JEFF DAVIS HINTON, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1977-07-06
No. 76-1614
Before HENDRY, C. J., and BARKDULL and NATHAN, JJ.
347 So. 2d 1079 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1977) Caution
Cited by 27 cases

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Synopsis

Jeff Davis Hinton was convicted of aggravated assault for attacking his brother with a hatchet. On appeal, he challenged the admission of hearsay testimony from the deceased victim identifying him as the assailant, arguing it violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. The court affirmed, finding the testimony admissible on redirect examination and harmless given ample direct eyewitness evidence of guilt.


Holding

The court held that the prosecutor properly pursued the line of inquiry on redirect examination where the questions amplified statements made in response to cross-examination by defense counsel. The testimony was admissible because it qualified, limited, or explained testimony elicited on cross-examination, and no reversible error was demonstrated given ample direct eyewitness evidence of guilt sufficient to sustain the conviction.


Headnotes

[1] Redirect examination of a witness may address matters raised during cross-examination, including qualifying, limiting, or explaining prior testimony.

[2] The scope of redirect examination is largely within the discretion of the trial court.

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Key Quotes

“Testimony is admissible on redirect examination which tends to qualify, limit or explain testimony elicited on cross-examination.”

Establishes the legal standard for admissibility of testimony on redirect examination

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Facts & Procedural History

Jeff Davis Hinton was charged with aggravated battery (reduced to aggravated assault) against his brother Carl using a hatchet. The critical issue at …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant, Jeff Davis Hinton, was charged by information with one count of aggravated battery upon his brother, Carl Hinton, with use of a hatchet. The charge was reduced to aggravated assault. Defendant was tried by jury, found guilty, convicted and sentenced to five years imprisonment. We note that Carl was unavailable for trial since he died from unspecified causes not related to this incident.

The crucial issue at trial was whether the defendant was the assailant, or whether his brother, Carl, was the assailant. During the redirect examination of the investigating officer the prosecutor asked the following question:

Q. In response to a question by [defense] counsel, you indicated that your arrest was predicated upon an identification of Mr. Hinton [the defendant] as the assailant by two witnesses?

A. And the victim, yes, sir. Excuse me — and Carl Hinton [the defendant’s brother].

Q. Carl Hinton told you that his assailant was the defendant, his brother, Jeff Hinton?

A. Yes, he did.

Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds to the testimony that the victim (now deceased) had said that the defendant was his assailant. Defendant also moved for a curative instruction, to strike and for a mistrial. The motions were denied, but the prosecutor was told not to pursue that questioning further. It appears that the trial judge was of the opinion that the defense had opened the door to this inquiry on cross-examination.

On appeal, defendant contends that the court erred in admitting the statement into evidence over objection, and in denying the motions for curative instruction, to strike and for mistrial, as violating his constitutional rights to confrontation, cross-examination and a fair trial.

As a general rule, a party may re-examine a witness about matters brought out on cross-examination. Noeling v. State, 40 So. 2d 120 (Fla.1949). See Marlow v. State, 49 Fla. 7, 38 So. 653 (1905); Stewart v. State, 58 Fla. 97, 50 So. 642 (1909). Testimony is admissible on redirect examination which tends to qualify, limit or explain testimony elicited on cross-examina tion. Tampa Electric Co. v. Charles, 69 Fla. 27, 67 So. 572 (1915). It is also generally held that the scope of redirect examination rests largely in the discretion of the court. See Yanzito v. Wagner, 244 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971); 81 Am.Jur. Witnesses, § 425 (1976).

The record reflects that defense counsel cross-examined the investigating officer as to whether he observed the incident, whether, he had any idea how the injuries had been inflicted aside from what people had told him; and consequently whether the “statements from witnesses” were the basis for his arrest of the defendant. The officer responded affirmatively and added Carl Hinton, defendant’s brother, the victim, as also having furnished the basis for the arrest. We find that the prosecutor properly pursued this line of inquiry on redirect examination of the officer, where the questions amplified the statements made in response to questions asked on cross-examination by defense counsel to elicit answers favorable to the defense. See 81 Am.Jur.2d, Witnesses § 425, supra.

In seeking reversal, defendant relies heavily on Spears v. State, 301 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), but we find this reliance to be misplaced. The record contains direct eyewitness testimony which is more than sufficient to sustain a conviction, without the testimony complained of. First, the prosecutor’s redirect examination of the officer on the same subject brought out by defense counsel on cross-examination did not deviate greatly from what had already been elicited by defense counsel on cross-examination. Second, the statement of the witness on redirect was not “the only evidence that directly implicated appellant as a participant in the crime charged.” Spears v. State, supra, page 24. The record contains ample direct evidence of defendant’s guilt furnished by eyewitnesses to the crime; and a conviction could have been had without the statement at issue. Therefore, we find that no reversible error has been demonstrated.

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By (14 total)

  • Tompkins v. State, 502 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1986)
    …o complaints about sexual advances. We cannot agree. Generally, testimony is admissible on redirect which tends to qualify, explain, or limit cross-examination testimony. Tampa Electric Co. v. Charles, 69 Fla. 27, 67 So. 572 (1915); Hinton v. State, 347 So. 2d 1079, 1080 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 981 (Fla.1977). Moreover, defense counsel’s question on cross-examination could have led the jury to infer that Lisa had never complained to her mother about Tompkins. We find that the state was properly…
  • Johnson v. State, 608 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1992)
    …, cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1033, 107 S.Ct. 3277, 97 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987). We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding Smith’s answer admissible to rebut an inference created by questioning on cross-examination. Tompkins; Hinton v. State, 347 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 981 (Fla.1977). The defense called Smith’s former probation officer in an attempt to impeach Smith’s testimony and now argues that the trial court improperly limited this witness’ testimony. We do not address…
  • Rodriguez v. State, 436 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
    …based on certain comments made by the prosecuting attorney in final argument. We find the subject testimony and comments insufficient to warrant a mistrial in this case. See e.g., Flowers v. State, 351 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Hinton v. State, 347 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 354 So. 2d 981 (Fla.1977); Thompson v. State, 318 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). Finally, it is urged that the trial court erred in giving á certain instruction to the jury. The state’s chief witness had testified thro…

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