GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, A CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
COMMERCIAL STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY, A CORPORATION, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
General Electric sued Commercial Standard Insurance on a payment bond claim, and the trial court dismissed based on a one-year statute of limitations. The appellate court reversed, holding that because the bond was not furnished in the amount required by statute, it did not qualify as a statutory payment bond and thus was not protected by the one-year limitation period.
The court held that because the payment bond was not furnished in compliance with Section 713.23's requirement that it be in at least the amount of the original contract price, it did not qualify as a statutory payment bond under that section and therefore was not protected by the one-year limitation provision. The case is governed by the five-year statute of limitation.
[1] A payment bond is not considered statutory for purposes of a one-year statute of limitations if it is not furnished in at least the amount of the original contract price…
[2] A plaintiff is not barred by a one-year statute of limitations for actions on a payment bond if the bond fails to meet the statutory requirements for its amount.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The payment bond required to exempt an owner under parts I and II of this chapter and chapter 85 shall be furnished by the contractor in at least the amount of the original contract price No action or suit shall be instituted or prosecuted against the contractor or against the surety on the bond required in this section after one year from the performance of the labor or completion of delivery of the materials and supplies.”
Establishes the statutory requirement that a payment bond must be in at least the contract price to qualify for the one-year limitation period
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGeneral Electric furnished equipment and appliances to a contractor performing construction work in Duval County, Florida. The contractor executed a p…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Statute Of Limitations cases and more on FLexlaw
RAWLS, Acting Chief Judge.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether appellant-plaintiff’s cause of action is governed by the five-year statute of limitation as prescribed in Section 95.11, Florida Statutes, or by the one year statute as set out in Section 713.23, Florida Statutes. The trial judge, in dismissing plaintiff’s complaint, held that the one year statute was applicable. We reverse.
Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that it furnished certain equipment and appliances to a contractor who utilized same in the performance of construction work in Duval County, Florida. A further allegation was that the contractor had executed a payment bond providing for payment to persons furnishing labor and materials in the performance of said construction work. The complaint also alleged that although the bond was purportedly given in accordance with Section 713.23, Florida Statutes, that such was not the case, because the statute provides that a bond given pursuant to it shall be in at least the contract price, whereas the instant bond was only in ten percent of the contract price.1
Appellee-defendant argues that the amount of the bond is immaterial because, admittedly, plaintiff’s claim is in an amount substantially less than the amount set forth therein. Section 713.23, Florida Statutes, provides, inter alia:
“. . . The payment bond required to exempt an owner under parts I and II of this chapter and chapter 85 shall be furnished by the contractor in at least the amount of the original contract price No action or suit shall be instituted or prosecuted against the contractor or against the surety on the bond required in this section after one year from the performance of the labor or completion of delivery of the materials and supplies. . . .” (emphasis supplied)
Although the subject bond is entitled “Statutory Payment Bond Pursuant to Sections 713.02(6) and 713.23, Florida Statutes”, such statement does not make it such, because it was not in at least the amount of the original contract price and thus not as required in Section 713.23. Since the purported statutory bond was not furnished in accordance with the requisites of the clear terms of Section 713.23, Florida Statutes, defendant is not protected by the one year limitation provision of the statute. United Bonding Ins. Co. v. City of Holly Hill, 249 So. 2d 720 (1 Fla.App.1971).
REVERSED with directions that plaintiff’s complaint be reinstated.
McCORD and SMITH, JJ., concur. . The construction contract required “10% Performance and payment bonds”.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Hunt Truck Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Bonanza Constr., Inc., 353 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)…nd is “in at least the amount of the original contract price.” That the bond be in at least the amount of the contract price is an essential feature of a Section 713.23 Payment Bond. General Electric Company v. Commercial Standard Insurance Company, 335 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Suffice to say, a bond furnished pursuant to Sec. 713.23 Florida Statutes (1975) must comply with the provisions of that section in order for the benefits afforded thereby to accrue to the owner since preclusion of a claimant’s…
-
Prof'l Plastering & Stucco, Inc. v. Bridgeport-Strasberg Joint Venture, 940 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)…t the amount of the original contract price,” but if the amount is sufficient to pay all outstanding claims, the majority apparently would conclude that no harm equates to statutory compliance. But see Gen. Elec. Co. v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 335 So. 2d 624, 625 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (actual prejudice notwithstanding, § 713.23 bond must be furnished in amount of contract to qualify as statutory bond). I disagree with the “no prejudice” analysis of the majority. The lien statute is entirely a legislative…
-
The Sch. Bd. OF Volusia Cnty. v. Fid. Co. OF Md., 468 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)…Bonding Insurance Company v. City of Holly Hill, 249 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971); see also Balboa Insurance Company v. W.C.B. Associates, Inc., 390 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); General Electric Company v. Commercial Standard Insurance Company, 335 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 342 So. 2d 1100 (Fla.1976); but see Florida Keys Community College v. Insurance Company of North America, 456 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1984). There is no comparable deferral of, accrual of a cause of action for latent…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Reese, 249 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971)
- United Bonding Ins. Co. v. City OF Holly Hill, 249 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)