RICHARD HENRY BRYAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Richard Henry Bryan sought to vacate his 1964 escape conviction on the ground that he was not represented by counsel and had not knowingly and intelligently waived counsel. The Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District, reversed the trial court's denial of the motion without a hearing, finding that the record affirmatively showed no valid waiver of counsel.
The court held that a prisoner in custody of another state is considered 'in custody' under Florida's collateral attack rules and therefore may challenge a prior Florida conviction. Additionally, the record affirmatively showed no valid waiver of counsel, requiring reversal and vacation of the judgment and sentence.
[1] A prisoner serving a sentence in another state is considered "in custody" for the purpose of collaterally attacking a prior Florida conviction under Rule 3.850.
[2] A defendant's right to counsel is violated when the record does not affirmatively show a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“we find that the record affirmatively shows no clear waiver of appellant's right to counsel and reverse”
The core holding that the record demonstrated no valid waiver of counsel rights.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBryan pled guilty to an escape charge in 1964 while serving a five-year sentence in state prison. Years later, while serving a federal sentence allege…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Knowing And Intelligent Waiver Of Counsel cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant filed a motion1 asking that the judgment and sentence on an escape charge be set aside on the ground that he was not represented by counsel and he had not knowingly and intelligently waived counsel. The lower court denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing. We find that the record affirmatively shows no clear waiver of appellant’s right to counsel and reverse.
Appellant pled guilty to an escape charge in 1964. At the time he filed the motion under consideration here he had served the sentence on the escape charge, but was serving a federal sentence which, he alleged, had been enhanced by his escape conviction.
The first question that must be decided on this appeal is whether one may collaterally attack a judgment and sentence when he is no longer in the custody of Florida authorities.
Although the First District in Chapman v. State, 300 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), and Parks v. State, 301 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), answered this question in the negative, these decisions appear to be in conflict with our Supreme Court’s holding in State v. Reynolds, 238 So. 2d 598 (Fla.1970), and with an earlier First District opinion, Wilcox v. State, 267 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972). We disagree with the Chapman and Parks decisions and hold that under Reynolds, supra, a prisoner in the custody of a state other than Florida is “in custody” within the meaning of Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.850.
Having decided that appellant may collaterally attack his prior conviction, we must determine whether he is entitled to relief, i. e., whether the record affirmatively shows that he knowingly and intelligently waived counsel.
The colloquy between appellant and the trial court upon the entry of his plea to the escape charge, in its entirety, consisted of the following:
“THE COURT: Richard, they filed an information against you while you were in the custody of the prison authorities serving a sentence of five years that was imposed against you in the Criminal Court in Hillsborough County on the 13th of February, 1964, that you escaped and went at large.
You understand that is — constitutes a felony.
MR. BRYAN: Yes, sir. THE COURT: For which you could get additional time in the state penitentiary. That you likewise have a right if you don’t feel you are guilty to plead not guilty and to have a jury to determine your guilt and if you do have a trial to an attorney to represent you. If you can’t afford the attorney, the State will pay for it and, of course, you can plead guilty and throw yourselve [sic] on the mercy of the Court. You have the privilege either way.
MR. BRYAN: That’s what I will do, your Honor. THE COURT: What, plead guilty?
MR. BRYAN: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Where do you live, Richard? In this county?
MR. BRYAN: Hillsborough County, Plant City.
THE COURT: I am sorry you did this because you added to your troubles. I don’t know that I blame you. I might have done the same thing if I had been out there. Under the law I have to sentence you to a year. MR. BRYAN: Could I ask you to give it concurrent?
THE COURT: Yes, sir, but I can’t do it under the law. You are going to have to go back and tough it out because now I understand they will send you back to Raiford and reclassify you and you will probably lose your good time. It’s rough, Richard. I don’t break the law. That one year is the minimum.”
This record affirmatively shows that appellant was not represented by counsel and further affirmatively shows the lack of a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel by appellant. Appellant is entitled to have the judgment and sentence on his escape charge vacated.
Reversed and remanded for the setting aside of the judgment and sentence on the escape charge against appellant.
HOBSON, Acting C. J., and McNULTY and OTT, JJ., concur. . Appellant’s motion was apparently treated as filed pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850, and we shall so consider it on this appeal.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Simmons v. State, 485 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)…s parole release date has been extended because of the 1968 convictions. A prisoner has standing to attack such prior convictions if his present sentence is enhanced by virtue thereof. Weir v. State, 319 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Bryan v. State, 345 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Lawrence v. State, 404 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). Simmons’ alleged classification by the Parole Commission as a recidivist constitutes sufficient nexus between his present confinement and the judgments and sentences under at…
-
Lawrence v. State, 404 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)…rence’s allegation that his present custody under a different sentence is being prolonged because of his 1953 conviction, the sentence on which was long ago served, is sufficient to satisfy the “in custody” requirement of Rule 3.850. Bryan v. State, 345 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Rose v. State, 235 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). See also Weir v. State, 319 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).…
-
In the Interest of D. C. T., 347 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977)…58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 [*688] L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); United States v. Garcia, 517 F. 2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975); Commonwealth v. Tyler, 468 Pa. 193, 360 A. 2d 617 (1976); Bryan v. State, 345 So. 2d 1095, Second District Court of Appeal Case, opinion filed May 6, 1977; Arnold v. State, 265 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). Accordingly, the adjudication of delinquency is reversed and the cause remanded for such other proceedings as may be consistent here…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Madison Lee Reynolds, 238 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 1970)
- Wilcox v. State, 267 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972)
- Chapman v. State, 300 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Parks v. State, 301 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)