ROGERT L. DOWST, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A 16-year-old defendant appeals his conviction on three counts of grand larceny, challenging the admissibility of tape-recorded confessions obtained after he was denied permission to call his parents in violation of Florida Statute § 39.03(3)(a). The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the violation of the statutory duty to immediately notify parents of a juvenile in custody renders any confession obtained before such notification inadmissible.
The court held that when a 16-year-old defendant requests to speak to his parents and is denied, such request constitutes a continuous assertion of his privilege against self-incrimination, and any confession given before either (1) he is granted the right to make such call or (2) the officer makes a good faith effort to notify his parents is inadmissible in evidence. The court also held that Miranda warnings alone are insufficient to cure the violation of the statutory duty to notify parents.
[1] A confession obtained from a sixteen-year-old suspect who requested to speak with his parents and was denied the opportunity until after giving the statement is inadmissi…
[2] A statute mandating immediate notification of a juvenile's parents or legal custodians upon taking the child into custody cannot be suspended by an arresting or interroga…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If the person taking the child into custody determines, pursuant to paragraph (c), that the child should be detained or placed in shelter care, he shall immediately notify the parents or legal custodians of the child”
The court quoted the statute establishing the mandatory duty of officers to immediately notify parents of juveniles in custody, the violation of which is at the heart of this case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant, age 16, was arrested and transported to the Sheriff's Office on suspicion of committing three felonies. Before any questioning, he requeste…
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MELVIN, Woodrow M., Associate Judge..
We review a timely appeal from a judgment and sentence on three counts of grand larceny.
The primary issue presented here for determination is whether the trial judge erred in refusing to suppress tape recorded statements of Appellant, typewritten transcriptions of the same, and testimony concerning such statements.
Upon the arrest of the Defendant, he was transported to the Sheriff’s Office where it was confirmed that he was sixteen years old. The investigating officer called the Division of Youth Services. The officer was advised by the Division of Youth Services that the Defendant was an escapee from the State training school and was requested to hold him in custody. Prior to any questioning of the Defendant and before he gave the alleged tape recorded confessions, he asked the officer if he could call his parents. He was not permitted to make the telephone call until sometime after he gave the statements in question.. Proper and timely objections were made to the introduction in evidence of all the tapes, transcriptions, and conversations relative thereto. Nevertheless, they were admitted in evidence and presented as the major thrust of the State’s case against the Defendant.
We are not here concerned with the Defendant’s argument that the statements should have been excluded because he was under the influence of some drug. The trial judge heard evidence pro and con on this issue, and the record is sufficient to support his finding in this regard.
The duty of an arresting officer or the interrogating officer, who in this case is the same person, is clearly set forth in Section 39.03(3) (a), Floria Statutes as follows:
“If the person taking the child into custody determines, pursuant to paragraph (c), that the child should be detained or placed in shelter care, he shall immediately notify the parents or legal custodians of the child . . .” (emphasis ours)
With full knowledge that he held in custody a youth of sixteen years and suspected of the commission of a serious felony, he was mandated by the provisions of the Statute to immediately notify his parents, or permit the boy to do so. It is not sufficient for the State to argue that notification of the Division of Youth Services satisfied the Statute since the Defendant was an escapee. All that call resulted in was a direction that the Defendant be placed in custody.
The purpose of the Statute is too clear to call for interpretation or construction. The Legislature has commanded with clear words that a juvenile’s parents shall he notified immediately, and it is not left to the discretion of the arresting or interrogating officer to suspend the operation of this legislative mandate until after he obtains confessions from the youth. In such posture, the giving of the Miranda rights to the Defendant was to no avail.
We hold that when the Defendant, sixteen years of age, requested to speak to his parents and was denied, such request constituted a continuous assertion of his privilege against self incrimination and that any confession given by him before either (1) he is granted the right to make such call, or (2) the officer makes a good faith effort to so advise his parents, is inadmissible in evidence. See Arnold v. State, 265 So. 2d 64 (Fla.App. 3rd, 1972); In re: A. J. A., 248 So. 2d 690 (Fla.App. 3rd, 1971) and Roberts v. State, 285 So. 2d 385 (Fla.1973).
The second point urged relates to alleged variances in allegation and proof of ownership of the money in question. When the evidence was presented, no objection was made as to alleged variance. The issue was not properly presented until after verdict. That timing of objection is out of season.
The third point on appeal relates to the refusal of the trial court to charge the jury as to the provisions of Section 39.-03(3) (a). The point is without merit.
The judgments and sentences are reversed with direction to grant the Defendant a new trial.
RAWLS, Acting C. J., and BARK-DULL, Thomas H., Jr., Associate Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Cited By
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Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1994)…pecially with an opinion. GRIMES, J., concurs with an opinion. BARKETT, C.J., concurs in result only. . Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. . § 39.037(2), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1990); see J.E.S. v. State, 366 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Dowst v. State, 336 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 339 So. 2d 1172 (Fla.1976). These last two cases were decided under superseded law, but the statutory language is sufficiently similar that the same conclusion still obtains, although failure to notify parents upon arre…
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Doerr v. State, 348 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)…ts or legal custodians of the child . . ,.” (emphasis supplied) The thrust of appellant’s argument is that noncompliance with the statute automatically requires suppression of his confessions. In support of this contention, he cites Dowst v. State, 336 So. 2d 375 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), wherein the First District stated that since Section 89.03(3)(a) commands that a juvenile’s parents shall be notified immediately, it is not left to the discretion of an arresting or interrogating officer to suspend that legisla…
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Tennell v. State, 348 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977)…shing that the waiver was intelligently made. The remaining point on appeal has been cárefully considered and found to be without merit. REVERSED and REMANDED. BOARDMAN, C. J., and DANAHY, PAUL W., Jr., Associate Judge, concur. . Dowst v. State, 336 So. 2d 375 (Fla.1st DCA 1976).…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Arnold v. State, 265 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)
- Roberts v. State, 285 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973)
- State of Fla. ex rel. Lorin Lee Furlong v. The Honorable Murray Goodman, 248 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- In the Interest of A. J. A., 248 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)