainty and juries may be so instructed.”

Establishes the legal standard that damages do not require precise mathematical proof, supporting the jury's damage assessment despite some imprecision in certain elements.

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Facts & Procedural History

Turner contracted with Kreider and Shubert (Tropical Refrigerating Company) to construct a cold storage plant according to plans and specifications. T…

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Opinion of the Court
ADAMS, J.:

ADAMS, J.:

This appeal brings for review the following order:

“This cause coming on this day, to wit, December 10, 1943, to be heard upon motion for new trial in this cause, *833and the matter having been argued by counsel and the Court being fully advised in the premises, is of the opinion that the verdict is excessive. There was some evidence that the normal shrinkage of beef was three percent and there was some testimony in the case that there was a shrinkage of six percent, but the proof in this case is uncertain as to the amount of loss by such shrinkage, and there was some evidence as to excessive consumption of electricity, but no proof of the actual amount; and there was testimony as to the spoilage of beef, and' there is, in the opinion of this Court, no foundation for the verdict for $4,000.00 but- since there is some competent testimony, the Court is of the opinion that this defect can be remedied by a remittitur, and this remitti-tur should be in the sum of $3,100.00, leaving the verdict to stand at $900.00.
“It Is Therefore Ordered that if the plaintiff shall, within ten days from this date, enter a remittitur for $3,100.00 reducing the judgment to $900.00, then the verdict shall stand for $900.00, otherwise, the said motion for new trial is granted.”

Appellant sued for breach of warranty contained in plans and specifications for the construction of a cold storage plant.

The defects claimed are that the coils installed were insufficient in number to give the required refrigeration in the produce and chill rooms; that one of the fans was improperly installed and that the plant would not perform automatically.

The damage claimed, as a result of these defects, was approximately: $700.00 for additional coils; $2,226.33 for spoilage of meat; 6% shrinkage on meat and 10% increase of electric current. There was an additional claim of $600.00 representing a penalty of $100.00 per week delay in the completion of the plant. The parties in the contract had agreed on such a penalty in event of more than ten weeks intervening after starting the plant.

As we approach the decision of this case, we must determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion in the entry of the quoted order. Naturally, we presume the order was properly entered, but we are bound to examine the foun*834dation upon which the trial judge based his finding. If the foundation upon which his judicial discretion was based would not, as a matter of law, justify his order then we must set it aside. The order itself reflects in no way what item, or items, the trial judge thought could, or could not, receive his approval. The evidence is- abundantly clear that the plant did not operate satisfactorily. The evidence is undisputed that spoilage of meat resulted in a net loss of $2,226.33. It is shown that the cost of installing additional coils amounted to approximately $700.00 and thereafter the plant operated properly. It is true the evidence did not show with exactness the loss in money from shrinkage of beef, neither did it disclose exactly the amount of money lost from the 10 % of excess current consumed. Damages are seldom capable of proof to a mathematical certainty and juries may be so instructed. There was a conflict in the testimony about the penalty item of $600.00. The testimony, as a whole, preponderates in favor of the plaintiff and the damages assessed by the jury cannot be said to be excessive.

From this showing, we are unable to follow the reason for reducing the judgment to $900.00. To sustain the order in granting a new trial would furnish no guide as to proof and assessment of damages on a second trial. A predicate to prove the detailed items was laid in the pleadings and very properly received the trial court’s approval, consequently if a new trial should be had, in all probability, the same result would be reached.

We have duly considered the cross assignments of error and fail to find merit in them.

The order appealed from is reversed with directions to enter judgment on the verdict.

Reversed.

BUFORD, C. J., TERRELL and SEBRING, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Price v. Jordan, 115 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959)
    …134 Fla. 354, 183 So. 738; and Elks Club v. Adair, 1928, 95 Fla. 415, 116 So. 26. The question is whether the trial judge abused his discretion, in the light of the record, in declaring the verdict excessive. See the case of Turner v. Krieder, 1944, 154 Fla. 832, 19 So. 2d 408; and De La Vallina v. De La Vallina, supra. Generally, see also 23 Fla.Jur., New Trial, sections 90, 91, and 92, pp. 459-462. Another case applicable in principle and very similar to the present case is Kovacs v. Venetian Sedan Servi…
  • Nolan Clark v. Russo, 133 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)
    …r a remittitur.” It is also stated in Price v, Jordan, supra: “ * * * The question is whether the trial judge abused his discretion, in the light of the record, in declaring the verdict excessive. See the case of Turner v. Krieder [Kreider], 1944, 154 Fla. 832, 19 So. 2d 408; and De La Vallina v. De La Vallina, supra, [90 Fla. 905, 107 So. 339], Generally, see also 23 Fla.Jur., New Trial, sections 90, 91, and 92, pp. 459-462. “Another case applicable in principle and very similar to the present case is K…
  • Ekhoff v. Hoffman, 200 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)
    …verdict of $18,000 and granting a new trial unless plaintiff entered a remittitur of $8,000. The question is whether the trial judge abused his discretion, in the light of the record, in declaring the verdict excessive. See Turner v. Kreider, 1944, 154 Fla. 832, 19 So. 2d 408; De La Vallina v. De La Vallina, 1926, 90 Fla. 905, 107 So. 339; and Fla.Jur., New Trials, §§ 90-92. The rule, often quoted, was stated in De La Vallina v. De La Vallina, 1926, 90 Fla. 905, 107 So. at 339, as follows: “In requiring…

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