JERRY LEE WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jerry Lee Williams pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and received a deferred sentence conditioned on serving as a police informant. When the original judge recused himself, the replacement judge found the arrangement unconstitutional, withdrew the plea, and after trial convicted Williams and sentenced him to five years imprisonment. The appellate court reversed, holding that Williams was entitled to specific performance of the plea bargain because he had complied with its conditions.
The court held that Williams was entitled to specific performance of the plea bargain and that a probationary term rather than imprisonment should be imposed. Because the trial court found that Williams had affirmatively complied with the court-sanctioned bargain, he had a right to enforce it despite the invalidity of the original deferred sentence arrangement.
[1] A court-sanctioned plea bargain is specifically enforceable if the accused satisfies the conditions of the agreement.
[2] A defendant who has affirmatively complied with the conditions of a court-approved plea bargain is entitled to specific performance of that bargain, even if the original…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“despite the invalidity of the sentence he had a right to specific performance of that bargain because as Judge Ryder found he had affirmatively complied with a court-sanctioned bargain”
Establishes the core holding that specific performance of a plea bargain is available to a defendant who complies with its conditions, even if the original sentence is invalid.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliams pleaded guilty to aggravated assault. The trial judge deferred sentencing and agreed to dismiss the case if Williams cooperated as a police i…
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BOARDMAN, Judge.
Appellant/defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault in violation of Section 784.04, Florida Statutes (1973). At the hearing following the court’s colloquy with appellant establishing the voluntariness and the factual basis for acceptance of the plea the trial judge, the Honorable Harry Lee Coe, said he would withhold adjudication and defer sentence from “day to day and term to term.” The judge advised appellant that if he sincerely and honestly assisted the police as an informant that he would “get rid of the case entirely.”1 The judge reserved the right to sentence appellant to five years imprisonment if he did not cooperate in good faith or if he were convicted of another crime during the period the sentence was deferred.
Prior to a hearing on appellant’s performance of the agreement Judge Coe recused himself, and the case was assigned to the Honorable Herboth S. Ryder. Judge Ryder correctly found that the deferred sentence was invalid and further that the agreement fashioned by Judge Coe was “unconstitutional.” Appellant's guilty plea was withdrawn, and the case was set for trial. At a pretrial hearing held on the day of the trial evidence of appellant’s good faith performance of his end of the bargain was presented to Judge Ryder, and he found that appellant had satisfied the plea bargain and that in the interest of fairness and justice he would place appellant on probation for five years. At this juncture appellant pled guilty again but during the colloquy Judge Ryder determined that appellant had a valid defense to the charge, i. e. self-defense. The judge set aside appellant’s guilty plea and entered a plea of not guilty. Appellant was found guilty at the conclusion of a jury trial, and Judge Ryder sentenced him to five years imprisonment.2
We are aware that upon vacation of an order which defers sentencing from “day to day and term to term” a defendant is amenable to imposition of a term of imprisonment. See State v. Bateh, 110 So. 2d 7 (Fla.1959).
Nevertheless we have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that appellant was prejudiced by the turn of events in this case, and under these peculiar circumstances a probationary term rather than a term of imprisonment should be imposed consistent with the plea bargain. Appellant did not complain that the plea bargain was “unconstitutional,” and despite the invalidity of the sentence he had a right to specific performance of that bargain because as Judge Ryder found he had affirmatively complied with a court-sanctioned bargain. This court has previously held that a court-approved agreement was specifically enforceable if, as in this case, the accused satisfied the conditions of the agreement. State v. Davis, 188 So. 2d 24 (Fla.2d DCA 1966).
See also Butler v. State, 228 So. 2d 421 (Fla.4th DCA 1969).
The case before us is significantly different from a situation where specific performance of a plea bargain would not be required. See Barker v. State, 259 So. 2d 200 (Fla.2d DCA 1972).
In Barker the court tentatively agreed to a plea bargain, the defendant did not change his position by acting upon the bargain, and the court subsequently became aware of facts indicating that leniency was not appropriate.
Accordingly the judgment and sentence is reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
McNULTY, C. J., and SCHEB, J., concur. . It is not clear what Judge Coe meant by “get rid of the case,” but he probably intended to place appellant on probation at a later time if appellant performed adequately as an informant.
. The maximum sentence for aggravated assault was five years. §§ 775.082(4)(d), 784.04, Fla.Stat. (1973).
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State v. Rogel Vixamar, 687 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…So. 2d 24 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. [*302] denied, 194 So. 2d 621 (Fla.1966). See Charatz v. State, 577 So. 2d 1298 (Fla.1991); State v. Upshaw, 648 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Flaherty v. State, 367 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Williams v. State, 341 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Butler v. State, 228 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969). Davis involved the state’s agreement with a defendant to submit to a polygraph examination by an operator selected by the parties. The bargain struck was that if the examinatio…
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Charatz v. State, 577 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 1991)…rgain may not be specifically enforced. Davis v. State, 308 So. 2d 27 (Fla.1975). However, there are circumstances under which a plea bargain may be enforced if the defendant has suffered irrevocable prejudice in reliance thereon. Williams v. State, 341 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). The order withholding adjudication had long become final when the state did not appeal, and Charatz was not guilty of any fraud that might justify setting aside the order. We decline to recede from Sanchez. However, we quash the…
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State v. Simons, 22 So. 3d 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…dant to withdraw the plea, but in others the only fair remedy is to enforce the agreement. For example, Florida courts have held that specific performance is a proper remedy if the defendant has partly performed the agreement, see Williams v. State, 341 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) (the state breached its promise after the defendant had assisted the police), or if withdrawal of the plea would deprive the defendant of the benefit of the bargain, see Buffa v. State, 641 [*737] So. 2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (th…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Mussa C. Bateh, 110 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959)
- Barker v. State, 259 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)
- State v. Sampson Davis, 188 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
- State v. Neal, 228 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969)
- Butler v. State, 228 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969)