ANTHONY I. TENNELL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant, a 14-year-old juvenile with below-average intelligence and first-grade reading ability, challenges the admissibility of his confession and an order transferring him to adult criminal court. The court reversed because the state failed to meet its heavy burden of establishing that the juvenile's Miranda waiver was intelligently made under the totality of circumstances.
The court held that the state did not bear its heavy burden in establishing that the juvenile's Miranda waiver was intelligently made under the totality of circumstances, considering his age, below-average intelligence, first-grade reading ability, and difficulty comprehending normal speech.
[1] A juvenile's confession is admissible if made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, considering the totality of the circumstances, including the juvenile's age, inte…
[2] A statute requiring notification of parents when a child is taken into custody does not apply when the child is not formally placed or retained in detention care.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A confession is not involuntary merely because the person making it is a juvenile. In determining the admissibility of a juvenile's statement the "totality of circumstances" under which it was made must be examined.”
Establishes the legal standard for evaluating juvenile confessions under Florida law
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was 14 years old at the time of his confession. He had below-average intelligence, reading ability equivalent to a first-grader, and difficu…
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HOBSON, Judge.
Appellant, a juvenile in these consolidated appeals, seeks review of an order transferring him to the adult criminal division of the circuit court and an order denying his motion to suppress his confession.
At the time the appellant gave his confession he was fourteen years of age. The record establishes that he was of below average intelligence; had the reading ability equivalent to that of a child entering the first grade; had difficulty understanding normal speech; and for that reason anyone speaking to him had to speak slowly, repeat himself often, and use simple words for the appellant to understand.
During the interrogation only the officer and appellant were present. The minor’s parents were not notified.1 The interrogating officer completed the Miranda waiver form himself after advising the appellant of his rights and satisfying himself that the appellant understood them. After appellant signed the waiver, while under interrogation, he made a statement which is the subject matter of this appeal.
The law as to the admissibility of juveniles’ confessions is aptly set forth in T. B. v. State, 306 So. 2d 183 (Fla.2d DCA 1975), wherein it is stated on page 185: A confession is not involuntary merely because the person making it is a juvenile. In determining the admissibility of a juvenile’s statement the “totality of circumstances” under which it was made must be examined. Gallegos v. Colorado, 1962, 370 U.S. 49, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325, 87 A.L.R.2d 614; Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 574.
A history of the problem of juvenile confessions is set out in People v. Lara, 1967, 67 Cal.2d 365, 62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P. 2d 202, cert. den., 1968, 392 U.S. 945, 88 S.Ct. 2303, 20 L.Ed.2d 1407. Lara sets out the general rule:
“, . .. [A] minor has the capacity to make a voluntary confession, even of capital offenses, without the presence or consent of counsel or other responsible adult, and the admissibility of such a confession depends not on his age alone but on a combination of that factor with such other circumstances as his intelligence, education, experience, and ability to comprehend the meaning and effect of his statement. . . . ” 62 Cal.Rptr. at 599, 432 P. 2d at 215.
To these considerations must be added the requirement that, if the statement stems from custodial interrogation, the accused must be given his rights under Miranda and must voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waive those rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 1966, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.
A juvenile may waive his rights under Miranda, but the state bears a heavy burden in establishing that the waiver was intelligently made. Arnold v. State, Fla.App.3rd, 1972, 265 So. 2d 64, cert. den., Fla. 1973, 272 So. 2d 817.
Upon a careful reading of the record in this case, we hold that the state has not borne its heavy burden in establishing that the waiver was intelligently made.
The remaining point on appeal has been cárefully considered and found to be without merit.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
BOARDMAN, C. J., and DANAHY, PAUL W., Jr., Associate Judge, concur. . Dowst v. State, 336 So. 2d 375 (Fla.1st DCA 1976).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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W.M. v. State, 585 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…ld’s age, the child’s borderline IQ and the fact that there was no tape recording of the statement or signing of any rights cards. [*983] CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The test as to the admissibility of a juvenile’s confession is set out in Tennell v. State, 348 So. 2d 937, 938 (Fla.2d DCA 1977) and T.B. v. State, 306 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla.2d DCA 1975): In determining the admissibility of a juvenile’s statement, the “totality of circumstances” under which it was made must be examined. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49…
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Doerr v. State, 348 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)…ilt to Detective Hartery, “I didn’t want to hear his mouth.” He even admitted that he was familiar with the Miranda warnings because he had heard them when the police had interrogated him on other occasions. This is not a case like Tennell v. State, 348 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (Opinion filed August 10, 1977) in which the absence of the juvenile’s parents because of the failure on the part of the appropriate authorities to notify them was only one of several factors dictating the conclusion that the conf…
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J.G. a child v. State, 883 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)…ed his rights. See T.S.D. v. State, 741 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).2 Law: Confessions “A confession is not involuntary merely because the person making it is a juvenile.” T.B. v. State, 306 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Tennell v. State, 348 So. 2d 937, 938 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). “The erroneous admission of statements obtained in violation of Miranda rights is subject to harmless error analysis.” Caso v. State, 524 So. 2d 422, 425 (Fla.1988); Mansfield, 758 So. 2d at 644; Ramirez, 739 So. 2d at 578.…
Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)
- Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (U.S. 1962)
- T. B. v. State, 306 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Arnold v. State, 265 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Rogert L. Dowst v. State, 336 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Connell, 272 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1973)
- Brett v. United States, 392 U.S. 945 (U.S. 1968)
- State v. Arnold, 272 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1973)
- Green v. Mississippi, 392 U.S. 945 (U.S. 1968)