ARTHUR CHEATHAM, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance for sentencing and did not err in reinstructing the jury on specific charges without repeating reasonable doubt instructions.
[1] A trial court's denial of a motion for continuance of a sentencing hearing is reviewed for palpable abuse of discretion.
[2] A trial court must afford a defendant the opportunity to present matters in mitigation of sentence before sentencing.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDefendant was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced. He moved for a continuance of the sentencing hearing, which was denied. The jury also req…
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PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Arthur Cheatham, was informed against for aggravated battery, tried by jury, found guilty of aggravated assault and sentenced to five years in the state penitentiary.
Defendant first urges as reversible error the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance of hearing on his sentencing in violation of Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.720(b).
While it is undisputed that this rule requires a court, before sentencing, to afford a defendant the opportunity to present matters in mitigation of sentence,1 the court is not compelled under the rules to grant defendant a continuance prior to sentencing upon his motion therefor. The general rule is that the granting or denial of a motion for continuance is within the discretion of the trial court, and the court’s action with respect thereto will be reversed only upon a showing of a palpable abuse of discretion. See Douglas v. State, 216 So. 2d 82 (Fla.3d DCA 1968); Mills v. State, 280 So. 2d 35 (Fla.3d DCA 1973). A review of the record reflects no such abuse of discretion. Defendant was given an opportunity to submit evidence in mitigation of sentence, and we find the trial court fully complied with the requirements of Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.720.
Defendant secondly contends that the court erred in reinstructing the jury, at its request, as to the elements of aggravated battery, aggravated assault and battery without also reinstructing the jury on reasonable doubt. We cannot agree.
It is proper for a trial judge to limit the repetition to the charges requested; however, the repeated charges should be complete on the subject involved. See Hedges v. State, 172 So. 2d 824 (Fla.1965). In the case sub judice the trial judge repeated the charges requested by the jury and these repeated charges were complete on the subject involved. The charges on reasonable doubt and acquittal were not essential to a complete and full instruction on the repeated charges. Cf. Bristow v. State, 338 So. 2d 553 (Fla.3d DCA 1976).
Judgment of conviction and sentence affirmed.
. Mask v. State, 289 So. 2d 385 (Fla.1973).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Miller v. State, 435 So. 2d 258 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)…s in mitigation, the cause must be remanded for a sentencing hearing and re-sentencing. However, this court has interpreted Rule 3.720(b) as requiring only that a defendant be given an opportunity to present matters in mitigation. Cheatham v. State, 346 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). In Cheatham, the defendant requested a continuance of the sentencing hearing and the trial court denied his motion. This court said: While it is undisputed that this rule requires a court, before sentencing, to afford a defendan…
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Hargis v. State, 451 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)…s unprepared to do so. The court held that Rule 3.720(b) only requires that the defendant be given an “opportunity” to present matters in mitigation and that no abuse was shown in the denial of the motion for continuance. See also Cheatham v. State, 346 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (court not compelled under Rule 3.720 to grant the defendant a continuance prior to sentencing). In the instant case, the evidence sought to be introduced consisted of a tape of recorded comments by three individuals. The defense…
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Gonzalez v. State, 502 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)…la. 3d DCA 1976). The trial court also properly limited its response to the jury’s request by denying Gonzalez’ request to re-instruct the jury on self-defense, and this was not misleading. See Bristow, 338 So. 2d at 556; see also Cheatham v. State, 346 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Gonzalez contends that this conflicts with McCormick v. State, 308 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). In McCormick, the district court held that it was error for the trial court to omit an instruction on self-defense in recharging t…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Whitney v. Colonial INN, 172 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1965)
- Hollis Mills v. State, 280 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973)
- Bristow v. State, 338 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Jones v. State, 289 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1974)
- Mask v. State, 289 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973)
- Taft Douglas, Jr. v. State, 216 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968)