STATE EX REL. MARY LOUISE MULLINS, RELATOR,
v.
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM T. SWIGERT, AS JUDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR MARION COUNTY, FLORIDA, RESPONDENT

Fla. 1st DCA | 1977-04-29
No. FF-13
MILLS, Acting C. J., and SMITH and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
345 So. 2d 386 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1977) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A defendant sought prohibition to prevent trial on a criminal information, claiming her right to speedy trial was violated when the trial court continued her case for 90 days beyond the 180-day speedy trial limit. The appellate court held that while the trial court erred in finding sufficient grounds for the continuance, the order was within the court's jurisdiction because it was entered within the prescribed timeframe.


Holding

The trial court erred in finding that the case was sufficiently unusual or complex to justify continuing trial beyond 180 days. However, because the continuance order was entered within the time prescribed by the rule, it was within the court's jurisdiction, and prohibition does not lie. The court denied the petition for prohibition.


Headnotes

[1] A court's order continuing a trial beyond the speedy trial period, even if erroneous, is within the court's jurisdiction if made within the time prescribed by the rule.

[2] A state must make a sufficient showing that a case is unusual or complex to justify continuing a trial beyond the statutory speedy trial period.

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Key Quotes

“the state failed to make a sufficient showing, pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(f)(ii), that the case was so unusual or complex as to justify the court's order continuing the case for trial beyond 180 days”

Establishes the legal standard for exceptions to the speedy trial rule and that the state did not meet it

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Facts & Procedural History

Relator was arrested on July 9, 1976, on 17 charges of grand larceny. An information charging her with five offenses was filed December 29, 1976 (173 …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Relator filed in this court a suggestion for writ of prohibition in which she contends she cannot be tried on a five count information since her right to speedy trial has been violated. We issued the rule and a return was filed.

On July 9, 1976, petitioner was arrested on 17 charges of grand larceny. An information was filed December 29, 1976, 173 days after her arrest, charging her with conspiracy to commit grand larceny, conspiracy to utter a forged instrument, conspiracy to commit forgery, receiving and concealing stolen property and uttering a forged instrument. Arraignment was scheduled for January 3, 1977 and trial was originally set for January 6, 1977. An amended notice of trial was filed resetting the case for January 4, 1977, the 179th day following her arrest. On that day, a hearing was held on petitioner’s motion for protective order, or in the alternative, motion for continuance of trial without prejudice to her right to speedy trial. At the conclusion of the hearing the motion was denied and the court, of its own motion, continued the case for trial for a period of 90 days from January 4, 1977, holding that the case was so unusual and so complex due to the number of defendants and the nature of the prosecution or otherwise, that it was unreasonable to expect adequate investigation or preparation within the period of time established by the rule.

On January 6, 1977, 181 days after her arrest, relator filed her motion for discharge, pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191. The motion was denied.

We are of the view that the state failed to make a sufficient showing, pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(f)(ii), that the case was so unusual or complex as to justify the court’s order continuing the case for trial beyond 180 days. See State ex rel Boren v. Sepe, 256 So. 2d 259 (Fla.3rd DCA 1972), cert. denied, Fla., 271 So. 2d 116. Nevertheless, the court’s order of continuance, although erroneous, having been made within the time prescribed by the rule, was within the court’s jurisdiction.

The prayer of the suggestion for writ of prohibition is denied and the rule nisi is discharged.

MILLS, Acting C. J., and SMITH and ERVIN, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • State ex rel. William M. C. Wilhoit v. Wells, 356 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
    …the circumstance that the typewritten transcript was filed September 9, before expiration on September 12 of the 180-day period prescribed for trial by the rule. The trial court had jurisdiction to enter the order, State ex rel. Mullins v. Swigert, 345 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), and there was no error in its finding of exceptional circumstances. The order did not extend the speedy trial period for a stated number of days. That was not error. The rule does not require that the trial court extend the spe…
  • Talton v. State, 362 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
    …is the preferred course. That course was followed in this case. We are satisfied that the oral ruling was timely. The trial court’s finding that exceptional circumstances existed was a matter within its discretion. State ex rel. Mullins v. Swigert, 345 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). No abuse of discretion has been shown. AFFIRMED. DAUKSCH and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.…
  • …ERVIN, Judge. This court reviewed the early facts of this prosecution in State ex rel. Mullins v. Swigert, 345 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). After arresting the relator, the state waited for 173 days to file an information and set a trial date on the 179th day. We then concluded that although the trial court’s order granting a continuance of 90 days was erroneous, th…

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