HARRY L. COE, JR., ETC., PETITIONER,
v.
ITT COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION ET AL., RESPONDENTS
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The Florida Supreme Court held that the 60-day deadline for filing complaints challenging ad valorem real property tax assessments is a jurisdictional statute of non-claim, not a statute of limitations, and quashed the First District Court of Appeal's contrary decision that allowed a late-filed tax assessment challenge.
The 60-day time limitation is a jurisdictional statute of non-claim rather than a statute of limitations, and it creates a jurisdictional bar to challenging tax assessments filed after the deadline.
[1] The 60-day time limitation for challenging a tax assessment under Section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes, is a jurisdictional statute of non-claim, not a statute of limitat…
[2] A statute of limitations establishes an affirmative defense, whereas a statute of non-claim is a jurisdictional bar that prevents a claim from being brought after a speci…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We have consistently held that the 60-day time limitation expressed in Section 194.171(2), and in its predecessor statutes, is a jurisdictional statute of non-claim rather than a statute of limitations.”
Establishes the core holding that the deadline is jurisdictional, not merely a statute of limitations that can be waived or tolled.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHarry L. Coe, Jr. filed a complaint challenging an ad valorem real property tax assessment by ITT Community Development Corporation after the 60-day p…
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ENGLAND, Chief Justice.
This case comes to us by petition for a writ of certiorari directed to the First District Court of Appeal, which recently held1 that a complaint challenging an ad valorem real property tax assessment need not be filed within the 60-day period prescribed by Section 194.171(2), Florida Statutes (1975).2 Recognizing that its decision would be in conflict with decisions of this Court and those of other district courts of appeal, the First District nonetheless held that the statute does not create a jurisdictional bar to the commencement of a tax assessment challenge and indicated that the “resulting conflict . . . may be remedied in the Supreme Court.”3 To remedy the conflict, we now quash the district court’s decision.
We have consistently held that the 60-day time limitation expressed in Section 194.171(2), and in its predecessor statutes, is a jurisdictional statute of non-claim rather than a statute of limitations. Rudisill v. City of Tampa, 151 Fla. 284, 9 So. 2d 380 (1942); Chatlos v. Overstreet, 124 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1960). The Third District Court of Appeal has consistently followed our interpretation. Henry v. County of Dade, 149 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 155 So. 2d 549 (Fla.1963); Harvey W. Seeds Post No. 29 v. Dade County, 230 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 238 So. 2d 420 (Fla.1970); Chaves Construction Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 256 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Blake v. R. M. S. Holding Corp., 341 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
Neither the district court below nor respondents here have suggested any invalidity or defect in the reasoning which prompted an early characterization of this statute as one of jurisdictional non-claim, rather than as one establishing an affirmative defense of the statute of limitations. Respondents’ principal basis for now challenging the formulation announced in Rudi-sill stems from an inartful use of the term “statute of limitations” in a recent decision of this Court,4 and a consequential reluctance of other Florida appellate courts to treat the statute as jurisdictional.5 While an inapt label may have been ascribed to Section 194.171(2) by our recent decision, the substance, purpose, and rationale for the statute have not been altered since Ru-disill. We therefore see no reason to recede from our earlier decisions.6
The decision of the First District Court of Appeal is quashed.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON and HATCHETT, JJ., concur. . Coe v. ITT Community Development Corp., 349 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
. “No action shall be brought to contest a tax assessment after sixty days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection . .
. Id. at 656. The decisional conflict identified by the district court, of course, provides the basis of our jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla.Const. . See Lake Worth Towers, Inc. v. Gerstung, 262 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1972).
. Maccabee Investments, Inc. v. Markham, 311 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), rev’d on other grounds, 343 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1977); Bailey v. Plaza Hotel Corp., 335 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1977). The Maccabee court’s conclusion that this provision constitutes a statute of limitation rather than a jurisdictional requisite was based largely on our misappellation in Gerstung. 311 So. 2d at 726. Bailey, in turn, relied entirely upon Maccabee for the same proposition. 335 So. 2d at 17.
. Respondents also contend that if Section 194.171(2) is held to be jurisdictional, it would be an unconstitutional encroachment upon our rule-making power under Article V, Section 2(a), Florida Constitution. This argument is without merit. See Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.010; cf. Gonzalez v. Badcock’s Home Furnishings Center, 343 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1977); Berry v. Clement, 346 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Markham v. Neptune Hollywood Beach Club, 527 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 1988)…4. (emphasis added). As the Department points out, in Lake Worth Towers we referred to section 192.-21(2), Florida Statutes (1967), the predecessor to section 194.171(2), as a statute of limitations. Then in Coe v. ITT Community Development Corp., 362 So. 2d 8 (Fla.1978), we recharacterized section 194.171(2) as a nonclaim statute and noted that our use of the term “statute of limitations” in Lake Worth Towers was the result of “an [*816] inartful use of the term.” 362 So. 2d at 9. Finally in Miller v. No…
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Miller v. Nolte, 453 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1984)…ssment after 60 days from the date the assessment being contested is certified for collection under s. 193.-122(2). The district court found the issue presented in this case had been resolved by this Court in Coe v. ITT Community Development Corp., 362 So. 2d 8 (Fla.1978). Miller v. Nolte, 427 So. 2d 248 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). In its brief opinion, the district court stated that Coe held that the sixty-day time limitation expressed in section 194.171(2) is a jurisdictional statute of non-claim rather than a…1 / 2
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Dep't OF Revenue of the State of Fla. v. Goembel, 382 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…eriod for filing such suit, the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider those years, and it was not necessary for either the assessor or the Department to assert that position by affirmative defense. Coe v. ITT Community Development Corporation, 362 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1978). The trial court was correct in holding that Tompkins was not entitled to relief for 1974. III. Interest on the refund. Tompkins contends that it is entitled to interest on the refund of overpaid taxes, and that the trial court erred i…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (16 total)
- Lake Worth Towers, Inc. v. Gratton Gerstung, 262 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972)
- Clarance A. Rudisill and Helen Rudisill v. City OF Tampa, 151 Fla. 284 (Fla. 1942)
- Chatlos v. Earnest Overstreet, 124 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1960)
- Blake v. R. M. S. Holding Corp., 341 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Henry v. Cnty. OF Dade, 149 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)
- Harvey W. Seeds Post NO. 29 v. Dade Cnty., 230 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970)
- Berry v. The Honorable C. Archie Clement, 346 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)
- Mincey v. State, 256 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- MacCabee Invs., Inc. v. Markham, 311 So. 2d 718 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Markham v. MacCABEE Invs., Inc., 343 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1977)