GEORGE CRIDLAND, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1976-07-27
No. 75-1418
Before BARKDULL, C. J., and HENDRY and NATHAN, JJ.
338 So. 2d 30 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1976) Positive Treatment
Cited by 11 cases

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Holding

The court held that the arresting officer's testimony regarding the defendant's silence was permissible and did not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.


Headnotes

[1] A defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not violated by testimony that the defendant made no statements if the testimony is not adduced to p…

[2] The common law inference that guilty knowledge may be drawn from the fact of unexplained possession of recently stolen goods is permissible.

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Facts & Procedural History

George Byron Cridland was arrested for breaking and entering and grand larceny after being found removing televisions from a hotel. The arresting offi…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

George Byron Cridland was arrested while removing six television sets from a Miami hotel. He was charged by information with breaking and entering and grand larceny, found guilty, convicted and sen tenced to consecutive ten-year and two-year terms in the state penitentiary.

During the presentation of the State’s case, the arresting officer was asked whether the defendant made any statements. The defendant's objection was overruled and the officer gave his answer, “No, sir.” The defendant contends that this violated his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Review of the record fails to demonstrate whether the prosecutor was making reference to statements prior to or at the time of arrest. The record reflects no evidence of custodial interrogation by the police officers which would elicit a response from the defendant.

Bennett v. State, Fla.1975, 316 So. 2d 41, holds that any comment upon the defendant standing mute in the face of an accusation is fundamental error requiring a new trial. This principle of law does not apply here as the arresting officer was not asked whether Cridland made a statement in the face of accusation or during custodial interrogation. In our opinion, the inquiry concerning the defendant’s failure to make any statements was not adduced to penalize the defendant for remaining silent. Rather, the purpose was to permit the jury to consider the deeply-rooted common law inference that guilty knowledge may be drawn from the fact of unexplained possession of recently stolen goods. See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 93 S.Ct. 2357, 37 L.Ed.2d 380; State v. Young, Fla.1968, 217 So. 2d 567; Lebowitz v. State, Fla.App.1975, 313 So. 2d 473, 477. Compare United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 45 L.Ed.2d 99; Jones v. State, Fla.App.1967, 200 So. 2d 574.

The remaining points raised on appeal are without merit and will not be discussed.

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Tsavaris v. Scruggs, 360 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1977)
    …(Fla. 1st DCA 1977) *759 Clark v. State, 336 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976) Greenfield v. State, 337 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976) Mansfield v. State, 338 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976), Cert. dismissed Fla., 342 So. 2d 1102 Cridland v. State, 338 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976) Farmer v. State, 326 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), Cert. dismissed, Fla., 340 So. 2d 927 Sylvester v. State, 341 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) Many of these decisions are pending before us, and we must eventually resolve thi…
  • Ruiz v. State, 378 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
    …e. We reject this contention. While the rule in question indeed applies only to references to custodial or post-apprehension silence, see Reaser v. State, 356 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 884 (Fla.1978); Cridland v. State, 338 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), the prosecutor’s remark in this case simply cannot properly be interpreted in the manner only now argued by the state.1 Fairly read, it plainly suggested to the jury that if Ruiz’s trial story were true, he would have told it to…
  • Chavers v. State, 380 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)
    …from the fact of unexplained possession of recently stolen goods. State v. Young, 217 So. 2d 567 (Fla.1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 853, 90 S.Ct. 112, 24 L.Ed.2d 101 (1969); Whiteside v. State, 366 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Cridland v. State, 338 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). However, the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to ask defendant’s key witness the following questions over objection during cross-examination, and erred in allowing the prosecutor to refer to the testimony during clo…

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