GEORGINA BOLICK, APPELLANT,
v.
EUGENE LEWIS SPERRY AND RONALD W. YUREWITZ, APPELLEES
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Georgina Bolick, a guest passenger, sued for personal injuries from a motor vehicle accident, alleging gross negligence. The jury returned a verdict for $2,500 in her favor, but the trial court set aside the verdict and entered judgment for defendants. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a plea of guilty to reckless driving under the criminal statute is insufficient to establish gross negligence under the guest statute.
A plea of guilty to reckless driving under the criminal statute is insufficient to establish gross negligence under the guest statute. Speed alone is not sufficient evidence of gross negligence to support a verdict for damages under the guest statute, and the trial court properly set aside the verdict where the plaintiff failed to bring up evidence of the trial proceedings.
“This court has repeatedly held that speed alone is not sufficient evidence of gross negligence to support a verdict for damages under the guest statute.”
Establishes the core legal principle that speed alone cannot establish gross negligence under the guest statute, even when accompanied by a guilty plea to reckless driving.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBolick was a guest passenger in an automobile owned and operated by the defendants. She sued for personal injuries, alleging gross negligence. At tria…
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TERRELL, Justice.
Georgina Bolick, a guest passenger sued appellees as defendants in the Circuit Court of Broward County for personal injuries, charging gross negligence. The automobile involved was owned by one of the defendants and driven <by the other. In their answer defendants denied gross negligence. Trial before a jury resulted in a verdict for $2,500 in favor of the plaintiff against both defendants. A motion to set aside the verdict and enter final judgment in favor of defendants was granted. This appeal is from that judgment.
The point for determination is whether or not the trial court committed error in setting aside the verdict and in ordering final judgment for defendants.
Appellant elected to omit bringing-up any of the evidence taken at the trial. Her sole reliance for reversal is an information for reckless driving based upon section 317.21, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., to which a plea of guilty was entered by defendant, Ronald W. Yurewitz. In this state of the record it is settled law that this court having no access to the evidence taken at the trial cannot rule on its sufficiency or insufficiency. Melrose Mfg. Co. v. Kennedy, 59 Fla. 312, 51 So. 595; Florida East Coast R. Co. v. Buckles, 85 Fla. 416, 96 So. 397.
Having disposed of this point, we revert to the question of whether or not a plea of guilty to a charge of reckless driving was sufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiff in an action under the guest statute.
Appellant contends that the terms of section 317.21, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., having to do with reckless driving to which a plea of guilty was entered by one defendant are so similar to the terms of section 320.59, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., upon which the guest action was based that it is equivalent to admission that defendants were guilty of the charge under the latter statute, section 320.59, and being so, it was useless to bring up the evidence. There is no merit to this contention Section 317.21 has to do with reckless driving and defines what speeds shall he lawful but declares that any speed m excess oí the limits so defined shall be prima facie evidence of reckless driving. The information to which the plea of guilty was entered charged that defendants did then and there operate their motor vehicle at a rate oí speed in excess of SO miles per hour at night.
This court has repeatedly held that speed alone is not sufficient evidence of gross negligence to support a verdict for damages under the guest statute. Section 320.59, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.; O’Reilly v. Sattler, 141 Fla. 770, 193 So. 817; Koger v. Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779, 198 So. 685, 131 A.L.R. 886; Crane v. Loftin, Fla., 70 So. 2d 574; Ling v. Edenfield, 5 Cir., 211 F. 2d 705. See also Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378, 25 So. 2d 870, 878, where we held that “violation of the speed limit fixed by the statute does not of itself constitute wilful and wanton misconduct or gross negligence within the meaning of our guest statute.” Whether this is such a case we could not tell without the evidence.
Sections 317.21 and 320.59 are so different in purpose and the evidence required to make out a case under them is such that conviction under the criminal statute would hardly be said to be sufficient to support a judgment for personal injuries under the guest statute. This is even more obvious from reading the cases cited herein.
Other questions have been considered but they bear no theory under which the judgment appealed from should be reversed so it must be, and is hereby, affirmed.
Affirmed.
DREW, C. J., THORNAL, J., and CARROLL, Associate Justice, concur. -
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Sherwin James Miller v. State, 636 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…or property.” W.E.B. v. State, 553 So. 2d 323, 326 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). See also Fla.Std.Jury Instr. (Misd.) (reckless driving). It appears that excessive speed alone is insufficient to constitute evidence of reckless driving. See Bolick v. Sperry, 88 So. 2d 495, 497 (Fla.1956); Preston v. State, 56 So. 2d 543, 544 (Fla.1952); State v. Knight, 622 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). In this case, Sergeant Griffin testified that based upon his experience, he estimated appellant’s speed at fifty to fifty-five mi…
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Brown v. Householder, 134 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961)…evidence, it must be assumed from an order granting a motion for a directed verdict that there was insufficient evidence to take the case to the jury. Gulf Coast Title Co. v. Walters, Fla.1937, 126 Fla. 739, 171 So. 763. Bolick v. Sperry, Fla.1956, 88 So. 2d 495, cited by appellee, presents facts closely analogous to the instant case. After a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff in a case under the Guest Statute, the trial court granted a motion to set aside the verdict and enter judgment for defendants. On a…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378 (Fla. 1946)
- Koger v. Hollahan, 144 Fla. 779 (Fla. 1940)
- Crane v. Loftin, 70 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1954)
- O'Reilly v. Sattler, 141 Fla. 770 (Fla. 1940)
- Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Buckles, 85 Fla. 416 (Fla. 1923)
- Bolick v. Sperry, 82 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 1955)
- Melrose Mfg. Co. v. Kennedy, 59 Fla. 312 (Fla. 1910)
- Ling v. Edenfield, 211 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1954)