L. L. J., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A 14-year-old juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for loitering and prowling in a parking garage at Miami International Airport based on his presence in the garage and his flight from police. The appellate court reversed, finding that the State failed to establish a prima facie case because police failed to give the juvenile an opportunity to explain his presence and conduct as required by statute.
The State failed to prove a prima facie case because it introduced no evidence that police gave the appellant an opportunity to explain his presence and conduct or showed circumstances making such an explanation impracticable, as required by § 856.021, Fla.Stat.
[1] A conviction for loitering and prowling requires evidence that the accused was given an opportunity to explain their presence and conduct, or that circumstances made such…
[2] Failure to provide an opportunity for explanation, or to demonstrate the impracticability thereof, is fatal to a loitering and prowling charge.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“It is uncontroverted from the record that the State failed to introduce evidence that the police gave the appellant an opportunity to explain his presence and conduct or to show circumstances making it impracticable to give the appellant such an opportunity, pursuant to the requirements of § 856.021, Fla.Stat.”
This establishes the core legal violation—the State's failure to comply with the statutory requirement to give the juvenile an opportunity to explain before arrest.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn January 29, 1975, a uniformed officer observed the appellant and another youth walking between vehicles in a parking garage at Miami International …
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PER CURIAM.
On February 27, 1975, appellant, a child of 14 years of age, was charged in a petition for delinquency with loitering and prowling in a parking garage at the Miami International Airport. An adjudicatory hearing was held. The judge of the juvenile court found “beyond and to the exclusion of any reasonable doubt that said child . . . did unlawfully loiter and prowl . . . ,” adjudication was temporarily withheld and the child was placed on probation in the custody of his mother under the supervision of the Division of Youth Services. This appeal ensued.
The evidence adduced at the adjudicatory hearing showed that on January 29, 1975, a uniformed Dade County Public Safety Department Officer observed the appellant and another youth walking into a parking garage at Miami International Airport. They walked between the motor vehicles on the ground level, exited the building and walked across to the next parking garage. When the appellant saw the officer, “. . .he turned, and said something to the other subject, and took off running, and the other subject hesitated and took off running.” The officer pursued the youths, lost sight of them and next saw the appellant crawling underneath a ramp to the building. The officer apprehended and arrested the appellant. The officer testified that the youths were not questioned as to what they were doing there until after they were placed under arrest for loitering and prowling. Following the testimony of the State’s witnesses, the State rested and defense counsel moved for judgment of acquittal on the grounds that the arrest was not pursuant to Chapter 39, Fla.Stat., because the offense occurred outside the presence of the arresting officer; that there was no prima facie showing that there was any concern for the safety of persons or property in the vi cinity; and that the officers failed to ask for a reasonable explanation from the two youths before placing them under arrest. The motion was denied. The defense then rested and renewed the motion for judgment of acquittal on the ground that the State failed to prove a prima facie case. The motion was denied, and the appellant was found to have committed the delinquent act. The court withheld adjudication and placed the youth on probation in the custody of his mother. We reverse.
It is uncontroverted from the record that the State failed to introduce evidence that the police gave the appellant an opportunity to explain his presence and conduct or to show circumstances making it impracticable to give the appellant such an opportunity, pursuant to the requirements of § 856.021, Fla.Stat. See State v. Ecker, Fla. 1975, 311 So. 2d 104.
Reversed.
HENDRY, Judge, dissents.
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Citator
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Patmore v. State, 383 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)…l any concern by requesting him to identify himself and explain his presence, unless the circumstances are such that it is impractical for the police to give him this opportunity. S. F. v. State, 354 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); L. L. J. v. State, 334 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); § 856.021(2), Fla.Stat. (1979). The statute is designed to proscribe conduct posing a reasonable threat to the public safety, but it may not be constitutionally applied as a catchall for vaguely undesirable conduct. See generally…
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Z.P. v. State, 440 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…and for resisting arrest without violence. We must reverse on the authority of State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104 (Fla.1975); In the Interest of O.W., 423 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); S.F. v. State, 354 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); L.L.J. v. State, 334 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). The elements of loitering and prowling as set out in State v. Ecker, supra, are: (1) the defendant loitered or prowled in a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals; (2) such loitering and prowling…
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D.L.B. v. State, 685 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)…v. State, 440 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 3d DCA [*1342] 1983) (adjudication of delinquency for loitering and prowling reversed where law enforcement failed to give defendant opportunity to explain his presence or conduct after flight); accord L.L.J. v. State, 334 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 342 So. 2d 1104 (Fla.1976). Additionally, since the crime of loitering and prowling is a misdemeanor, the questionable conduct supporting the charge must have occurred in the arresting officer’s presence. Such is not th…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1975)