Z.P., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for loitering and prowling and resisting arrest without violence. The court reversed, holding that the state failed to meet the statutory requirements for loitering and prowling and that giving a false name does not constitute resisting arrest.
The adjudication of delinquency must be reversed. The state failed to introduce testimony of the concerned citizen who observed the juvenile's conduct as required by Ecker, and failed to give the juvenile an opportunity to explain his presence as required by statute. Additionally, giving a false name, occurring after arrest, cannot constitute resisting arrest without violence.
[1] Loitering and prowling requires circumstances that warrant a justifiable and reasonable claim or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity.
[2] The offense of loitering and prowling requires the testimony of a citizen who observed the defendant's conduct.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The elements of loitering and prowling as set out in State v. Ecker, supra, are: (1) the defendant loitered or prowled in a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals; (2) such loitering and prowling were under circumstances that warranted a justifiable and reasonable claim or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity.”
Establishes the two-prong test required to prove loitering and prowling under Florida law
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe juvenile was arrested after police were called to investigate a purse snatching that had occurred the day before in the area. A third person alleg…
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PER CURIAM.
The juvenile herein appeals an adjudication of delinquency for loitering and prowling and for resisting arrest without violence. We must reverse on the authority of State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104 (Fla.1975); In the Interest of O.W., 423 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); S.F. v. State, 354 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); L.L.J. v. State, 334 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
The elements of loitering and prowling as set out in State v. Ecker, supra, are: (1) the defendant loitered or prowled in a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals; (2) such loitering and prowling were under circumstances that warranted a justifiable and reasonable claim or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity. It is true the arresting officer was called to the scene upon a report of purse snatching the day before in the area and that a third person allegedly identified the juvenile as one of the purse snatchers.
However, said act took place outside the presence of the officer and the state failed to introduce the testimony of the concerned individual citizen who observed the juvenile’s conduct as required in State v. Ecker, supra, at page 111 in the consolidated case of Worth v. State. The juvenile also contends the arresting officer failed to give him an opportunity to explain his presence as required by Section 856.021 Florida Statutes (1981).
The state suggests that it was not necessary to permit him to explain because probable cause coupled with flight completed or established the offense which could not be altered by a subsequent explanation of his presence. We cannot accept this suggestion because in L.L.J v. State, supra, this court reversed an adjudication of delinquency for failure to give the juvenile an opportunity to explain his presence or conduct after flight. The conduct com plained of to support the charge of resisting arrest without violence in violation of Section 843.02 Florida Statutes (1981) was that the juvenile gave the arresting officer a false name. This act occurred subsequent to the arrest and therefore could not constitute resisting arrest without violence in violation of Section 843.02 Florida Statutes (1981).
Furthermore, we question whether such an act would constitute a crime under Section 843.02 Florida Statutes (1981).1
Therefore, the adjudication of delinquency appealed herein is hereby reversed.
Reversed.
. Section 843.035 Fla.Stat. (1982) [effective July 1, 1982, subsequent to the arrest herein] makes the giving of a false name or false address with intent to hinder, obstruct or interrupt a law enforcement officer a misdemeanor of the first degree.
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Rumph v. State, 544 So. 2d 1150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)…ce to shove Ms. King out of his way and into the door as he fled with the jeans constitutes the use of force in flight after the taking [*1152] and provides the evidence to sustain appellant’s conviction for robbery. Next, relying on Z.P. v. State, 440 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), appellant argues that the conduct charged, i.e. giving a false name to the officer, occurred at a point in time after he had been arrested, handcuffed, and placed in the back of a police vehicle and thus could not constitute the…
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Caines v. State, 500 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…officer was carrying out the duties of his office. It seems obvious to us that one who gives an officer false identification under the circumstances outlined is hindering the officer’s performance of those duties. Defendant relies on Z.P. v. State, 440 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), as authority [*730] for reversal. In Z.P., the court stated that a juvenile’s act of giving a false name to an arresting officer, after the arrest, could not support a charge of resisting arrest without violence under section 843…
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Olsen v. State, 691 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)…e disagree. The only evidence adduced at trial to support the charge of resisting arrest without violence was testimony that the defendant gave the police a false name subsequent to his arrest. The defendant correctly argues that in Z.P. v. State, 440 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), this Court held that the giving of a false name subsequent to arrest cannot constitute the offense of resisting arrest without violence. However, we now recede from that portion of Z.P. and adopt the holding of cases such as Rump…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Ecker, 311 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1975)
- In the Interest of O.W., 423 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)
- L. L. J. v. State, 334 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- S. F. v. State, 354 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)