HOMER SAINT-GAUDENS, APPELLANT,
v.
PENELOPE R. BULL (FORMERLY PENELOPE R. SAINT-GAUDENS, AND PENELOPE SAINT-GAUDENS CORT, APPELLEES
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Homer Saint-Gaudens sought to subject the Cutler property to payment of a judgment against Penelope Bull, claiming the property was not her homestead and that Bull's conveyance to her daughter Cort was fraudulent. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the property was Bull's homestead and the conveyance was not made to defraud creditors.
The Cutler property was Bull's homestead. Bull's temporary absence from the property from May 1952 to April 1953 did not constitute abandonment of the homestead because she had a legitimate reason for leaving (her divorce proceedings) and intended to return. The conveyance to Cort was not made to defraud creditors.
“The point for determination turns on whether or not there is any showing that Bull, in the meantime, permanently abandoned the property as her home.”
Establishes the central legal question in the case regarding whether temporary absence constitutes homestead abandonment.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBull and her then-husband jointly owned the Cutler property since 1936. In July 1952, Bull's son conveyed his interest to Bull. Bull vacated the prope…
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TERRELL, Justice.
Homer Saint-Gaudens filed a complaint in equity against Penelope R. Bull (formerly Penelope R. Saint-G&udens) to subject certain real estate, hereinafter referred to as the Cutler property, to the payment of a judgment secured against defendant, hereinafter referred to as Bull. Said judgment was promulgated May 1, 1953 and recorded May 8, seven, days later. Prior to entry of said judgment but during pendency. of. the suit, Bull, then unmarried, on May 8, 1953 filed her claim of homestead exemption in and - to the Cutler property. April 29, 1953, Bull executed a warranty deed to appellee Cort,-. describing the-Cutler property. Cort was then-unmarried and-was-known as ' Penelope Saint-Gaudens.' She, Cort, was not designated in the deed as-daughter .'but -the consideration : named was one dollar and natural love and affection. Said deed was-recorded April 30, 1953.
The complaint charges, that the Cutler property was at no time named herein the homestead of Bull and that the conveyance’ to Cort was in fraud of creditors. Ap-pellees answered, admitting the allegations of the complaint except those relating to non-existence of the homestead and those charging-the conveyance to Cort to be in fraud of creditors. The answer flatly de-nied these allegations. On the issues thus made, evidence was taken by the Chancellor who on final hearing found for defendants that the Cutler property was the homestead of Bull and that the deed from Bull to Cort was not to defraud creditors. He accordingly dismissed the complaint with prejudice. This appeal was prosecuted from the final decree.
The only point for determination is whether or not the Cutler property was the homestead of Penelope Bull and if so, whether the conveyance by her to Penelope Cort was made to defraud the appellant, her creditor. It is not disputed that the Cutler property had been the home of appellees commencing in 1936 and was owned by them jointly and that on July 10, 1952 Augustus Saint-Gaudens, the son of appellant, conveyed his interest in the property to Bull who had previously become head of .the household. It is also not disputed that Bull conveyed to her daughter, Cort, April 29, 1953. The point for determination turns on whether or not there is any showing that Bull, in the meantime, permanently abandoned the property as her home.
Appellees admit that they did not live on the Cutler property from May 1952 - to April 1953 but it is shown that there was sound reason for being away from it at this time and that the leave-taking was not intended as abandonment of the homestead. The divorce case between Bull and her husband was pending at the time, she moved in an apartment because she considered it depressing and improper to live in the house with her husband while such a proceeding was in progress. The divorce was granted July 2, 1952, but the evidence shows that Bull was so emotionally disturbed over that and the immediate marriage of her husband that it was April 1, 1953 before she became reconciled to the situation and returned to her home.
The Chancellor found on this showing that Bull’s absence from the home did not amount to an abandonment of the homestead. We think he was right in so holding. City of Jacksonville v. Bailey, 159 Fla. 11, 30 So. 2d 529; Collins v. Collins, 150 Fla. 374, 7 So. 2d 443; Hillsborough Investment Co. v. Wilcox, 152 Fla. 889, 13; So. 2d 448. Otherwise, the evidence supporting abandonment of the homestead is^ indefinite, largely conjectural and fails to* show any intention on the part'of Bull to do* so. A careful examination of the evidence-reveals nothing but casual comment as basis, to overthrow the decree appealed from.. That is not sufficient.
The judgment of the Chancellor is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
ROBERTS, .C. J., and SEBRING and MATHEWS, JJ., concur.
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Mrs. v. N. (Minnie Belle) Vandiver, 139 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)…mily nor the dependents have to reside on the property all the time, so long as they leave temporarily or with intention to return. Hillsborough Inv. Co. v. Wilcox, supra; Collins v. Collins, 150 Fla. 734, 7 So. 2d 443 (1942); Saint Gaudens v. Bull, 74 So. 2d 693 (Fla.1954); L’Engle v. Forbes, 81 So. 2d 214 (Fla.1955); Olesky v. Nicholas, 82 So. 2d 510 (Fla.1955). There are many other variances from the customary definition of a head of a family entitled to a homestead exemption, all of which emphasize the…
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L'Engle v. Forbes, 81 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1955)…ctions 1 and 4 as authority for a decision involving the character of property for the purpose of homestead tax exemption under Section 7, see City of Jacksonville v. Bailey, supra, 30 So. 2d 529, and vice versa, see Saint-Gaudens v. Bull, Fla.1954, 74 So. 2d 693, citing the City of Jacksonville case in a judgment creditor suit. Applying those rules to the facts of the instant case, we think it is clear that there has been no abandonment of the “homestead”. The plaintiff-husband did not voluntarily quit the…
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In re Rodger A. Monson and Linda S. Monson v. First Nat'l Bank OF Bradenton, 497 F.2d 135 (5th Cir. 1974)…eptions to the homestead exemption should be strictly construed. Quigley v. Kennedy & Ely Insurance, Inc., supra. To this end, the Florida courts have held that mere absence from the household, when necessitated by health, see Saint-Gaudens v. Bull, 74 So. 2d 693 (Fla.S.Ct.1954), financial, see Olesky v. Nicholas, supra; Marsh v. Hartley, 109 So. 2d 34, 38 (Fla.Ct. of App.1959), or familial concerns, see Poppell v. Padrick, 117 So. 2d 435 (Fla.Ct. of App.1960), does not [*139] effect an abandonment of the ho…
Authorities Cited
- Hillsborough Inv. Co. v. Wilcox, 152 Fla. 889 (Fla. 1943)
- Collins v. Collins, 150 Fla. 374 (Fla. 1942)
- City OF Jacksonville & C. W. Hendley v. Bailey, 159 Fla. 11 (Fla. 1947)