THEODORE BERRY ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
THE HONORABLE C. ARCHIE CLEMENT, AS COUNTY JUDGE, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1977-05-18
No. 76-1774
HOBSON, Acting C. J., and McNULTY, J., concur.
346 So. 2d 105 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1977) Caution
Cited by 18 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Appellants in a summary eviction proceeding appealed the dismissal of their pleadings for alleged untimeliness. The court held that when computing the five-day filing deadline under Florida's summary procedure statute, intermediate Saturdays and Sundays must be excluded under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, making the filing timely. The court reversed and directed issuance of a writ of common law certiorari.


Holding

Appellants' pleadings were timely filed because intermediate Saturdays and Sundays must be excluded when computing time periods less than seven days under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090, reducing the elapsed time to four business days. Mandamus was improper, but common law certiorari was the appropriate remedy, and the circuit court should have granted the petition on the merits.


Headnotes

[1] When computing a time period of less than seven days prescribed by a statute or rule, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays are excluded.

[2] The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure apply to special statutory proceedings unless the statute prescribes a contrary procedure.

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Key Quotes

“In computing any period of time prescribed by these rules, by order of court or by any applicable statute, [w]hen the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.”

Establishes the rule for time computation under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090, which applies to determine whether the filing was timely.

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Facts & Procedural History

A landlord initiated summary eviction proceedings against appellants in county court. Process was served on Thursday, August 5, 1976. Appellants filed…

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Opinion of the Court
OTT, Judge.

OTT, Judge.

Appellants appeal the dismissal of an alternative writ of mandamus issued by the Pinellas County Circuit Court directing the county court to reinstate appellants’ pleadings in a cause before it. Appellants’ pleadings were dismissed for the sole reason that they were not timely filed. We hold that the filing was timely and reverse.

Appellants’ landlord brought summary eviction proceedings against them in county court. Process was served upon appellants on Thursday, August 5, 1976. Appellants filed and served their answer, affirmative defenses and counterclaim on the following Wednesday, August 11, 1976. Six days had elapsed including the intermediate Saturday and Sunday.

Section 51.011, Florida Statutes (1975), which governs summary procedure, requires service of the defendant’s answer within 5 days after service of process.

At issue here is the method of computing the time period allowed for the filing of appellants’ answer. The statute does not prescribe the method. However, Fla.R. Civ.P. 1.090 does; it provides:

In computing any period of. time prescribed by these rules, by order of court or by any applicable statute, [w]hen the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation.

The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure apply to special statutory proceedings, although the form, content, procedure and time for pleading prescribed in the statutes governing such proceedings are controlling unless the rules specifically provide to the contrary. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.010. Since Section 51.011, Florida Statutes (1975) does not prescribe the method of computing the five-day time period allowed for the filing of defensive pleadings, Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.090 is applicable and intermediate Saturdays and Sundays must be excluded. Moffett v. MacArthur, 291 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).

When the intermediate Saturday and Sunday are excluded from the computation of the time allowed in the case at bar, the elapsed period totals four days. Consequently, appellants’ pleadings were timely filed and should not have been dismissed.

However, mandamus was not the proper remedy here. If the error committed by a court is one made in the course of the exercise of legitimate jurisdiction, then mandamus will not lie to compel correction of the error. State ex rel. Meriden Creamery v. Robles, 111 Fla. 276, 150 So. 247 (1933). The petition for writ of mandamus, having been filed within thirty days of the county court’s dismissal of appellants’ pleadings, however, the discretionary writ of common law certiorari would have been viable, assuming no other adequate remedy at law was available.

Here, the assailed order was a nonappealable interlocutory order at law and, ordinarily, the defendant/appellant would have been required to obtain a final order and appeal therefrom. This was a summary statutory proceeding, though, and the parties are entitled to a summary disposition. Therefore, it would appear that the circuitous route of compulsory remand for the entry of a final judgment, and then a review by the circuit court in its appellate capacity, would frustrate the summary purpose of the statute. Accordingly, the remedy of appeal would be inadequate and common law certiorari was appropriate. The circuit court should therefore have treated the petition as a petition for common law certiorari and granted it.1

The circuit court’s order is hereby quashed and the cause remanded to the circuit court with directions to issue its gracious writ of common law certiorari vacating the county court’s order. HOBSON, Acting C. J., and McNULTY, J., concur. . The Florida Constitution, Article V, Section 2(a) provides that “The supreme court shall adopt ... a requirement that no cause shall be dismissed because an improper remedy has been sought,” and pursuant to that mandate, the Supreme Court has held that a cause which has merit is to be entertained in whatever form is proper. State v. Johnson, 306 So. 2d 102 (Fla.1974).


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Citator

Cited By

  • …ecord does not indicate that V-Strategic provided any advance notice of its intent to abandon its damages claim. . Intervening Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays do not count toward the five-day limit under section 51.011. See Berry v. Clement, 346 So. 2d 105, 106 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (holding that section 51.011 does not provide a time-computation procedure; therefore, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090(a) applies, which states that "[w]hen the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than 7 days,…
  • COE v. ITT Cmty. Dev. Corp., 362 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1978)
    …ional encroachment upon our rule-making power under Article V, Section 2(a), Florida Constitution. This argument is without merit. See Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.010; cf. Gonzalez v. Badcock’s Home Furnishings Center, 343 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1977); Berry v. Clement, 346 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).…
  • Gonzalez v. The Honorable Jack M. Turner, 427 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
    …is far from clear that we would be compelling a purely ministerial act. We are authorized, however, to treat Gonzalez’s petition for a writ of mandamus as a petition for writ of certiorari, and we do so. See Fla.R.App.P. 9.040(c); Berry v. Clement, 346 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). We grant in part and deny in part the petition for writ of certiorari. We quash the trial court’s order refusing to enter judgment against Continental on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and remand the cause for further proceed…

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