ALEX LAMAZARES, APPELLANT,
v.
FELIX ADOLFO VALDEZ AND INTEGON INSURANCE COMPANY, A CORPORATION LICENSED TO DO BUSINESS IN THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEES
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In this automobile collision case, the trial court erred by admitting psychological and psychiatric testimony opining that the defendant was untruthful and prone to misjudgment in driving, invading the jury's province to assess credibility and causation. The appellate court reversed, holding that such character and competency evidence is inadmissible regardless of advances in psychological science.
Expert testimony opining that a defendant is untruthful or prone to misjudgment in driving ability is inadmissible because it invades the jury's exclusive province to assess credibility and determine causation. The trial court committed reversible error in admitting such evidence despite advances in psychological science.
[1] A trial court commits reversible error by admitting expert testimony that a party is untruthful or prone to making mistakes in their driving ability.
[2] Expert testimony regarding a party's truthfulness or propensity for error in driving invades the province of the jury or trier of fact.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The admission of evidence of the nature set forth above is a clear invasion of the province of the jury or the court when sitting as a trier of fact.”
Establishes the core holding that psychological opinions on truthfulness and driving competency invade the jury's exclusive role
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn automobile collision occurred between the plaintiff Lamazares and defendant Valdez. At trial, the defendant presented expert testimony from a psych…
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DREW, E. HARRIS (Ret.), Associate Judge.
In the trial of this automobile collision case the trial judge, over appropriate and timely objections of the plaintiff, allowed defendant to introduce evidence of a psychologist and a psychiatrist that the defendant was untruthful and that he was liable to make a mistake or misjudgment in his driving ability to re-act to accident circumstances. In doing so, the trial court committed reversible error. Defendant below, the appellee here, defends the action of the trial judge, asserting in his brief:
“It is submitted that the science of psychology has advanced far enough to allow its use in litigation when the trial court determines in its broad discretion that such testimony is competent and relevant. See, Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Hill, 250 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971); United States v. Hiss, 88 F.Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y.1950), cert. den. 340 U.S. 948 [71 S.Ct. 532, 95 L.Ed. 683] (1951); Ingalls v. Ingalls [257 Ala. 521], 59 So. 2d 898 (Ala.1952); State v. Burno [200 N.C. 267], 156 S.E. 781 (N.C.1931); Ellarson v. Ellarson [198 App.Div. 103], 190 N.Y.S. 6 (App.Div.1921); People v. Cowles [246 Mich. 429], 224 N.W. 387 (Mich.1929); Taborsky v. State [142 Conn. 619], 116 A. 2d 433 (Conn.1955); State v. Armstrong [232 N.C. 727], 62 S.E. 2d 50 (N.C.1950); Koehler v. Kline [290 Minn. 485], 185 N.W. 2d 539 (Minn.1971).”
Appellee cites two Florida cases which he says supports his position, viz. Reese v. Naylor, 222 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969) and Seaboard Coast Line v. Hill, 250 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971). In the Reese case, the holding was that a qualified clinical psychologist was competent to testify as to his diagnosis of a person’s mental condition. And, in the Seaboard case, the holding was that the psychologist there was qualified to testify that an average driver would not have seen a train under the facts there related in time to avoid a collision. It should be noted however, that in that case the expert had been qualified in the understanding of human reactions in environments of darkness, fog, sound deficiency, etc. at the time of a particular accident. We find nothing in these cases which can give comfort or support to appellees’ argument. Nor are we yet ready to accept the conclusion reached in the scholarly articles cited by appellee.
The admission of evidence of the nature set forth above is a clear invasion of the province of the jury or the court when sitting as a trier of fact. To allow such evidence would open a new area of speculation in the search for the truth, complicate the issues now and historically entrusted to the triers of fact, and add great costs to litigation which is already approaching prohibitive figures.
The other assignments have been examined by us and are found to be without merit.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
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Reyes v. State, 580 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)…d was “a truthful child.” This testimony was clearly an impermissible intrusion into the role of the jury whose primary function it was to determine just that question of the victim’s credibility. Holliday, 389 So. 2d at 680-81; Lamazares v. Valdez, 353 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); see Francis v. State, 512 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), pet. for review dismissed, 507 So. 2d 588 (Fla.1987). As such, its reception into evidence constitutes another, indepen…
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Francis v. State, 512 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987)…o vouch for the credibility of another witness. Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), petition for cert. dismissed, 507 So. 2d 588 (Fla.1987); see also, Holliday v. State, 389 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); Lamazares [*283] v. Valdez, 353 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Reversed and remanded. SCHEB, A.C.J., and THREADGILL, J., concur.…
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Schneer v. Allstate Indem. Co., 767 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)…products liability case to testify that product was defective); Libby [*489] v. State, 540 So. 2d 171, 172 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (no error in excluding psychiatrist’s opinion “as to whether the defendant committed the lewd acts.”); Lamazares v. Valdez, 353 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (expert may not testify that the defendant was untruthful and liable to make a mistake or misjudgment in his driving ability). As previously stated, the initial issue before the jury in this case was whether the Schneers perpetra…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Viehbeck v. Hausheer, 250 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)
- Hiss v. United States, 340 U.S. 948 (U.S. 1951)
- Moffett v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., Inc., 340 U.S. 948 (U.S. 1951)
- Moore v. State, 222 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969)
- Reese v. Naylor, 222 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969)