JAMES R. THOMPSON, AS JUDGE OF THE COUNTY COURT OF LEE COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE EX REL. GEORGE MITCHELL, APPELLEE
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The court holds that a defendant's express and unconditional waiver of speedy trial rights in a stipulation for continuance is valid under Florida criminal procedure rules, requiring trial only within a reasonable time thereafter rather than the strict speedy trial timeline. The court reverses the grant of a writ of prohibition that would have discharged the defendant.
The court holds that a specific and unconditional waiver of speedy trial rights in a stipulation for continuance is valid. When such a waiver is made, the defendant need only be tried within a reasonable time rather than within the strict time limitations of the speedy trial rule, though the defendant retains his constitutional speedy trial right and may demand trial within 60 days after completing trial preparation.
[1] An express and unconditional waiver of speedy trial rights in a stipulation for continuance constitutes a waiver of speedy trial rights under Fla.R.Crim.P. …
[2] When a defendant's request for a continuance results in a waiver of speedy trial rule time limitations, the accused must be tried within a reasonable time.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When the time limitations set forth in the speedy trial rule (now Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191) are waived by a defendant's request for a continuance, the accused need only be tried within a reasonable time.”
Establishes the central holding that a valid waiver of speedy trial limits the requirement to reasonable time rather than strict statutory deadlines.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant stipulated to two continuances of his trial, both containing explicit waivers of speedy trial rights, with trial initially set for June …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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OTT, Judge.
In this appeal from the granting of a suggestion for writ of prohibition we are asked to decide whether relator’s express and unconditional waiver of his speedy trial rights in a stipulation for continuance constituted a waiver of his speedy trial rights under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191. We hold that it does and reverse.
Defendant/relator twice stipulated to a continuance of his trial,1 trial being set for June 18, 1976 by the second stipulation. Both stipulations contained the statement: “The Defendant herein waives speedy trial.” Thereafter, relator’s trial was continued twice more through no fault of rela-tors — one continuance was at the request of the state; the other was on the court’s own motion due to an overcrowded docket — with trial ultimately reset for October 29, 1976. On September 23, 1976, relator filed a motion for discharge. Upon denial of this motion, relator applied to the circuit court for a writ of prohibition, which was granted.
Relator contends that Negron v. State, 306 So. 2d 104 (Fla.1974), requires affirmance of this case. However, the defendant in Negron had not specifically waived her speedy trial rights under the rule. Coppola v. State, 337 So. 2d 779 (Fla.1976).
Here a specific and unconditional waiver of speedy trial was made in writing. We think this case falls within the rationale of State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla.1971). That case held that when the time limitations set forth in the speedy trial rule (now Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191) are waived by a defendant’s request for a continuance, the accused need only be tried within a reasonable time. The accused always, of course, retains his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Furthermore, an accused may at any time following completion of his preparation for trial file a demand for speedy trial pursuant to Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.191(a)(2). He must then be brought to trial within 60 days.
This opinion is limited to situations where the accused has filed a specific and unconditional waiver of his right to speedy trial. We do not now pass on the situation where the accused files a motion for continuance without a specific waiver of his speedy trial rights.
In accordance with this opinion, the writ of prohibition is vacated and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views expressed herein.
GRIMES, Acting C. J., and SCHEB, J., concur. . He was charged with a misdemeanor and therefore fell under the jurisdiction of the county court.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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State v. Beckett, 357 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978)…ial rule in that the seven-day delay plus the ten-day extension moved the 180th day from January 11 to January 28. . This situation is distinguishable from that where a specific and unconditional waiver is made in writing. See Thompson v. Mitchell, 353 So. 2d 664 (Fla.2d DCA 1978).…
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COX v. State, 389 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980)…nd the case was heard within 180 days from this date. . Even if a defendant waives his right to speedy trial pursuant to Rule 3.191, or if the rule is not applicable, he still retains his constitutional right to speedy trial. See Thompson v. State, 353 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). And a delay in the prosecution of an offense which does not violate the speedy trial rule may nevertheless violate a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial. Suggs v. State, 358 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). In Suggs,…
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Rodriguez v. State, 376 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. State v. Felton, 348 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Gereca v. State, 336 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); State ex rel. Ranalli v. Johnson, 277 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1973); Thompson v. State ex rel. Mitchell, 353 So. 2d 664, 665 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(c), (d), (f)(i), (iii).…
Authorities Cited
- State of Fla. ex rel. Isaac Don Butler & Gerald Nickles v. Honorable Ralph O. Cullen, 253 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1971)
- Ozzie Joseph Negron and Teresa Negron v. State, 306 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1974)
- Coppola v. State, 337 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1976)