JESSIE MARIE MILLER SUHOR, APPELLANT,
v.
CHARLES AUGUST SUHOR, APPELLEE
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In a marital dissolution case, the Florida District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order requiring sale of the marital home to satisfy the husband's debts, holding that trial courts lack authority to dispose of jointly owned property absent special circumstances or proper pleadings.
The trial court lacked authority to order the sale. Under Florida law, absent special equities or appropriate pleadings requesting partition upon divorce, a chancellor has no authority to partition jointly owned property or dispose of it as an incident to divorce. After each party's proportionate share in jointly owned property is fixed and the marriage is dissolved, the parties themselves determine whether the property should be partitioned or otherwise disposed of.
[1] In the absence of special circumstances, a trial court lacks the authority to order the sale of jointly owned marital property or to dispose of such property as an incide…
[2] Upon entry of a divorce decree, an estate by the entireties in jointly owned property is converted into a tenancy in common, absent special equities.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In the absence of special equities, an estate by the entireties held by a husband and wife in property acquired by them during marriage is automatically converted into a tenancy in common upon the entry of a decree of divorce.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that jointly owned marital property becomes a tenancy in common upon divorce, not subject to court-ordered disposition as an incident to divorce.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court, in a final judgment of divorce, ordered the marital home to be sold and the proceeds used to pay specific debts of the appellee (husb…
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PER CURIAM.
The primary issue involved herein is whether the trial court in its final judgment of dissolution of marriage had the authority to order that the marital home of the parties be sold and that the proceeds derived therefrom be used to satisfy specific debts. In its final judgment, the trial court specifically found that inasmuch as appellee had numerous outstanding debts which he could not meet on his current earnings, the only source from which payment of the obligations could be met would be from a sale of the marital residence.
We agree with appellant that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court acted without authority by ordering a sale of the marital home. We formerly held in Bergh v. Bergh, Fla.App. 1st 1961, 127 So. 2d 481, that a trial court may not dispose of jointly owned property in the absence of special circumstances. Specifically, we held,
“In the absence of special equities, an estate by the entireties held by a husband and wife in property acquired by them during marriage is automatically converted into a tenancy in common upon the entry of a decree of divorce. As a general rule, in the absence of an agreement of the parties or appropriate pleadings praying for partition of jointly owned property upon the entry of a decree of divorce, a chancellor has no authority either to partition jointly owned property or effect what might amount to a property settlement between the parties nor dispose of property belonging to them as an incident to the divorce. After the proportionate share of each party has been fixed in jointly owned property and the marriage dissolved, it is then up to the parties themselves to determine whether their property should be partitioned or disposed of in some other manner. In the absence of special circumstances a chancellor is without authority to order that one of the parties transfer his or her property interest to the other.” (127 So. 2d at page 487; footnotes deleted)
(See also O’Hara v. O’Hara, Fla.App. 1st 1976, 327 So. 2d 242)
Our examination of the record has revealed none of the special circumstances as discussed in the Bergh case. Thus, although the trial court sought, for the best of reasons, to effectuate an equitable settlement, the court was without the authority to do so.
We do not find it necessary to discuss the other issues raised by appellant.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
BOYER, C. J., McCORD, J., and MCDONALD, PARKER LEE, Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Fuchs v. Fuchs, 356 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)…court erred in awarding to the husband a special equity in certain property jointly owned by the parties during the marriage. The husband neither pleaded nor presented substantial competent evidence of his entitlement for such award. Suhor v. Suhor, 341 So. 2d 277 (Fla.1st DCA 1977). The judgment is otherwise affirmed. REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART. MILLS, Acting C. J., and ERVIN and BOOTH, JJ., concur.…
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Borntraeger v. Borntraeger, 521 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987)…ence of an agreement of the parties or appropriate pleadings praying for partition, a chancellor has no authority either to partition jointly-owned property or effect what might amount to a property settlement between the parties..." Suhor v. Suhor, 341 So. 2d 277, 278 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); O’Hara v. O’Hara, 327 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Coykendall v. Coykendall, 260 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972) (on rehearing); Rankin v. Rankin, 258 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972). In the instant case, the pleadings did n…
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Dobbins v. Dobbins, 359 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)…rriage, as well as certain furnishings, fixtures and equipment located therein. The wife neither pled nor presented substantial competent evidence of her entitlement for such award. Jones v. Jones, 330 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Suhor v. Suhor, 341 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Fuchs v. Fuchs, 356 So. 2d 1355 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). The wife’s petition for dissolution requested only exclusive use and possession of the marital home and the furniture and furnishings within it. As a result the husband was wi…
Authorities Cited
- Bergh v. Bergh, 127 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961)
- Allie Pittman v. Mehaffey, 127 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961)
- O'Hara v. O'Hara, 327 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)