MERCY HOSPITAL, INC., PETITIONER,
v.
GERALD BADIA, AS FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, AND PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF JASON BADIA, DECEASED, AND GERALD BADIA AND JUDY BADIA, AS HUSBAND AND WIFE, RESPONDENTS
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Mercy Hospital challenged a medical malpractice mediation panel's termination of proceedings after the plaintiff failed to request a hearing extension within 120 days. The court affirmed the referee's lack of jurisdiction to grant an extension after the statutory deadline had passed, strictly construing Florida's medical mediation statute against the party seeking its benefits.
The court held that the judicial referee lacked jurisdiction to grant an extension after the 120-day period expired. The statute requires that any extension request be made before expiration of the 120-day period, and the referee cannot retroactively extend this jurisdictional deadline.
[1] A judicial referee lacks jurisdiction to grant an extension for medical mediation proceedings after the statutory 120-day period has expired.
[2] Statutes in derogation of a claimant's right to seek immediate legal redress in court should be strictly construed against those seeking their benefits.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The statutes enacted as Part II to Ch. 768 place an impediment to a claimant's right to seek legal redress in the courts of this State, notwithstanding the provisions of Article I, Section 21, Constitution of the State of Florida (1968). And, the statute should be strictly construed against those seeking the benefits of it, the statute being in derogation of the normal right of a claimant to seek immediate redress in the courts.”
Establishes that medical mediation statutes restrict access to courts and must be strictly construed against defendants seeking to invoke them
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRespondents filed a medical malpractice complaint against Mercy Hospital and requested a medical mediation panel under Florida law. After service and …
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BARKDULL, Judge.
The respondents, as plaintiffs, filed a complaint sounding in medical malpractice against the petitioner,1 as defendant, and a request for a medical mediation panel pursuant to the provisions of Section 768.-44(l)(a & b), Florida Statutes (1975). Prompt service of. process was obtained upon the defendant and it filed an answer. Nothing further transpired for 120 days from the filing of the claim for medical •mediation. On July 15, 1976, the clerk of the court noticed a request for an extension of time before the mediation referee, although no motion was filed demonstrating any alleged good cause. On July 19, 1976, the clerk of the court executed a notice of termination of medical mediation proceedings. The matter came on to be heard on the clerk’s notice, and the judicial referee, on August 6, 1976, denied any extension because he lacked jurisdiction.
The statute involved is Section 768.44(3), Florida Statutes (1975), and reads as follows:
“(3) The clerk shall, with the advice and cooperation of the parties and their counsel, fix a date, time, and place for a hearing on the claim before the hearing panel. The hearing shall be held within 120 days of the date the claim was filed with the clerk unless, for good cause shown upon order of the judicial referee, such time is extended. Such extension shall not exceed 6 months from the date the claim is filed. If no hearing on the merits is held within 10 months of the date the claim is filed, the jurisdiction of the mediation panel on the subject matter shall terminate, and the parties may proceed in accordance with law.”
The judicial referee held that he was without jurisdiction to grant an extension request made after the expiration of the 120-day period. We agree.
The statutes enacted as Part II to Ch. 768 place an impediment to a claimant’s right to seek legal redress in the courts of this State, notwithstanding the provisions of Article I, Section 21, Constitution of the State of Florida (1968). And, the statute should be strictly construed against those seeking the benefits of it, the statute being in derogation of the normal right of a claimant to seek immediate redress in the courts. This pre-litigation burden was recognized by the Supreme Court of Florida in Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), which upheld the constitutionality of these statutes; No affirmative action having been taken by the defendant during the 120-day period, upon the expiration thereof the claimant was at liberty to pursue his cause of action in the circuit court without further delay.
The petitioner has called to our attention the following cases: State v. Vann, 342 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A.1977); State v. Jacobson, 343 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1977); State v. Cowart, 344 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A.1977); Richards v. Foulk, 345 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A.1977). In each of the cited cases the facts are distinguishable from the instant case and we, therefore, do not find them either persuasive or controlling.
For the reasons above stated, the order of the mediation referee, finding that he was without jurisdiction to extend the period after the expiration of the 120-day period provided in Section 768.44(3), Florida Statutes (1975), is affirmed. Even if he had had jurisdiction, which we do not find, he would not have departed from the essential requirements of the law because there was no motion filed showing good cause.
Certiorari denied.
. The petitioner filed an appeal in this matter which, because of the nature of medical mediation panels being quasi-judicial bodies, we choose to treat as a petition for certiorari. See: Article V, Section 2(a), Constitution of the State of Florida (1968). Also, see: Koota v. Parkway General Hospital, Inc., 346 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A.1977).
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Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980)…International Hospital, 356 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Aldana v. Holub, 354 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Cole v. Wallace, 354 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Perkins v. Pare, 352 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Mercy Hospital, Inc. v. Badia, 348 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). But see Morales v. Moore, 356 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). . Vital to the concept of procedural due process is the notion that valuable property interests, such as those conferred by state law, must not be “arbitrarily underm…
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Green v. Broward Gen. Med. Ctr. & Dr. C. L. Reid, 356 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)…aw, and is an impediment to the constitutional guarantee of access to the courts of this state, strict compliance with the statutory provisions of Chapter 768 is required. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla.1976); Mercy Hospital, Inc. v. Badia, 348 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3 DCA 1977). [*878] No hearing on the claim having been held within six months from the date the claim was filed, Petitioner is now entitled to pursue his cause of action in the circuit court without further delay. But see, State ex rel. Love…
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Raedel v. Watson Clinic Found., Inc., 360 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)…cuit court or that the late filing was with the consent of opposing counsel. Latorra v. Patrick, No. 77-1129, 359 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Johnson v. Crawford, No. 77-233, 361 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).2 In Mercy Hospital, Inc. v. Badia, 348 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), the Third District Court of Appeal held that, where the answer was timely filed, but no hearing begun within 120 days from the date the claim was filed and no extension granted within the 120 day period, jurisdiction of the medic…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Mercy Hosp., Inc. v. The Honorable Harold Vann, 342 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Marcia A. McGUIRK v. Honorable Edward D. Cowart, 344 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- State of Fla. ex rel. v. Ira S. Jacobson, M.D., 343 So. 2d 1328 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Tobin Koota and Marilyn Koota v. Parkway Gen. Hosp., Inc., Radiologic Consultants, P. A., 346 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)
- Richards v. Foulk, 345 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)