KENNETH RODNEY PRINGLE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Kenneth Pringle was promised probation with adjudication withheld in exchange for his nolo contendere plea to receiving a stolen sailboat, but the judge imposed three years imprisonment at sentencing after learning details about his prior marijuana offense. The court reversed and remanded, holding that when a judge cannot honor a plea bargain, the defendant must be allowed to withdraw the plea.
The court held that when a judge cannot honor a plea bargain, either through mistake, inadvertence, or change in the judge's concurrence, the defendant must have the opportunity to withdraw the plea. The judge's belief that he had been misled about the severity of the prior offense did not relieve him of this obligation.
[1] A judge who cannot honor a plea bargain must afford the defendant an opportunity to withdraw their plea.
[2] A defendant should be permitted to withdraw their plea when a plea bargain is not honored due to mistake, inadvertence, or a subsequent change in the court's concurrence.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When this agreement was not honored, either through mistake, inadvertence, or subsequent change in the trial court's concurrence with the plea bargain, appellant should have had the opportunity to withdraw his pleas.”
Establishes the controlling legal rule that defendants must be allowed to withdraw pleas when judges cannot honor bargains
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePringle negotiated a plea bargain in chambers involving his attorney, the assistant state attorney, and the judge. The judge indicated the case 'does …
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GRIMES, Judge.
The appellant was charged with receiving a stolen sailboat. Upon appearing for trial, plea negotiations took place in chambers involving appellant’s attorney, the assistant state attorney and the judge. The in-chambers proceedings were not reported.
As a result of the conference, appellant entered a nolo contendere plea to the charge. Upon the request of the prosecutor, the court ordered a presentence investigation. The judge then stated in open court:
“. . . We will have a P.S.I., but, as I told you earlier, counsel, this does sound like a probation case with adjudication withheld.
Mr. Pringle, Mr. Rogers does tell me you are on probation at this time for some sort of crime before.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. i|< # $ # #
THE COURT: If you get in any trouble with the law between now and sen-fencing in this case, all bets are off. You understand that, don’t you?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.”
When the appellant returned for sentencing, he was sentenced to three years imprisonment. The court denied appellant’s request to withdraw his plea and entered the judgment and sentence which are now appealed.
The law is clear that when a judge finds that he cannot honor a plea bargain, he must give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea. Odom v. State, 310 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Kurlin v. State, 302 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Enos v. State, 272 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). Thus, our court stated in Odom :
“. . . When this agreement was not honored, either through mistake, inadvertence, or subsequent change in the trial court’s concurrence with the plea bargain, appellant should have had the opportunity to withdraw his pleas. . . ”
Apparently, the reason why the judge changed his mind was because he felt that he had been misled concerning the severity of the prior offense that was referred to in the quotation set forth above. To the extent that can be gleaned from the colloquy during arguments on the appellant’s right to withdraw his plea, appellant’s counsel had advised the court during the plea bargain conference that appellant had one prior marijuana conviction. Between the time of the entry of the plea and the sentencing hearing, another state attorney who was engaged in the investigation of a large marijuana import operation became aware of the pending charge against appellant and sought to obtain appellant’s cooperation in his investigation. When appellant declined to cooperate,1 the judge was then advised that appellant’s prior marijuana possession offense was connected with this operation. Understandably miffed, the judge concluded that he had been misled and imposed the three year sentence. The problem with this is that the plea bargain seemed to call for probation unless appellant got into more trouble or something was brought out in the presentence investigation warranting a more severe penalty. There was no indication that appellant was further involved in crime between the time of the entry of the plea and the time of sentencing, and there was no substantial adverse information in the pre-sentence report beyond what the judge already knew. Cf. Barker v. State, 259 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972).
Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the judge had every right to decline to put appellant on probation, but when he did so, he was obligated to permit appellant to withdraw his plea. Accordingly, the judgment and sentence are reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings at which appellant shall be permitted to withdraw his plea.
HOBSON, A. C. J., and OTT, J., concur. . Indeed, one of the conditions of the bargain for his plea in the original marijuana charge was that he would not be required to testify against others who might have been involved.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Nova v. State, 439 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…at when the agreement is one which cannot be legally enforced, and, as here, the defendant is not irrevocably prejudiced by relying on the agreement, the defendant’s remedy for its violation cannot be to compel its performance. See Pringle v, State, 341 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Odom v. State, 310 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Barker v. State, 259 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972). However, Nova’s inappropriate choice of relief cannot be a basis for affirming the trial court’s denial of his motion. As Rule…
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Nesmith v. State, 374 So. 2d 1139 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)…e held in several cases that when a trial judge determines that he can no longer honor the terms of a plea bargain, he is required to give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea. Brown v. State, 245 So. 2d 41 (Fla.1971); Pringle v. State, 341 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Moore v. State, 339 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Kurlin v. State, 302 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Enos v. State, 272 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 277 So. 2d 286 (Fla.1973). See also Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 902 (1975…
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Reaves v. State, 417 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)…ined plea hold the trial court should allow a defendant to withdraw the plea in the event the trial judge finds he cannot adhere to the sentencing part of the bargain. See, e.g., Kurlin v. State, 302 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Pringle v. State, 341 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). The only exception to that rule should be that a defendant who through his own fault has made it inappropriate for the court to comply with the bargain will not be allowed to withdraw his plea if some prejudice has accrued to the…
Authorities Cited
- Smith v. State, 310 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Odom v. State, 310 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Barker v. State, 259 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)
- Schubert v. State, 302 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Kurlin v. State, 302 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Enos v. State, 272 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)