LEE RAYMOND OGLETREE, APPELLANT,
v.
SENTRY INDEMNITY COMPANY AND WILLIE DAVIS, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
An automobile collision case where a driver stopping at a STOP sign was struck broadside by another vehicle exiting a gas station. The trial court refused Ogletree's requested jury instruction on the general right-of-way statute while instructing on the STOP sign statute and negligence, and the jury found for the other driver. The appellate court affirmed, finding the requested instruction would have been confusing and inadequate under the facts.
The trial court did not err in refusing the requested jury instruction on Section 316.121(1) because such an instruction would have been inadequate and misleading when applied to these facts, particularly given that the trial court properly instructed the jury on Section 316.123 (STOP sign duties) and negligence.
[1] A jury instruction on a statute governing the duty of a driver approaching an intersection to yield the right of way to a vehicle that has entered the intersection from a…
[2] A trial court may refuse to give a jury instruction on a statute if that statute is inadequate or misleading when applied to the specific facts of the case.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“it was improper for a court in a similar situation to charge solely on the statute requested here by Appellant because it was 'inadequate and misleading' when applied to the facts of the case”
Establishes the precedential basis for refusing Ogletree's requested jury instruction
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOgletree stopped at a STOP sign and began crossing an intersection when he was hit broadside by Davis, who had pulled out from a gas station more than…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Right Of Way cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant/plaintiff Ogletree and Appel-lee Davis were involved in an automobile collision which occurred when Appellant, after stopping at a STOP sign and “easing on across” an intersection, was hit broadside by Appellee, who had pulled out on the highway from a gas station more than 100 feet from the intersection. At the ensuing trial, the jury found in favor of Appellee, allowing Appellant no recovery. The trial judge refused to give an instruction requested by Appellant on Section 316.121(1), Fla.Stat., which sets out the duty of a driver approaching an intersection to yield the right of way to a vehicle which has entered the intersection from a different highway. He did instruct on Section 316.123, which prescribes the duty to stop at STOP signs and yield the right of way to vehicles on the protected road. He also gave Standard Jury Instruction 4.1, defining negligence as the failure to use reasonable care.
We find no error in the failure to instruct on Section 316.121(1). This Court held in Allen v. Rucks, 121 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960), that it was improper for a court in a similar situation to charge solely on the statute requested here by Appellant because it was “inadequate and misleading” when applied to the facts of the case. We conceive that the same is true here. It would be extremely perplexing, and we think improper, to instruct a jury that the driver of a vehicle at a STOP sign must stop and yield the way to oncoming vehicles but that a driver of a vehicle on the street not controlled by the STOP sign must yield the right of way to the vehicle if it enters the intersection first.
We find Appellant’s other point to be without merit.
AFFIRMED. McCORD, C. J., and MELVIN, J., concur. BOYER, J., dissents.
BOYER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my view Allen v. Rucks, cited in the majority opinion, has no application to the facts sub judice. Here, the evidence revealed, as recited in the majority opinion, that Ogletree stopped at the stop sign and was then “easing on across” when he was hit broadside by Davis, who had entered the intersecting street from a gas station a short distance from the intersection. A driver who has legally entered a controlled intersection does not thereby become fair game for anyone who can hit him before he can get through the intersection. The jury should have been instructed, in my view, that one legally entering a controlled intersection, viz.: After obeying the traffic control and determining that there was no other vehicle in the intersection nor so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard, has thereupon preempted the intersection and accordingly has the right of way over other vehicles entering the intersection. I would reverse.