MYRNA N. MUMM, APPELLANT,
v.
ROGER V. MUMM, APPELLEE
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Myrna Mumm appealed an order terminating her alimony payments from her former husband Roger Mumm based on changed circumstances. The appellate court affirmed the termination but amended the order to retain jurisdiction to award alimony in the future if circumstances change.
The court affirmed the termination of alimony payments as the trial court did not abuse its discretion given the material changes in circumstances, but amended the order to expressly retain jurisdiction to award alimony in the future upon a proper showing of changed circumstances by either party.
[1] A court may err by failing to retain jurisdiction to award alimony in the future when there is a possibility of changed circumstances for either party.
[2] A material change in circumstances may justify the termination of alimony payments.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the chancellor erred in failing to retain jurisdiction to award alimony in the future as there exists the possibility of a change of circumstances on the part of either of the parties in the future to justify or require the award of alimony payments”
Establishes the core holding that trial courts must retain jurisdiction over alimony matters despite terminating payments, as future circumstances may warrant reinstatement.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe parties divorced in 1965 after 13 years of marriage, with a settlement agreement providing Roger pay Myrna $350 monthly alimony with automatic cos…
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PER CURIAM.
Myrna N. Mumm appeals an order ceasing all alimony payments entered pursuant to the modification petition of her former husband, Roger V. Mumm, the appellee.
In 1965 a judgment dissolving the marital bonds between Myrna and Roger Mumm was entered after 13 years of marriage. The judgment incorporated a settlement agreement executed by the parties whereby Roger agreed to pay Myrna $350 per month alimony. In addition, the agreement contained a cost of living clause which provided for automatic increases in the amount of alimony. In November 1975 Myrna filed a petition to enforce the final judgment alleging that Roger had failed to pay the cost of living increases since November 1974 and had refused since July 1975 to make any alimony payments. Roger answered that he was in arrears; but had borrowed sufficient funds to pay the arrearage and petitioned, pursuant to Section 61.14, Florida Statutes (1975), for modification seeking to terminate the alimony payments on the ground of changed circumstances. After an evidentiary hearing, the chancellor entered an order ceasing all alimony payments as of June 23, 1976 based upon the finding of a material change in circumstances.
We find merit in only one point raised on appeal, to-wit: the chancellor erred in failing to retain jurisdiction to award alimony in the future as there exists the possibility of a change of circumstances on the part of either of the parties in the future to justify or require the award of alimony payments. See Dings v. Dings, 161 So. 2d 227, 229 (Fla.3d DCA 1964); Reed v. Reed, 244 So. 2d 449 (Fla.1st DCA 1971).
Considering the remaining points directed toward the termination of alimony, we find from the record that Roger’s income has decreased over the past few years; Myrna is self-supporting and earns in excess of $16,000 a year; since the divorce Myrna has obtained both a Master’s and Doctorate Degree; in addition to her home, Myrna owns a duplex; and the parties only son has attained the age of majority. Thus, we cannot say that the chancellor abused his discretion in entering the order ceasing alimony payments. See Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla.1976) and Cf. Anderson v. Anderson, 333 So. 2d 484 (Fla.3d DCA 1976).
Accordingly, we amend the order ceasing payment of alimony so as to expressly retain jurisdiction of this cause for the future award of alimony upon a proper showing of changed circumstances with respect to either party.
Order affirmed as amended.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Mirth K. Brown v. Brown, 440 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)…kelihood of a change in circumstances in the future that would warrant an award of alimony, the court should retain jurisdiction. Reed v. Reed, 244 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971); Roberts v. Roberts, 283 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973); Mumm v. Mumm, 353 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977); Hunt v. Hunt, 394 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). While the burden of persuasion as to retention of jurisdiction would be on the party seeking alimony in a dissolution proceeding, because of the res judicata effect of a final ju…
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Friedman v. Friedman, 366 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…the alimony, it was shown that the financial condition of the wife had improved substantially and that she had become self-supporting, we hold it was an abuse of discretion for the court to deny the husband’s petition for modification. Mumm v. Mumm, 353 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Goldin v. Goldin, 346 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Anderson v. Anderson, 333 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 303 So. 2d 629 (Fla.1974); Craig v. Craig, 298 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Thigpen v. Thigpen,…
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Barko v. Barko, 557 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990)…mstances demonstrate that a change in circumstances in the future is likely that will affect either the need for, or ability to pay alimony, the court should retain jurisdiction. Brown; Hunt v. Hunt, 394 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Mumm v. Mumm, 353 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Roberts v. Roberts, 283 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973); Reed v. Reed, 244 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971). In this ease it was uncontroverted that the former husband will be eligible for social security benefits in the near futu…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976)
- Dings v. Gwladys H. Dings, 161 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)
- Modesto Bisono v. State, 333 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Anderson v. Anderson, 333 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
- Thomas v. State, 244 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)
- Reed v. Reed, 244 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971)