STEPHEN JACKSON, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Stephen Jackson was convicted of robbery occurring on October 25, 1975, despite presenting an alibi defense for that specific date. The trial court erroneously instructed the jury it need not prove the robbery occurred on the charged date, allowing the jury to speculate about when the crime actually occurred. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that when a defendant raises an alibi defense tied to a specific date, the state must prove that particular date.
Yes, reversible error occurred. When an accused's defense is keyed to the particular time the offense was allegedly committed, the state must prove that specific date. The general rule allowing proof of a different date within the statute of limitations does not apply when an alibi defense is presented, because permitting jury speculation about the date undermines the value of such a defense.
[1] A trial court commits reversible error by instructing the jury that the state is not required to establish the specific date of the crime when the defendant has presented…
[2] When a defendant provides notice of an alibi defense, the state must prove the crime occurred on the date alleged in the information, even if other dates are within the s…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“If a jury is allowed to speculate, an alibi defense will seldom be of any real value to a defendant.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that speculative jury verdicts regarding the date of a crime undermine the effectiveness of alibi defenses.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJackson was charged with robbery on October 25, 1975, and provided notice of an alibi defense. At trial, the state presented evidence showing the robb…
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SCHEB, Acting Chief Judge.
The trial court, over appellant’s objection, instructed the jury that the state was not required to establish the specific date of the crime even though appellant pled an alibi defense. Appellant claims that in so doing the trial court committed reversible error. We agree and award appellant a new trial.
Appellant, Stephen Jackson, Jr., was charged by information with having committed robbery on October 25, 1975. During discovery procedures appellant provided the state with a notice of intent to claim alibi. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.200. However, appellant did not request that the state furnish him a statement of particulars as to the specific date of the offense. At trial the state’s proof showed that the robbery had occurred on October 25, 1975, and no evidence was introduced to show that the robbery took place on any other date. Appellant put on his alibi defense keyed to the October 25 date. Three witnesses testified in support of his statement as to his whereabouts at the time of the robbery. After both sides rested, the court instructed the jury, over defense objection, that it was not necessary for the state to prove that the robbery occurred on October 25. Appellant was convicted and the trial court sentenced him to ninety-nine years in prison.
Appellant contends the trial court committed reversible error in giving the previously mentioned instruction over his objection. We agree and reverse.
The First District Court of Appeal recently considered this same point in Mitchell v. State, 333 So. 2d 89 (Fla.1st DCA 1976). After reviewing the relevant facts, which are parallel in all material aspects to those in the present case, Judge Smith said:
It follows that, in the circumstances of this ease, the trial court erred in charging the jury in effect that it might convict appellant if it found that she committed the offense charged on some date other than December 14,1974 [the date charged in the information]. That the evidence which was adduced gave the jury a hard choice was no justification for inviting the jury to indulge in speculation which disregarded all the evidence. 333 So. 2d at 91.
We think that Judge Smith’s conclusion is sound. If a jury is allowed to speculate, an alibi defense will seldom be of any real value to a defendant.
We recognize that our holding is an exception to the well established rule of law upon which the judge’s instruction was based, that one date may be alleged in an information and another proved at trial if the proof shows the crime was committed before the information was filed and within the period of the statute of limitations. State v. Clein, 93 So. 2d 876 (Fla.1957); Fla. Standard Jury Instruction 2.09. However, where an accused’s defense is keyed to the particular time when the offense was allegedly committed, the general rule is not applicable. Mitchell v. State, supra.
In view of our decision, we need not consider the other points which appellant raises.
Appellant’s conviction and sentence are vacated and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
OTT and RYDER, JJ., concur.
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Gaines v. State, 406 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)…motion for judgment of acquittal and denying his requested instruction. Compare R.C.B. v. State, 374 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (date of offense significant where burglaries of same premises occurred within three-week period); Jackson v. State, 350 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (date of offense significant where alibi defense directed to specific date charged in information); Mitchell v. State, 333 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (date of offense significant where alibi defense directed to specific date ch…
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Miller v. State, 389 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)…o evidence the pharmacy was burglarized other than between 1:00 a. m., and 7:00 a. m., [*1212] when appellant was admitted to the hospital. Cases cited by appellant are not on point. State v. Beamon, 298 So. 2d 376 (Fla.1974), and Jackson v. State, 350 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), held that the state was bound to prove the exact date of the offense as in the bill of particulars. In State v. Witherspoon, 366 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), the trial judge had ordered the defendant discharged because the stat…
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Brown v. State, 462 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)…(Fla. 3d DCA 1967). To charge that the crime was committed during one specific time, and to prove that it was committed at another time can have a devastating effect upon an accused’s ability to prepare.and present a defense. See, Jackson v. State, 350 So. 2d 808, 809 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). . There is a dearth of direct factual evidence or physical evidence tying appellant to the crimes. The murder weapon was never found. . Although not all prosecutorial error is per se reversible, such error will be reversib…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Reubin J. Clein, 93 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1957)
- Woodburn v. Woodburn, 333 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
- Mitchell v. State, 333 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)